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ABSTRACT 
 
Visions of Alterity: The Impact of Cross-Cultural Contacts on European Self-
Understanding in the Pre-Enlightenment Period. (December 2008) 
Hassan Bashir, B.A., University of the Punjab; M.Sc., Quaid-e-Azam University 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Cary J. Nederman 
 
Comparative Political Theory (CPT) focuses on political ideas of non-western 
thinkers and compares these to their western counterparts. In recent years, works of CPT 
have demonstrated that a comparative perspective allows us to see the many parallels in 
the theoretical projects of western and non-western thinkers. This approach towards 
political theorizing opens up previously unexplored avenues to gain a better 
understanding of the political. CPT has also strongly challenged traditional western 
political theorists, and political scientists alike, to reconsider the validity of several 
existing theories about the political. This is a result of CPT’s awareness of the bias 
introduced by western dominance in a globalized world. Works of CPT attempt to 
neutralize this power imbalance between the west and the rest by attempting to revitalize 
the non-west in terms of its self-understanding.  
 This dissertation argues that a comparative perspective must be adopted in 
political theory, because, while it helps us to interpret non-western ideas it also allows us 
to understand how the west has come to its present self-understanding. Hence, unlike 
previous comparative works which argue for CPT as a separate subfield of political 
 iv 
theory in the west, this dissertation brings the CPT enterprise to the center of the 
vocational landscape of the western political theory. The dissertation supports this claim 
by presenting an in-depth analysis of four cases of east-west encounters in the pre-
Enlightenment period. The analysis is based on several primary and secondary sources 
from the western and non-western civilizations which span a period of over four 
centuries.  
The significance of the dissertation is distributed along four dimensions. First, it 
presents a comprehensive review and critique of scholarship done by comparative 
theorists till now. Second, it highlights additional points of significance attached to the 
integral role of the non-west in the construction of the west itself. Third, it extends the 
range of comparative analyses to the pre and early modern periods. Fourth, it considers 
actual cases of east-west encounters as against CPT’s exclusive focus on constructing 
imaginary inter-civilizational dialogues.  
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In recent years the subfield of comparative political theory (CPT) has rapidly 
gained acceptance by and admiration from political theorists in the west. As a result, 
many western universities are now introducing courses in non-western political thought 
in their curriculum, as well as non-western theorists into topical courses in political 
theory.1 A major reason for rapid growth of this new subfield is the thought provoking 
work and advocacy for comparative theorizing, by prominent western theorists such as 
Fred Dallmayr, Anthony Parel and Roxanne Euben.2 Armed with the notion that political 
theory is about “human and not merely western dilemmas,” these theorists have 
inaugurated this new sub-field by analyzing political ideas of influential non-western 
thinkers in the modern period and comparing them with western political theorists.3 
Main thrust of their arguments has been to show that ideas of non-westerners are in fact 
attempts to utilize their own cultural predispositions to engage with and respond to 
modernity and western global dominance. From this vantage point, the comparativists 
argue that apparently radically different non-western systems of thought can be treated 
as variants of critiques of western modernity and rationality. Westerners often recognize 
                                                 
This dissertation follows the style of The Journal of Politics. 
1
 See Rosow (2004) p. 255 
2
 See Dallmayr (1989, 1996, 1998, 1999, 2001 2002, 2004), Euben (1999, 2002) and Parel (1992, 1997, 
2000, 2003 and 2005) 
3
 Parel (2003) p.12 and Euben (1999) p. 9 
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and participate in such critiques when these originate in a more familiar geographic and 
linguistic setting.4 
On the face of it, then, one clear advantage of including non-western ideas in the 
theoretical discourse of the west is to bring greater rigor to the practice of political 
theory in general. However, this argument is not consciously advanced by leading 
comparative theorists. Their preference and advocacy for comparative theorizing focuses 
on making the claim that there is an urgent need to bridge the gap between the supposed 
irrational Other and the enlightened and intelligible western Self. Political theory, 
according to comparative theorists, must respond to the new global order which is 
characterized by deepening interdependence, increased cultural interaction, and the 
resultant global diversity. However, this response must not be an attempt to domesticate 
the Other and provide an even more universalistic, Eurocentric explanation of dilemmas, 
which CPT forcefully claims are human and not just western. The fear of domestication 
of the Other is not unfounded; comparative theorists agree with Edward Said’s 
Orientalist thesis that there is a close connection between exteriority and power which 
lies at the core of western rationality.5 This insight into the nature of western rationalist 
discourse makes it problematic for these theorists to use popular methods of comparison 
prevalent in western social science. To an extent the same also justifies the need for CPT 
to be recognized as an independent discipline which focuses not on objectivity but on 
revitalizing the Other in terms of its self-understanding. To achieve this aim, 
comparative theorists, by and large, use the Gadamerian hermeneutic/ dialogic method to 
                                                 
4
 Euben, Ibid. pp.11-12 
5
 Said (1978) and Ibid. p. 23 
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bring the west and non-west together in their work. This method, they believe, is less 
susceptible to the distortions of power than the social scientific models which feed on 
the rationalist discourse.6  
The above assertion by comparative theorists forms a partial basis for this 
dissertation. I argue for an expansion of the context, which can be done by inclusion of 
actual historical and socio-political interactions between the west and other peoples 
before the European Enlightenment. In this period, the interaction between the west and 
non-west was not necessarily characterized by unequal power, and though there was no 
globalization as in the modern period, there nevertheless was real and continuous contact 
between the two sides. This contact was sparked by several factors, which include, but 
are not limited to, the search for allies against common enemies, desire for new markets 
and trading partners, the quest to satisfy curiosity and explore new lands and the goal to 
spread one’s religious ideas. All of these factors hint at, or imply, a superior view of the 
tradition to which the visitors belong, hence, presenting a scenario in which contacts 
with other cultures serve as a means to test and hone the superiority of one’s tradition. In 
fact, cross-cultural contacts in the pre-Enlightenment period are particularly useful, from 
the point of view of the debate between CPT and traditional political theory, because of 
the lack of knowledge and erroneous or stereotypical views of the Other and the Self 
held by parties on both sides of the contact equation. In the late modern period the 
situation is very different. Now the west, due to its technological and scientific 
advancement, has overtime erased contributions of the Other in historical considerations 
                                                 
6
 Euben, ibid. pp. 22-3  
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of the development of western self-understanding which has resulted in producing a 
superior view of the west in comparison to other cultures. In a very powerful sense, then, 
CPT’s insistence on including the non-west in the theoretical discourse of the west in 
order to make the claims of traditional political theory more inclusive, reminds us of the 
spirit of cross-cultural contacts in the pre-colonial and pre-modern times.  
If one understands CPT as an attempt to dispel an implied western vision of 
history – in which the history has already reached its pinnacle in the garb of modernity 
and is firmly situated in the west – it becomes necessary for comparative theorists to 
develop methodological techniques that are powerful enough to transcend west’s 
dominant understanding of itself as the end of all human history. The justifications given 
by comparative theorists for preferring the hermeneutic/ dialogic model also reveal a 
keen understanding of this complex task. According to them, CPT’s mission is to gain a 
more inclusive understanding of the political, but this understanding must be 
accomplished after bypassing the distortions of power at work in the current relationship 
of west with other cultures.7 Despite such awareness, comparative theorists do not cast 
any serious doubt on claims made by traditional political theory regarding the west’s 
achievements, or for that matter, the implications of these claims as regards the 
reliability of knowledge generated by political theory in general. Hence, some forcefully 
argue that the western canon must be accepted in its current form because it serves the 
important purpose of demarcation of boundaries between the east and the west. CPT’s 
                                                 
7
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 5 
task in this formulation is to make strategic border crossings and produce hybrid 
understandings of the political.8  
The above observation, when tied to CPT’s focus on interactions between west 
and its Others in the modern period, and the justification for CPT’s inevitability in 
context of globalization, raises several interesting questions. The primary among these, 
which for me runs to the heart of CPT’s dilemma, arises from the very notion of 
introducing non-western ideas in order to achieve a broader understanding of the 
political, while keeping intact the claims of traditional political theory. How can non-
western ideas be introduced as anything but silent partners in a discourse in which the 
west has an inescapable priority? On the other hand, if one treats non-westerners as 
coequal or as rival traditions, it trivializes the justification to have CPT as an 
independent subfield of political theory. This is to say, in a modern and globalized world 
where intercultural contacts are inevitable and the west is dominant, any discovery 
which shows that the non-west is responding to the claims made by its counterpart 
(whether to refute or uphold them) is like an empty suit. What real options does the non-
west have here, except responding to the western understanding that the political is 
essentially western? In whichever manner the non-west engages with the west, in the late 
modern period, it basically ends up contributing to some side of a debate whose rules are 
defined and monopolized by the west. 
In fact, I argue that what CPT treats as non-western is in fact already western by 
means of constant exposure to western civilization through direct contact; examples 
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include Gandhi and Syed Qutb, both of whom received considerable professional 
training in western countries. Similarly, to argue for Latin American political thought, as 
distinct from traditional western political theory, is also problematic. U.S. influence on 
Latin America and, before that, the influence and presence of western European colonial 
powers on the continent makes one doubt the real possibility of a uniquely preserved 
Latin American political theory, whose story now needs to be told by political theorists.  
What, then, are the contributions of CPT to our understanding of the nature of the 
political as regards its humanness rather than its westernness? Some, such as Dallmayr, 
argue that it reveals central core themes that are common to all humans regardless of 
their geographical location.  While this is indeed a useful observation, it nevertheless 
lacks rigorous testing because comparative theorists, by and large, limit themselves to 
the modern period in which alternative traditions are almost always already responding 
to western themes. The centrality of core themes can equally be a function of western 
global dominance in this period of human history, as much as it can be an effect of our 
being human. After all, “being human” also entails our being observant of our 
surroundings and responding to challenges or opportunities that they pose. 
In the modern period, the erosion of indigenous cultures by the west is a norm. 
Attempts to argue that there are purely non-western understandings of the political will 
always remain suspect. This, however, does not mean that CPT’s claim to include the 
non-west in the mainstream of western theoretical discourse is incorrect and that there 
are no alternate conceptions of the political. Rather, in order to comprehend these 
alternate conceptions, there is an immediate need to broaden the scope of CPT by 
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expanding its context to other periods of human history. This will not only provide a 
rigorous testing ground for some of the claims already made by CPT, but it will also 
further improve our understanding of the premise and motivation of non-western 
doctrines, i.e., even those which have already been analyzed by comparative theorists. 
An expansion of context also provides an opportunity to open CPT to other approaches 
of traditional political theory, such as techniques used by political theorists who have a 
historical bent, or those who approach the political from the perspective of the history of 
ideas. Finally, in terms of usefulness of CPT in furthering larger objectives of political 
theory as a western academic discipline, an extension of context may also considerably 
enhance political theory’s general standing within the overall framework of modern 
political science. It can do so by raising the bar for empirical political scientists through 
bringing in new evidence to challenge or improve the assumptions and range of 
observations that go into the collection of data and the making of datasets. In the above 
context, then, this dissertation supports the argument for adopting a comparative 
approach to political theorizing. However, unlike comparative works done till now, the 
focus of this dissertation is on four cases of actual east-west contacts in the pre-
Enlightenment period ranging from the thirteenth to the late sixteenth centuries. 
The first case, discussed in the third chapter, looks at William of Rubruck’s 
journey to the Mongols in mid-thirteenth century. Rubruck’s was the first eye witness 
account of the Mongols to reach the west. In order to contextualize William of 
Rubruck’s significance the chapter begins with a brief discussion of west’s perception of 
the Mongols, at the time. After this it looks at recent evaluations of William’s account by 
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prominent western scholars.9 The chapter then does a textual analysis of William’s 
actual account from the perspective of this dissertation.10 The chapter looks at William’s 
description of the Mongols and their land from multiple vantage points. In particular, it 
assesses how William thinks about himself and his actual task, the manner in which he 
describes all things that are new or unusual and then how he relates these to his pre-
existing experience and knowledge. In short, William’s account is treated as a western 
lens on the Mongols and I try to decipher the implicit and explicit themes in his choice 
of words and in the ways in which he relates to the Mongol peculiarities he encounters. 
As I argue in the chapter, William’s account is a unique source for comprehending the 
impact of the Other on the creation, or at least realization, of the Self. This uniqueness 
stems from the matter-of-fact manner in which William records his experiences. His 
objective, at least in his own mind, is fairly simple and the hardships of his long and 
uncomfortable journey are justified only by the fact that he is on a holy mission. This 
single-mindedness on William’s part is a blessing in disguise because he seems least 
concerned about mesmerizing a potential audience at home with tales of wonders of the 
east. William admits that he is not a scholar and his account is exactly that, non-
scholarly and unembellished by fancy words or concepts. As Campbell rightly suggests, 
his focus is on making contact with concrete persons whom he maybe able to convert as 
against describing a people.11 Thus, William’s compulsion to rely on the vulgate makes 
his account distinctively representative of average Europeans of his time. Elements of 
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the Mongol culture which intrigue or offend William are the things that would have a 
similar impact on many Europeans of his time. In this situation the manner in which 
William becomes aware of and puts into effect the difference between him and his 
quarry, enables us to see the contribution of the Other in the construction of the western 
Self, in what we may call, the embryonic stages of western modernity. 
Next case, discussed in chapter IV, looks at the observations of the first Jesuit 
mission to the court of Indian Emperor Akbar the Great A.D. 1580-1583. Here I analyze 
several primary sources, which include the commentary by Father Monserrate who was a 
member of the Jesuit mission and accompanied Akbar on several of his campaigns 
during the three year period of their association. In addition I also look at the letters 
which the visiting missionaries exchanged with their peers Europe during their stay at 
Akbar’s court. I also look at Indian perceptions of the Self and Other as recorded in 
native sources of Indian history. As the chapter describes, Akbar’s place in history, as 
the most influential and successful Mughal ruler, is normally attributed to his 
phenomenal success in dissolving differences between two major segments of India’s 
population, the Hindus and the Muslims. However, Akbar’s politics was not limited to 
these two religious groups only; he was keenly interested in all faiths and had 
constructed a house of worship adjacent to his court with the sole purpose of fostering 
religious debate among representatives of various faiths that included Muslims, Hindus, 
Jains, Parsees and Christians. The Jesuit missionaries were invited personally by Akbar 
with an expressed desire to learn more about the Christian faith. Given this background, 
Monserrate’s commentary is exceptionally well suited for the purposes of this 
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dissertation. In a sense Monserrate’s and Rubruck’s purposes were the same, i.e., 
conversion of an eastern king to Christianity. The confidence to embark on such a quest, 
in the first place, was the result of the European perception of Muslims as an enemy. 
Hence missions to the Mongols, who had emerged as the latest threat to Europe through 
their conquests of European lands, were also seen as a new opportunity to build alliances 
against a common enemy. The facts that the Mongols had a unique understanding of 
their own role in history - one which informed them that they were destined to rule the 
world- and that they could not see any other purpose of a visit form a European envoy 
except to confirm submission of their rulers to the Mongol king; did not even occur to 
the Europeans. Similarly, in Akbar’s case it is evident, from several perplexed remarks 
by Monserrate in his commentary regarding the Emperor’s true religious bent, that the 
Jesuits retained hope of converting the Emperor on the basis of the evidence that he did 
not conform to the stereotypical image of a Muslim ruler in the European mind. Hence, 
Akbar’s willingness to hear severe criticism of Islam provided false hope to the Jesuits 
that he might actually convert to Christianity. That Akbar eventually came up with his 
own religion, which he called Din-e-Ilahi (Faith of the Divine), and that in founding this 
religion he attempted to bring together elements from not just Christianity and Islam but 
even non-Abrahamic religions, reveals that in his mind religion was subservient to 
political gain. As the ruler of India, which had a diverse and multi-confessional 
population, his main interest was in resolving the issues that created friction among his 
subjects and thus prolong peace and thereby his own rule. In the chapter I am not overly 
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concerned with the failure or success of Akbar’s endeavor but I discuss the main features 
of his political thought and discuss its implications for CPT.  
The third case, discussed in fifth chapter, considers the experience of Jesuit 
missionaries in late-Ming China. Here I examine the Journal of Matteo Ricci which 
covers the period from A.D. 1583 - 1610. Ricci was co-founder of the Jesuits’ China 
Mission and the main force behind its development. Europe’s knowledge of China, 
before Ricci’s Journal was published in Europe in A.D. 1614, was limited to Marco 
Polo’s account of the Far East, which preceded Ricci’s by almost three centuries. In a 
sense, therefore, Matteo Ricci was responsible for reintroducing China to Europe. The 
journals differ in content and style from Marco Polo’s description of Far East in several 
respects. First, unlike Polo, Ricci was a missionary with a definite mission of bringing 
Christianity to China. Second, Ricci’s journal covers a period of almost thirty years and 
includes not only his diary, but also his correspondence and other documents of which 
he was either the initiator or the recipient; it therefore, can also be seen as a history of 
Christianity in China. Ricci never expected his diary to be published, which makes it 
even more useful for the purposes of this dissertation, because things that Ricci chose to 
record reveal not only the character of Chinese society but also what in that society 
struck Ricci and his associates as most noteworthy. Third, and perhaps most important, 
is Ricci’s general approach towards dealing with the Chinese. He devised a detailed 
program of accommodation of Christianity to the Chinese culture. Given that China was 
almost completely closed to the Occident, Ricci’s approach also reveals elements of the 
Chinese culture which were deemed suitable for adoption by European visitors. In 
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particular, Ricci focused on winning a position for the missionaries at the Chinese 
imperial court and gain respect among the ruling scholar class, by establishing that he 
and his colleagues were scholar of Chinese literature, mathematics, astronomy and of 
course the Christian faith. The case of Jesuits in China therefore represents the event 
through which Europe was first introduced to Confucius and China to Euclid and 
Copernicus. The very fact that Europeans mingled with Chinese society on the natives’ 
terms in order to spread their faith is instructive of how commonality was achieved to 
introduce difference. In introducing this difference, the Jesuits constantly revealed how 
they understood themselves, and through the choices they made, they open a window on 
self-understanding of the western civilization. Furthermore, by shifting the focus to the 
recipients instead of the bearers of the message of Christianity, they ended up generating 
an intense debate at home about “purity of faith” which again reflects on maintenance 
and creation of difference as the key element of intra-civilizational and cross-cultural 
dialogue. Hence, in discussing the case of Jesuits in China my main aim is to explicate 
the inevitability of the production of difference from the Other as the key element of 
one’s self-understanding.  
The fourth and final case, discussed in the concluding chapter of this dissertation, 
is the discovery of the New World by Europeans. I take this case out of the 
chronological order primarily because of its unique characteristics but also because I 
want to use it in support of my concluding arguments in favor of a new approach for 
CPT in context of otherness and canonicity, which as I later explain, form an integral 
part of any approach based on philosophical hermeneutics.  I also juxtapose this case 
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against the other three cases discussed in earlier chapters. My specific focus in this 
instance is on Columbus’s initial impressions of the Amerindians and also on the 
writings of Bartolomé de Las Casas. The brutality of the Spaniards and the protest 
mounted by Las Casas reveal the flexible and immensely complex nature of how we 
understand ourselves. At the same time, it also confirms that in cross-cultural contact 
there are no predetermined outcomes. I attempt to demonstrate in the chapter that 
observation of the physical attributes and social practices of the inhabitants of the New 
World elicited novel reactions from the Spaniards. These reactions ranged from assertion 
of a sub-human status on the Indians, assigned in the light of past knowledge and 
experience of the west, on the one hand, to the emergence of a scholarly rift among the 
Spaniards regarding the rights of the Indians and the role, purpose and power of the 
Church in general. In all these reactions the westerners not only placed Indians, in what 
they thought was their rightful position on the scale of human and civilizational 
development, but they also questioned their own place on this so-called scale. Most 
important of these, and one that occupies the primary position in the works of Las Casas 
in my view, is the responsibilities of the powerful and supposedly rightly guided 
Christian west. The role that Las Casas assumed, after witnessing the events of Spanish 
conquest of the New World, can be seen as a hallmark of the western tradition, to 
consistently reflect on and bring to the mainstream, the voice of those who are on the 
margins. From the broader perspective of this dissertation, this tradition is a natural 
outcome of the necessity to constantly evaluate one’s actions and redefine oneself in 
context of the reality of cross-cultural-contact. This suggests that understandings 
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developed in the initial stages of cross-cultural contact, and the reactions they provoke, 
are never permanent. Stressing the self-determined task of CPT then, inclusion of the 
non-west into the theoretical discourse of the west is virtually inevitable. A look at the 
European experience in the New World, therefore, helps us in understanding this 
suggested inevitability.  Furthermore, this becomes even more important, as the 
discovery of the New World also represents a time in human history when the west had 
just begun its ascent to world domination; to find oneself face to face with the 
responsibility of defining and then criticizing the newfound definition of what it means 
to be human is one of the most potent sources of understanding the contribution of the 
Other in the making of Self. 
The choice of cases above in no way suggests that Europeans had a monopoly on 
cross-cultural encounters in the period of concern here. However, keeping the west on 
one side of the contact equation is justified in the context of the discussion of CPT in this 
introduction and in the second chapter. As argued there, in these cases power distortions 
are not the sole defining element in determining perceptions of the Other. No doubt, 
parties involved in these encounters approached each other with some preconceived 
notions, but these are not the same as in the late modern period, where the west’s global 
dominance is almost inescapable. In addition, because these are accounts of actual 
encounters by eye witnesses, one does not need to construct imaginary dialogues, which 
as this dissertation argues, tend to favor the west. The reality of physical contact also 
brings forth the dynamic nature of cross-cultural contact, which involves immense 
complexities and in which options for action are never predetermined. The responses 
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formulated as a result of observation or questions put forward by one side allow us to 
understand not only how the Other is constructed but also how the respondents view 
themselves. More importantly in these situations, the manner in which similarities are 
recorded becomes more telling than the preconceived differences with which the 
encounter actually began. It is posited here that difference is continuously created, so 
that distinction between one’s own culture and the Others’ is produced every time the 
contact is made. Finally, the room for creativity and surprise, which is made available by 
the place and nature of an encounter, can lead us to a more comprehensive understanding 
of the political in different cultural contexts.  
The above expands the task of CPT itself by requiring comparative theorists to 
investigate the possibility of an externally situated venue for the construction of Self 
when approaching the political in any context. In fact, a major dissatisfaction which the 
comparativists have with traditional political theory, i.e., monopolization of the political 
by the west, can itself be better understood by adopting this approach. This is to say, a 
deeply ingrained imperialist tendency is the defining element of modernity itself. 12 
Therefore, the course which traditional political theory, as a western academic discipline 
in modern times, has adopted is inevitable. This imperialist tendency leads to a kind of 
universalism regardless of where the political is conceived. Human dilemmas in the 
modern period are modern dilemmas and this understanding has equally reached all 
cultures, due to the speed with which ideas can travel in this age. When CPT argues that 
radically different non-western ideas are attempts to respond to western rationality and 
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modernity, it ignores the possibility that these could equally be an engagement with 
those in one’s own culture, who have already been positively influenced by western 
modernity. This suggests yet another production of the Other, i.e., an ‘internal Other’. 
The presence of internal others, i.e., those who question the universalism claimed by the 
dominant paradigm, has been a fact in all societies at all times.13  
However, reverting once again to the imperialist tendency of modernity, it is 
noteworthy that, by definition, imperialism survives through the exclusion, subjugation 
or marginalization of all that does not agree with its program. Hence, to understand the 
nature of modernity one has to look at what it excludes in order to maintain its 
universalism. Similarly if one insists that modernity is synonymous with the west, then 
one has to look at all that is non-western in order to understand the west itself. As a 
critique of CPT, an understanding of alternative visions of the political, even in the 
modern period, is desirable not only because these join the category of theories which 
criticize the logic of modern rationality. Instead, these should be brought into western 
discourse because, in the absence of a through analysis of challenges posed by these 
external critiques, any understanding of the western Self is basically incomplete.  
In the context above, the significance of this dissertation is distributed along four 
dimensions; first, it presents a comprehensive review and critique of scholarship done 
under the rubric of CPT; second, it provides a new dimension to the significance 
attached by comparative theorists to the inclusion of non-western theorists; third, it 
extends the range of comparative analyses to the pre modern and early modern period; 
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and finally, it considers a range of cases where actual encounters took place between 
representatives of the west and other cultures. These encounters highlight the fact that 
cross-cultural interaction is messy, dynamic and extremely complex, as well as 
recognizing that the creation of the Other is reflective of one’s self-understanding(s).  
This dissertation has six chapters. Chapter after the introduction is a 
comprehensive review of scholarship done under the rubric of CPT where I focus on the 
methodological preferences of comparative theorists, as well as, the cases that they have 
considered. While specific focus, in this chapter, is on the works of Fred Dallmayr, 
Roxanne Euben and Anthony Parel it also considers works of scholars who have inspired 
these political theorists to adopt the comparative perspective in political theory. The 
chapter also introduces previously unexplored ideas about political theorizing in the 
works of non-western thinkers and compares these to the methodological preferences of 
western theorists.  
The next three chapters are dedicated to cases of cross-cultural contact between 
Europeans and other peoples. Brief descriptions of these cases have been provided 
earlier in this introduction; however, a few things need to be stressed in terms of the 
general approach here. Each chapter begins with a brief introduction to the historical 
circumstances in which the contact was made. After this it analyzes primary sources 
relevant to each case and discusses how in each instance a unique understanding of the 
Self comes forth in the observations recorded about the Other by European eye- 
witnesses. Wherever possible, I also discuss the impact of these eyewitness accounts on 
western civilization, after these were published in the west. There can be many 
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dimensions in which this impact can be studied, however, in line with the scope and 
purpose of this dissertation; I will remain limited to exploring the ways in which claims 
made by Comparative theorists are affected by the cross-cultural contacts under 
consideration in this dissertation.  
In the final chapter I bring together findings of the past chapters and see how 
they transform the debate generated by CPT within traditional political theory. My main 
argument, as I have delineated earlier, is that an examination of European cross-cultural 
contacts in the pre-Enlightenment period provides us with additional, and perhaps 
stronger, reasons than those advanced as justification to do CPT by comparative theorists 
till now. Such an expansion of context, i.e., a consideration of periods other than late 
modernity, makes us realize that adopting the comparative approach is virtually 
unavoidable for political theorists anywhere, as it provides us with better understanding 
of not only ‘the political’ in different cultural contexts, but also, with a more inclusive 
understanding of how we have become what we are. Hence where CPT, up till now, has 
focused on the need to reach a more inclusive understanding of the political through 
considering non-western theorists; this dissertation advances that argument, by exploring 
the construction of the political in the west itself, as a function of non-western 
contributions in the development of western self-understanding. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
COMPARATIVE POLITICAL THEORY: 
SCOPE, PROGRESS AND PROMISE 
 
Comparative Political Theory (CPT) may be regarded as an invitation for western 
political theorists to treat ideas of non-westerners about the political as valid ideas rather 
than unintelligible oddities or isolated instances of unexpected brilliance originating 
from cultures that are otherwise deemed politically bankrupt. To a non-specialist reader 
such a description of CPT may sound a little too strong. Yet, for those who are part of 
the scholarly debates about political theory in western universities, this invitation is 
nothing short of sensational. In recent years, for instance, comparative theorizing has 
opened up the possibility of seeing ideas of a radical Islamic fundamentalist thinker like 
Syed Qutb of Egypt as conceptually parallel to Hannah Arendt’s critique of western 
rationalism.14 CPT makes such a reading of Qutb’s ideas possible by demanding that 
mechanistic Eurocentric models of interpretation be avoided when evaluating non-
western ideas. In a sense, therefore, CPT identifies inherent deficiencies of the academic 
environment which western political theorists have created and within which, in the 
absence of an alternative, they are bound to operate. This claim has profound 
implications and the potential to change the practice of political theory as an academic 
discipline in the west.  
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As a field CPT was formally inaugurated by Fred Dallmayr in 1999, so one can 
call him the founder of CPT, even though there are some earlier scholarship was 
undertaken with the same objective as Dallmayr’s.15 This chapter, which is a review of 
the scholarship accomplished under the rubric of CPT, begins by elaborating on the 
question: what is CPT? It then looks at the methodological preferences and arguments in 
favor of the usefulness of specific approaches to comparative theorizing. Third, it 
evaluates the choice of cases by comparative theorists from the point of view that these 
best substantiate CPT’s claim regarding the usefulness of including non-westerners to 
achieve a richer understanding of the political. Finally, the chapter discusses the 
arguments made by non-western thinkers in making sense of their tradition vis-à-vis the 
west, and analyzes implications of these for CPT. In sum, therefore, this chapter is both a 
critical review of work done under the rubric of CPT and a work of CPT itself. 
The first explicit statement in support of the need for CPT comes from Dallmayr 
who, in the introduction of his edited volume, proposed “to inaugurate or help launch a 
new field of academic inquiry as well as of general intellectual concerns: the field of 
comparative political theory or philosophy.”16 Dallmayr’s justification for advancing this 
proposal is based on two claims: first, reshaping of the world in the image of a global 
village, which has happened towards the end of the last century and is unprecedented in 
human history, second, the practice of contemporary western academia of limiting itself 
to the canons of western political thought while attempting to gain an insight into the 
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nature of the political that could be termed universal.17 Dallmayr’s major thesis, 
therefore, is that in a globalized world western theories are deficient when it comes to 
capturing the diversity of the human condition. Overcoming this deficiency is of utmost 
significance because of the rate at which the usefulness of seeing the world in terms of 
geographically insulated regions has been rendered invalid by the effects of 
globalization. For him, it is important to develop a new outlook which would better 
capture the dilemma of our times, that is, the “lag of human understanding behind the 
immensity of technological change.”18 Dallmayr acknowledges the existence of 
comparative politics, a well established sub discipline of western political science, but he 
is also critical of the manner in which explanatory models are developed and employed 
by comparative political scientists. He argues that these models derive heavily from key 
features of modern western politics and the stance assumed by these empirically-oriented 
comparativists is one of a global overseer armed with a universal yardstick against which 
all societies are measured.19 Hence, following in the footsteps of Empirical political 
science is not an option for Dallmayr, as it would only replicate the problems that have 
led him to propose the new discipline in the first place. To avoid these problems, the 
trajectory along which he launches CPT relegates the status of the west from a universal 
teacher to that of a fellow student in a cross-cultural learning experience.20 In this 
characterization, both of these students, Dallmayr believes, do their learning while 
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revolving around the normative status and acceptability of western modernity.21 Hence 
modernity, defined as a, “welter of ideas and practices deriving from European 
Enlightenment,”22 delineates the arena in which political theorists will act in order to 
reach a more inclusive understanding of the political through comparative theorizing. 
 In sum, therefore, Dallmayr’s call for comparative theorizing is an invitation to 
study non-western political ideas in a manner similar to their western counterparts. This 
further implies that we must cope with the complexities of their sources and 
interpretation in the manner normally practiced by western political theorists when 
analyzing works that constitute the canons of western political theory. In fact, how to 
study non-western texts is the primary reason for calling Dallmayr the founder of CPT. 
He is an ardent advocate of employing Hans Georg Gadamer’s hermeneutic approach 
towards non-western texts. According to Dallmayr’s interpretation, Gadamer’s 
philosophical hermeneutics provides a way to steer a course between “Eurocentrism” 
and “Euro-denial” and find a mid point where alone a dialogue between the east and the 
west can flourish.23 Dallmayr’s reliance on Gadamer, coupled with his insistence that a 
move towards comparative theorizing is inevitable in the late modern period, pushes him 
towards casting CPT as a dialogical exercise. A reinterpretation of Gadamer is not 
within the scope of this dissertation. However, a brief description of Dallmayr’s use of 
Gadamer in support of his argument for CPT is merited. According to Dallmayr,   
From Gadamer’s vantage, every dialogue – between readers and texts or 
between people across distances - has to start from the sedimented “pre-
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judgments” of participants, pre- judgments that are meant to function not 
as prison walls but rather as launching pads for excursions into unfamiliar 
terrain. Proceeding from this premise, his work develops a philosophical 
account of dialogue or a perspective that sees human encounters as 
necessarily dialogical.24 
 
Gadamer’s basic insight seems to be that all human statements are historically situated 
and that they simply cannot be understood unless we take into account the historical 
context which not only necessitate their production, but also shape their form, i.e., 
dialogue. In other words, as they are historically situated, human beings possess an inner 
frame of reference by default and all social encounters are automatically gauged against 
this existing framework of sedimented patterns and stereotypes. By implication, then, the 
key to true comprehension of the other lies in discrediting the literal or immediate 
meaning of her words (written or spoken) as well as actions, because what one says (or 
does) is merely a part of a wider context which forms the whole. As is obvious from 
such conceptualization of human affairs how one understands oneself is also a product of 
the same forces.  Furthermore, since reality or truth eludes mere observation, during any 
encounter we are constantly making sense of others’ actions by incorporating them into 
our own frame of reference. This incorporation is simultaneously accompanied by 
transporting oneself into the others’ way of creating sense and interpreting the world. 
The inevitable movement of the other and the self in turn adds to the pool of 
“sedimented pre-judgments” which, according to Dallmayr, are launching pads in the 
Gadamerian scheme, rather than prison walls, for necessary excursions into the realm of 
the unknown. As Gadamer affirms:  
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The meaning of the part can be discovered only from the context – i.e., 
ultimately from the whole. Fundamentally, understanding is always a 
movement in this kind of circle, which is why the repeated return from 
the whole to the parts, and vice versa, is essential. Moreover, this circle is 
constantly expanding, since the concept of the whole is relative, and 
being integrated in ever larger contexts always affects the understanding 
of the individual part. 25 
 
 Gadamer’s approach towards understanding human affairs has several 
implications for conducting social inquiry. He calls the above description a ‘hermeneutic 
circle’ and clearly suggests that trustworthiness of any interpretation of the other’s 
actions (or words) is directly proportional to the amount of information we possess 
regarding the social, historical, political and institutional contexts in which statements 
are made or acts performed.26 Furthermore, the very act of information gathering, by 
shuttling between the part and its whole, expands the diameter of the circle itself.  In 
delineating this scheme, Gadamer shows the futility of searching for laws that govern 
human behavior, hence, providing a critique of empirical social science through 
highlighting the immensely complex nature of social inquiry in general. To reiterate, it is 
virtually impossible to acquire complete information because of the fluid nature of the 
whole at both ends of the contact, i.e., the self as well as the other.  
 As Dallmayr defines CPT in terms of facilitating the inclusion of non-western 
ideas into the theoretical discourse of the west, therefore, usefulness of employing 
Gadamerian insights into the nature of human understanding and knowledge seem like 
the most natural course for Dallmayr to advance this project. As the earlier and 
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following quotes suggest, of particular interest to him is the dialogical construction of 
this interaction.  Writes Dallmayr: 
Gadamer’s hermeneutics proves most helpful: [for civilizational dialogue] 
namely, by centerstaging a mode of dialogue that is open-ended and 
hospitable to multiple and expanding horizons.27  
 
The use of dialogical models in the western, as well as other cultural traditions, has a 
rich and long history.28 However, as Dallmayr states, the open ended nature of 
Gadamer’s conception makes it especially useful for CPT. Part of his rationale for 
launching CPT was dissatisfaction with the perceived inescapable hegemony of the west 
in the late modern period. Gadamer’s model seems to him to be radically non-
instrumental in nature, as it simultaneously allows for questioning as well as being 
questioned.29 In other words, according to Dallmayr, when seen through a Gadamerian 
lens, nobody has definite answers. The dialogue, in this state of uncertainty, can only be 
conducted in a tone which not only lacks conviction as regards the external validity of 
one’s own beliefs but is also devoid of any authority to talk down the other.30 Dallmayr 
cites this as one of the advantages of this approach over previous and prevalent modes of 
thinking about the other in the west, namely, Said’s Orientalism and Huntington’s Clash 
of Civilizations, which view inter-cultural relations in terms of domination and conflict 
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respectively.31 Nevertheless, where Said and Huntington adopted a descriptive approach, 
Dallmayr’s project is prescriptive in nature. It is prescriptive because of an acute 
awareness of the current state of globalization and the demands it makes on the success 
of a meaningful engagement between the west and its others.  
 It is interesting, however, that even though Dallmayr insists on the adoption of a 
Gadamerian approach, he is not so keen on discussing the implications of using a 
Gadamerian lens for the broader discipline of political theory in the west. As I attempt to 
show in later chapters of this dissertation, excessive reliance on Gadamerian 
philosophical hermeneutics has the potential to seriously question some of the most 
widely accepted claims in western political theory. In this context, then, if philosophical 
hermeneutics is the correct approach for CPT, then CPT is on a confrontational course 
with traditional political theory instead of being content on remaining one of its 
subfields. This situation is complicated further by the fact that even when comparative 
works have been attempted in the past by prominent western thinkers, they have only 
contributed towards worsening the situation. The comparative strain in western 
philosophy, in the words of Gerald J. Larson, is representative of a tragedy of the 
modern west to laud “naïveté posing as sophistication.”32 In context of Dallmayr’s 
preference for Gadamer, then, an obvious task for CPT scholarship is to reassess what 
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the west has come to believe as its superior heritage.33 As the later chapters of this 
dissertation will illustrate, an inevitable consequence of cross-cultural contact is cross 
pollination of ideas between cultures. While it is not within the scope of this dissertation 
to trace the genealogy of prominent civilizational ideas to prove this thesis, it does not 
require any special effort to acknowledge the soundness of this claim. In one of his 
earlier works, Dallmayr himself refers to the phenomenon of partial assimilation or 
cultural borrowing as one outcome of cross-cultural encounter.34 Interestingly, most of 
the examples to support his argument come from the pre and the early modern periods. 
Yet he makes the case for CPT’s need in the context of the late modern period and the 
current wave of globalization. It seems that either Dallmayr does not want to explore the 
full potential of CPT or he does not want to rock the boat when it comes to questioning 
the achievements and claims of western modernity. Dallmayr attempts to cover up this 
problem by referring to Gadamer’s advocacy for tolerating legitimate critiques of 
modernity.35 As the bulk of CPT scholarship (since Dallmayr’s foundational work) 
demonstrates, this practice has also become one of the most preferred ways to cast and 
legitimize the works of non-western thinkers.36  
 Another disturbing aspect of this approach, to seek cross pollination narrowly by 
limiting it to late modernity, is that it casts a conspiratorial hue on the efforts of 
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comparative political theorists as well as the motivations of non-western thinkers. This is 
to say that west’s need to include non-western thinkers, in Dallmayr’s scheme, is 
implicitly a function of its inability to maintain insularity or physical domination over 
the non-west due to globalization. On the other hand, this western inability and increased 
transparency facilitated by globalization also emboldens the non-west to closely 
scrutinize western claims of being heirs to a superior heritage, therefore, limiting 
western facility to keep ignoring the omissions of non-western contributions in its own 
development.  
 In the above context, one could argue that the prudence for a call to CPT lies in 
its usefulness in maintaining western superiority rather than challenging it. Non-western 
systems of ideas, when viewed in the context of globalization and not in their own 
historical, socio-cultural and linguistic complexities, will always have a greater tendency 
to resemble established western approaches towards political theory, especially when the 
non-western authors, chosen by the new comparative theorists, have spent considerable 
time in the west as part of their professional training.   Examples include Gandhi, Syed 
Qutb, Mohammad Iqbal, Ali Shariati and Abdul Karim Sarosh. In a sense, projects of 
these thinkers depict only one aspect of non-western thinking, i.e., that which defines 
itself in contradistinction to the west. Without a doubt omission of these non-western 
critiques of western rationality and modernity reflects on the poverty of western 
scholarship in terms of taking seriously the ideas that originate outside its own domain. 
Non-western systems of ideas are equally as theoretically diverse and complex as their 
western counterparts and any attempt to understand them must pay full attention to detail 
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and not only to the variants which seem relevant in a globalized world.37 In addition, 
most non-western theorists chosen by comparativists are those who developed their ideas 
during western colonial domination or in its immediate aftermath. This, in my opinion, 
does not do justice to the richness of non-western traditions themselves. The theoretical 
diversity of the non-western systems at the time of decolonization and later can only be 
understood by reference to the long and complex histories of how these ideas were 
reshaped from a period when the west was peripheral in a non-western centered world, 
to keep them relevant for current times when the two are virtually interdependent. In 
these complex histories is embedded the record of how attitudes towards each other were 
developed. The description of how one is different is the basis for one’s claim to the 
others’ inferiority. Dallmayr, in his fervent advocacy for CPT, clearly misses out on the 
need to understand how this difference is created within each tradition. For example, 
when non-western theorists, especially Islamic fundamentalist theorists, critique the 
west, they are suspicious of it in general and rarely refer to the presence of like minded 
critical western thinkers. An argument, then, that portrays a thinker such as Maududi or 
Qutb as a non-western critic of modernity is misleading right from the beginning, simply 
because the Islamic fundamentalist critique of western rationalism and modernity is 
based on the faith that Judaism and Christianity are revelations superseded by Islam.38 
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The west, in such a context, is essentially a Christian west and it is detestable to an 
Islamic fundamentalist thinker because its current condition, i.e., modernity, promotes 
godlessness in society. Furthermore, just as these Islamic fundamentalist thinkers 
erroneously, but consistently, treat the west as a monolithic analytical category, CPT 
scholarship also misses out on the immense diversity within Islamic fundamentalist 
thinking itself.39 Yet another significant aspect of Islamic fundamentalism, to continue 
with the example, is the inspiration that it takes from the thinkers from the pre modern 
period. If we stick to the modern period, as Dallmayr suggests, we are most likely to 
misunderstand the many concepts which modern thinkers borrow from their medieval 
predecessors and reshape to fit a modern context.40  This suggestion, yet again, brings 
into question Dallmayr’s choice of method and period for doing comparative theorizing. 
In Dallmayr’s defense, one could argue that his work signifies only the starting point of 
a new subfield and later scholars would take it into other directions using diverse 
methodological approaches and other historical periods. However, when one looks 
chronologically at Dallmayr’s work on inter-civilizational dialogue over the decade 
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before his formal invitation for CPT, it becomes clear that it is after much deliberation 
that he decided to define CPT around the current status of western modernity. As 
discussed in the concluding chapter of this dissertation Dallmayr’s bias for late 
modernity is also confirmed strongly in his more recent writings on the necessity of CPT 
for the west in context of globalization. 
 Dallmayr’s fixation with late modernity is also evident in the works of those who 
have felt inspired by his call. Foremost among these is Roxanne Euben, who focuses 
primarily on cross-cultural learning between the Islamic and western civilizations. Euben 
is also most responsible for shaping CPT as a legitimate discipline. Her first book, 
Enemy in the Mirror, which is also the first full length work of CPT, analyzes theoretical 
insights from the works of influential Islamic fundamentalist thinkers (in particular, 
Syed Qutb), and compares these to the ideas of prominent western critics of modernity. 
Euben claims that, as an enterprise, political theory may have started from the western 
civilization but is not coterminous with it.41 Based on this claim, she describes CPT as a 
hybrid of the established subfields of political theory and comparative politics, which 
attempts to understand the nature and value of the political in a variety of cultural and 
historical contexts.42 The fundamental assumption in this description of CPT is that, 
despite serious political and moral disagreements, disparate cultures exist in 
conversation with one another.43 This intercultural conversation happens because of the 
fact that human beings face common dilemmas which know no geographical or 
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civilizational boundaries. This, according to Euben, strongly supports the possibility that 
there is humanly significant knowledge outside the confines of the western canon.44 The 
possibility of the existence of such knowledge discourages the practice of judging 
cultures as inferior against the knowledge gained by political theorists in one specific 
context.  
 An obvious question that comes to mind is that if this is the case, then what 
justifies the need for a separate subfield?  Why can we not apply this insight towards 
doing traditional political theory using prevalent methods? Euben’s response is that it is 
only when conceived in this manner that comparisons or insights from foreign cultures 
do not erode the integrity of political theory as a field. Rather, if one looks at the earliest 
known uses of the word theory in the west, CPT’s project would appear to be one of 
reclaiming the foundations of Political Theory as a field.45 Since theory in these early 
uses often referred to the exercise of observing and learning from the other, therefore 
CPT acts as a reminder for traditional political theorists that their vocation is inherently a 
comparative enterprise.46 Euben’s conscious effort to keep intact the current status of 
political theory, while recasting the same as being inherently comparative in nature, 
seems like a fallacy to me. This is further complicated by her methodological preference 
for studying Islamic fundamentalism. She borrows the notion of a thick description from 
anthropologist/ ethnographer Clifford Geertz, who builds on the Weberian notion that 
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‘man is an animal suspended in webs of significance he himself has spun,’ and argues, 
that cultural analysis is an interpretive science in search of meaning. 47 This meaning can 
be achieved through a semiotic approach to a culture in order to gain access to the 
conceptual world of its members and make it a real possibility to carry out a 
conversation with them. 48 Since CPT, by definition, is an endeavor to facilitate the 
inclusion of non-western ideas in the theoretical discourse of the west, it should come as 
no surprise that Geertz’s scheme holds special attraction for Euben’s project, just as 
Gadamer’s insights did for Dallmayr. Thus a dialogical model, in order to converse with 
the other, is the preferred method for Euben, too. However, Euben ignores the fact that 
Geertz, in delineating his interpretive theory, also warns us about the theoretical 
formulations which arise out of following in his footsteps, i.e., “they hover so low over 
the interpretations they govern that if stated independently of their applications, they 
seem either commonplace or vacant.”49 Geertz’s caution, coupled with the brief 
discussion of diversity within Sunni Islamic fundamentalism above, makes Euben’s 
interpretation of Qutb’s thought suspect of having any real value beyond the Qutbian 
brand of Sunni fundamentalism itself. Yet Euben claims that her reading of Qutb’s ideas 
is valuable precisely for the opposite of Geertz’s caution, as her interpretation challenges 
accounts that identify Qutb solely as a critic of Nasserist socialism and Egyptian 
corruption.50 Euben goes on to claim that her reading of Qutb’s thought, as a systematic 
engagement with and a critique of post-Enlightenment rationalism and westernization, 
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provides several methodological insights. First, entertaining radically different systems 
of ideas on their own terms allows us to gain a richer understanding of these systems, as 
it discourages the practice of shunning anything as irrelevant or irrational and provides 
us with new ways of looking at the world. Second, her interpretive account of Islamic 
fundamentalism not only makes this previously inaccessible system of ideas intelligible, 
but that it also contributes to the prevalent explanations given by social scientists, for the 
recent resurgence of Islamic fundamentalist politics, through making it causally 
adequate. 51 Finally, she argues that employing a dialogical model is perhaps the best 
way to approach systems of ideas which are otherwise elusive in nature. The model’s 
suitability is based on the assumption that it rejects the positivist standards of objectivity 
in favor of its alternate, which entails understanding as a reciprocal, transformative and 
ongoing process. Because of its ongoing nature, it remains permanently open to new 
interpretations, thus taking into account the inequalities which are a hallmark of a post 
colonial and globalized world.52  
  Globalization is also the starting point for Euben’s second major work, Journeys 
to the Other Shore, published in December 2006.53 There are many similarities between 
her two books. However, unlike Enemy in the Mirror, where she constructed an 
imaginary intellectual dialogue, here she focuses on actual travel narratives produced by 
Muslims and westerners without particular regard to any one period. These travel 
narratives, in her opinion, challenge the traditional notion that political theory as a 
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discipline must be organized around specific western texts whose canonical status both 
presupposes and secures  the preeminence of the philosophical treatise as the genre most 
appropriate to the discipline.54 The source of this challenge is again Euben’s specific 
understanding of theory, in which search for theory is intrinsically linked to travel or 
journey. She writes: 
… I define theory as a practice of inquiry in which critical distance plays 
an integral role, thereby shifting the emphasis from ‘theory’ as a body of 
ideas subject to domestication or in need of constant chastening to 
“theorizing” as a reflective activity engaged in by ordinary people at 
particular moments in time.55  
 
The privilege of theorizing, in Euben’s definition, belongs clearly to those who 
are able to achieve a critical distance from the comfort of the familiar to the perplexity of 
the unknown. She, however, uses the phrase critical distance in a fairly broad sense, for 
her, this critical distance is not only achieved through travel; an argument which would 
have justified her choice of travel narratives as the genre of choice, but also by opening 
oneself to other periods of history for reevaluating one’s self-understanding in the 
present age.56 
CPT, then, is not just about venturing into the non-west but also equally into a 
west that exists in a distant and forgotten past. In my opinion, the keyword here is 
‘forgotten,’ since Euben seems to be arguing that the present is simply the contemporary 
expression of what was once familiar, therefore, works of traditional political theorists 
who focus on periods before the dawn of European Enlightenment may also be 
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characterized as works of CPT.57 Arguments that are doubtful of the uniqueness of the 
attributes of modernity have been stated more convincingly and in much greater detail 
by other prominent political theorists too.58 But Euben’s claim in the context of CPT is 
interesting because she not only relies on globalization as a condition necessitating 
comparative theorizing but also questions the manner in which globalization is 
understood by traditional political theory and empirical social science in the west. 
Euben’s specific argument in this regard is that globalization in its current form, that is 
deterritorialization of politics and culture par excellence, is uniquely beyond the grasp of 
traditional political theory due to its parallel focus on canonical texts of western thought 
and preoccupation with the relations between sovereign and people and the state and 
society.59 The essentially territorial nature of these elements of political theory pushes 
scholars, who attempt to understand the nature and implications of globalization, 
towards analyses that are essentially presentist and provincial in nature themselves.60 
Furthermore, Euben’s broad use of the terms ‘travel’ or ‘journey’ away from the 
familiar, as the necessary condition for theorizing in general, shifts the focus from a 
particular culture as having a monopoly over the political. As argued above, this shifted 
focus now rests on the individuals who make the journey and the translation practices 
they employ based on their cultural predispositions.61 
Translation here is used in terms of the manner in which the unfamiliar is 
internalized and restated by the traveler. Implicit in this characterization is the notion 
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that ‘self’ and ‘place’ are conjoined. As the place changes, so does the self, hence 
making the ‘other’, at the place one is visiting (physically or mentally), a primary 
contributor to any notion of self-understanding. Euben argues, when stressing both a 
balanced curriculum for new generations of political theory students and her choice of 
the travel narrative as a genre, that 
… the capacity for imagination, reflection, and judgment is cultivated not 
by reading to affirm what one already knows but by exposure to what 
disturbs, provokes , and dislocates... Texts that themselves reflect and 
enact such dislocation … can serve as an invaluable resource for those 
who do not or cannot travel, in part by enabling imagination of and 
reflection on modes of life other than their own.62 
 
CPT à la Euben, then, is an invitation to adopt the stance of a traveler. 
Continuing with the same analogy, in a globalized world where none can help but travel 
due to the increased frequency and necessity of intercultural contact, traditional political 
theorists who do not strive to achieve Euben’s crucial critical distance are mere 
wanderers or tourists, they are inherently resistant to the influence of insights that 
produce genuine theory, because of their uncritical faith in the comprehensiveness and 
superiority of their own culture. Eric Leeds, describing the mentality of these modern 
day travelers states that it: 
… reflects upon surfaces and is adaptive rather than creative: wide rather 
than deep, mirroring rather than penetrating.63   
 
However, unlike Euben, Leeds attributes above words to the mind of the modern 
traveler as an unavoidable consequence of the condition of globalization. And 
interestingly, the modern traveler for Leed is not a western traveler; modernity is not the 
                                                 
62
 Ibid. p.196 
63
 Leed (1991) p. 287 
 38 
monopoly of the west.64 The dilemma of the moderns, in this context, is not that 
globalization has changed the rationale for travel, but that, it has significantly reduced 
the previously rewarding outcomes of undertaking the journey.65 He likens any traveler 
in a globalized age to a prisoner, regardless of her civilizational affiliation, stating that: 
 [In]… a global culture now knit by international systems of 
transportation, production, distribution, communication, destruction. The 
world we cannot, as yet, leave. Travel … has become like the activity of a 
prisoner pacing a cell much crossed and grooved by other equally mobile 
and “free” captives. What was once the agent of our liberty has become 
means for the revelation of our containment.66 
 
Leed’s description significantly reduces Euben’s charges against traditional 
political theorists’ tendency to regurgitate western texts and bask in the glory of western 
superiority over other civilizational contexts. To say the least, Leed’s observations are 
possible only if we drop the notion that west has a decided advantage in a globalized 
world, a perspective that has been missing in the works of CPT till now. The absence of 
this perspective in all comparative theorizing under the rubric of CPT is, to a great 
extent, the main inspiration for this dissertation. Leeds’ characterization suggests that 
globalization is a leveler of the playing field rather than a homogenizing force, and in 
my opinion rightly so. The urgency felt by the comparativists, such as Dallmayr and 
Euben, to include non-western conceptions of the political, in the theoretical discourse 
of the west, is a result of this leveling effect of globalization. As stated above, in this 
period, the west has lost the advantage that it enjoyed in the pre-globalized era. 
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Consequently, I think, CPT’s self imposed compulsion to control methodologically for 
the power disparity between the west and its others, before a truly neutral comparative 
study can be undertaken, works implicitly towards regaining the lost advantage of the 
pre-global era for the west. This is also strengthened by the fact that in a globalized 
world, the west still has all the options to continue regurgitating its canon; however, such 
recycling does not provide good explanations for the dilemma’s faced today, due to the 
inherent deficiencies created by systematic exclusion of the non-west in the making of 
western self-understanding.  
A conception of CPT, which is based firmly in the belief that the west’s current 
influence over the rest of the world is unprecedented in human history, and not focused 
on exposing the theoretical misconception that west’s achievements have been made in 
isolation from its others seems an exceptionally ill-conceived project to me. Ill-
conceived, because, it does not reconcile the call for a new sub field with any unique 
objectives which this new sub field can achieve.   
Arguments made by comparativists themselves present a mixed picture of what 
they understand their job to be. One can glean from the above discussion of Dallmayr’s 
and Euben’s works that CPT’s task is to engage the west in a dialogue with its other 
primarily because it is no longer possible to avoid doing so. In addition, this dialogue 
must be carried out only after recognizing that the west is extremely powerful and 
constantly subjects the others to its own theoretical preferences. Finally, due to such 
subjection, it is only reasonable to assume that responses are made to the western 
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influence by its weaker opponents. Hence emerges a possibility of knowledge outside 
the western domain.  
Other comparativists have explained the task of CPT differently. For instance, 
Anthony Parel and Ronald Keith approach the notion of a comparative political 
philosophy from the standpoint of locating and comparing instances of equivalences 
between different cultural and linguistic traditions.67 The term “equivalences,” which 
they borrow from Eric Voegelin, implies that, when properly contextualized, there are 
more similarities than differences in the ideas of apparently incompatible historical and 
intellectual traditions which make comparison between different traditions a real 
possibility.68 This is a fairly different understanding of the field, as it clearly considers 
the task of CPT to seek comparisons between the west and its others and find similarities 
between the two.69 More importantly, however, this approach is exploratory in nature 
and assumes that there are equally significant observations made by non-westerners. The 
essays in their edited volume, which seek equivalences between western and Chinese, 
Indian or Islamic traditions, also confirm this. But to seek comparisons with other 
intellectual traditions and especially in context of political theory requires the presence 
of an equally well established non-western canon.  The unsystematic and repetitive 
choice of cases by comparative theorists does not provide much confidence in the notion 
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that such counter-canons exist. This makes identification of a canon of non-western texts 
an additional responsibility of comparative theorists. In his later work, Parel has actually 
tried to highlight this issue. He argues that the function of a canon is to provide 
indispensable basis of historical identity, internal coherence and further development.70 
Furthermore, he suggests that without such canons any comparisons would not be 
possible at all, as there would be no clearly marked boundaries to cross.71 Indeed, Parel’s 
work on Gandhi seems to be a step towards identifying an Indian canon of political 
theory.72 Gandhi and his politics are no strangers to the west, primarily because he was 
trained as a lawyer in the west, spent considerable time in which he was politically 
active in the western occupied South Africa, and led a successful national independence 
movement against the British in India. But even more importantly, the question is; given 
that Gandhi borrowed his notion of non-violence from Tolstoy, named his farm in South 
Africa after Tolstoy and inspired the civil rights movement in the US, is it correct to 
consider him the representative of a distinctly Indian political theory? Any discussion of 
Gandhi as an Indian political thinker must invariably include a discussion of his 
relationship to the thought of other prominent Indian thinkers and politicians of the time 
such as Bhim Rao Ambedkar, Aurobindo Ghosh, Rabindranath Tagore, M.A. Jinnah, 
Abulkalam Azad and Subhash Chandra Bhose.73 Much of Gandhi’s thought was in fact a 
response to his critics, who were also equally committed to getting rid of the British Raj 
in India. But the question that is paramount, in context of this dissertation, is this: What 
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would we achieve even if we are able to identify a more balanced Indian canon? It seems 
like twisted logic on Parel’s part in specific and comparative theorists in general to stress 
first the need for CPT because the western canon and the subsequent discipline of 
political theory is too restrictive, and then actually go on and create similar restrictive 
canons in non-western geographical contexts. Furthermore all this effort, according to 
Parel is required, so that these new borders can now be crossed and a geographically 
neutral understanding of the political can be achieved? 
The notion of cross-culturally enlarging the political theory canon has also been 
addressed by Farah Godrej who suggests that the texts to be introduced in the enlarged 
canon must, first, address themselves to certain foundationalist questions about the 
political dimension of human experience, and, second, do so in a manner that is 
provocative and enlightening.74 I think that the most precise and comprehensive 
evaluation of Godrej’s criteria is given by her when she writes that at best, her “criteria 
remain at the level of vague generality.”75 The noteworthy thing about Godrej’s 
approach is that she wants to enlarge the existing canon cross-culturally instead of 
constructing a separate canon in a non-western context. However, at the same time, she 
introduces a selection criterion which evaluates the candidacy of non-western texts 
depending on their being provocative and enlightening (whatever that means). 
Provocation is invariably a function of the degree of comfort we feel by adhering to that 
which is familiar. Godrej’s approach makes me uncomfortable on several levels. First, 
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since political theory is ostensibly a western vocation (as argued by Euben, Dallmayr 
and Parel), the probability is high that a western bias will carry itself into the texts 
chosen for enlargement of the canon. We must remember that it is because of the same 
bias that a call for CPT was issued in the first place, so logically speaking, Godrej’s 
criteria essentially negates the need for a separate subfield. Second, it negates the whole 
notion of accepting the non-west on its own terms. As an unintended, but happy 
consequence, this approach exposes the limitations of CPT’s, as well as Godrej’s 
personal, excessive reliance on the dialogical model of philosophical hermeneutics.76 
Finally, as I argue in the final chapter, such an approach can let an otherwise sincere 
effort go astray.  
Quite ironically, if we look at non-western texts and individuals chosen by 
comparative theorists till now, it seems that Godrej is right. A common and overriding 
theme in Gandhi and Islamic fundamentalist theorists is violence. Gandhi’s appeal for 
the west, in terms of the enlightenment component of Godrej’s scheme, is his advocacy 
for non-violence as a tool to fight the oppressor. Similarly, Islamic fundamentalism is of 
relevance because of its exceptionally violent tactics, especially suicide bombings. This 
technique in its modern form was perfected by the Tamil Tigers, who are neither 
Muslims nor fundamentalists and also not in conflict with the west.77 However, it is only 
after Islamic fundamentalists used it as a tool against western targets that the west felt 
provoked enough to understand the nature of this phenomenon. In fact, before becoming 
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a direct target, western policies had always supported religious elements to further their 
own agenda in Islamic lands.78 The point which I want to highlight is not that 
comparativists have done a bad job; instead, it is that if the provocation and 
enlightenment are the criteria on which non-western texts should be included in the 
recognized canon of political theory, then we must shed the pretense of non-western 
texts as having any intrinsic value for political theory. To say the least, this was the 
approach of western political theorists towards non-western texts even before a call for 
CPT was issued by Dallmayr.79  
What, then, should be the rationale and mode of comparative theorizing for 
someone like myself who is convinced that the time is right for a more balanced 
discipline of political theory, but is not satisfied with the rationale and work done by 
comparativists in this regard till now? I believe some of the answers, and only some, can 
be gleaned by going back to the drawing board with the purpose of seeing if there can be 
an alternate basis for CPT.  
The most vital issue in this reevaluation of CPT is the status and nature of 
modernity. The story of CPT, as we know, begins with modernity. Dallmayr, Euben, 
Parel and Godrej are all concerned that traditional political theory, as a field, is 
considered coterminous with the west and there is an urgent need to dispel this erroneous 
notion. As a result, and in support of their arguments, these comparativists choose the 
works of those individuals from non-western traditions who, to paraphrase Parel, are the 
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most significant political thinkers of their respective cultures and whose basic focus is to 
update their particular political traditions in the context of the challenges posed by 
western modernity.80 There are two significant issues here: First, is modernity really 
synonymous with the west? And second, if non-westerners tend to update their ideas and 
approach towards the political, when in a disadvantaged position vis-à-vis a dominant 
west, why wouldn’t the west have done the same when it was not the dominant 
civilization? My purpose here is not to start a contest of egos between the west and the 
rest in the shape of CPT. Instead, it is to offer grounds for a conception of CPT which 
focuses less on confuting the unsophisticated nature of the non-west and more on 
exposing the parochialism of the west. The idea here is that the west’s dominance over 
rest of the world has a history that only begins in the middle of the modern period and 
continues till now. Works of scholars who are not obsessed with globalization and late 
modernity, such as Andre Gunder Frank and Donald Lach, show convincingly that until 
the end of eighteenth century, Europe continued to be peripheral to an Asian centered 
world economy.81 In this context, CPT’s practice of using the terms “modernity” and 
“west” interchangeably is fallacious. 82 It is fallacious because it wrongly assumes 
modernity’s birth place is in the west and tries to assert the position that, in an inter-
civilizational context, flow of ideas since modernity’s birth is unidirectional i.e. from the 
west to the rest. Because of this unidirectionality, the non-west is placed in a situation 
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where all its options converge on responding to modernity. As I have argued above, the 
choice of cases by comparativists is not very helpful in remedying this situation either, 
but still, the argument is that the condition of modernity can be more appropriately 
understood as environmental in nature rather than being in possession of any one 
civilization.83 As I have argued earlier in this chapter, globalization actually levels the 
playing field, e.g., in a post communication revolution and under a global capitalist 
economic framework, India alone, with a middle class of over three hundred million 
people (which is equal in size to the total U.S. population) can change the direction of 
influence between itself and the west. Theoretically, CPT so conceived, virtually 
becomes the hope of traditional political theory to continue its delusion of the notion that 
the political is western. Even if we treat this delusion as inherently value neutral, the 
question remains: why have a separate subfield in shape of CPT to pursue it through 
alternate means? 
On the other hand, if we reorient CPT towards questioning modernity’s western 
domicile, we are likely to make greater progress in most of the areas identified by 
comparative theorists as essential to sustaining the comparative endeavor in political 
theory.84 If we do not accept that modernity originated in and is coterminous with the 
west, we automatically open the door for abandoning the geographical reference every 
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time we mention modernity.  In a paradoxical sense, this is an approach which tries to 
gain a more rigorous and complex understanding of modernity, and subsequently of the 
political, by focusing on exactly the reasons which may have prompted western political 
theorists to exclude analyses of non-western ideas from their works.85 This leads us to an 
understanding of CPT which is not based on a method but on its actual content, on the 
one hand, and which produces the kind of analyses which would be resistant towards 
contributing to the notion of a universal western modernity. 86 I have argued above, that 
in its current form, CPT inadvertently contributes towards enhancement of the notion 
that the political is essentially western. More specifically, this contribution takes place 
because the category of the west is not dropped by comparative thinkers and modernity 
is taken to be a western condition.87 To be sure, this does not mean that scholarship 
accomplished under the rubric of CPT is insignificant in any way; on the contrary, such 
work has helped enormously in highlighting alternate conceptions of the political 
produced outside a western core. Yet by upholding the categories west and modern, the 
significance of non-western systems of ideas in the cases chosen by comparativists is 
reduced to the status of a respondent to ideas generated in the west. As a consequence of 
this, works of CPT look more like the product of an effort focused on achieving a 
convenient plurality, a larger notion of the political. I call it a convenience because 
comparativists do not, in any rigorous manner, address this question: what is it within 
                                                 
85
 Mitchell, (2000) Ibid. pp. xii and  12-13 
86
 The problem of defining a subfield based on a method rather than substance has been discussed by 
Sartori in his seminal piece (1970) pp 1033-1053. Sartori argues that the label comparative politics 
indicates the how but does not specify the what of the analysis. Also see Lijphart (1971) pp 682-693 
87
 For a critique of Euben’s use of western and modern and its implications for CPT see Norton (2001) pp. 
736-749 
 48 
modernity that empowers traditional political theorists to argue that their notion of the 
political can be expanded and replicated to the level of universality?88 In my opinion, if 
we do not explore this question, comparative analyses will continue to imply a primarily 
singular notion of the political that is only partially, and perhaps temporarily, 
transformed into a multiplicity of civilizational forms due to the impact of non-western 
local circumstances, highlighted in comparative works. I call this non-western political, 
partial because it is only a representation of a broader and universal notion of the 
political and temporary because the truth value and accuracy of that broader notion of 
the political is never seriously doubted by comparative theorists.  
The other major theme in CPT scholarship, as I have discussed earlier in this 
chapter, is the preference for a dialogical model of philosophical hermeneutics because it 
is open ended and hospitable to multiple and expanding horizons. One of the problems 
with constructing an inter-civilizational dialogue in this manner, as pointed out by 
Nederman et.al, is the fixed expectation that there will eventually be a fusion of 
horizons. These authors convincingly show, by way of comparison with other well 
known dialogical models in history, that such an outcome rarely takes place.89 But more 
importantly, their comparison brings forth another useful dimension of dialogical 
encounter between the west and its others, namely, an opportunity for “self criticism and 
the realization of the cultural linguistic and conceptual limits to achieving 
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communication.”90 I argue that if we separate “modernity” from the “west” a similar 
outcome occurs because the west and the non-west will both function as modern subjects 
in such a formulation. There are serious implications of this separation for CPT: First 
and foremost, in the context of modernity it would allow comparativists the basis to 
consider alternate understandings of the political free from their value in terms of 
provocation or enlightenment for the west, as suggested earlier by Godrej. If we look at 
CPT’s favorite topic in this context, i.e., Gandhi and his contemporaries who resisted the 
British, they would appear as representatives of a modern and westernized colonial elite 
of British India. The ideas of these thinkers and activists would appear less as 
constituting a distinctively Indian political thought and more as something which should 
always have been an integral part of the story of modernity. As characterized in the 
works of Partha Chaterjee, this westernized colonial elite was able to turn modernizing 
discourse against the civilizing prerogatives of a colonial power by constructing an 
Indian tradition that was not open to colonization.91 The fact that Gandhi’s ideas were 
seen specifically as a stubborn resistance to modernity by the British, despite the 
formative elements of his thought discussed earlier, confirms the limitations identified 
by Nederman and his co-authors mentioned above. Western inability to comprehend 
non-western notions of the political is epitomized in the following comment by Winston 
Churchill on Gandhi:  
It is alarming and also nauseating to see Mr. Gandhi, a seditious middle 
temple lawyer, now posing as a fakir of a type well known in the east, 
striding half-naked up the steps of the viceregal palace, while he is still 
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organizing and conducting a defiant campaign of civil disobedience, to 
parley on equal terms with the representative of the king-emperor.92 
 
 Gandhi’s background in western legal training, his strategy of defying the very 
legal code that he was trained to uphold, and his distinctly non-western and 
unsophisticated appearance, constitute an amazing collection of negatives. But the fact 
that Churchill chooses these characteristics to describe Gandhi is reflective of how he, as 
a representative of the west, creates and deploys the difference between himself and his 
counterpart. In creating this difference, Churchill reveals how he constructs his own, and 
by implication the west’s, superior image. Similarly, all these elements are also 
representative of how Gandhi chooses to define himself. The irony of Churchill’s remark 
is in the fact that Gandhi is on his way to a dialogue with the west. In his remarks during 
this meeting, Gandhi is reported to have said to an immaculately dressed viceroy: 
I have caused a great deal of trouble for your government. But as men, we 
can set aside our differences for welfare of the nation.93 
 
 Gandhi’s comment and desire to resolve conflicts through discussion has a 
decidedly modern western tone to it, yet his words chastise and correct the west’s self 
image as the great civilizer. This correction, as a reading of Hind Swaraj reveals, was 
achieved by intentionally locating India’s strength in the facets of Indian society which 
were untouched by colonial rule and unaffected by the westernized Indian elite’s 
practice of employing western terminology and logic in an attempt to overthrow the 
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Raj.94 This vision allowed Gandhi to challenge the dominant western colonial power 
through recourse to a glorious past record of India’s civilizational achievement. What is 
extremely important for CPT is the fact that Gandhi does not restate a political history of 
pre-colonial times; in fact, he is curiously silent about any verifiable facts of that period. 
Gandhi’s India is an imagined India, one whose contours are defined precisely in terms 
of what the west is not. Thus, if India had to be cast as a great civilization, then the west 
could not be any such thing. This is confirmed by his dismissive view of western 
civilization when he comments that “[i]t would be a good idea.”95 Gandhi’s attitude 
mirrors the western universality of which comparativists are so weary. What is more, the 
metaphor used by Euben in her title Enemy in the Mirror fully applies here, albeit with a 
profound twist, i.e., roles which Euben assigns to the two sides of the contact are 
reversed in this instance.  
 What, then, are the implications of the above discussion for CPT? I think that, 
first and foremost, it highlights the need to recognize that constitutive elements of 
civilizational attitudes and identity are equally externally located. If this is the case, then 
CPT’s current dominant practice of treating the west and modernity as synonymous is 
incorrect. A separation of these two terms deprives the west of its assumed monopoly 
over the modern which, as the discussion in this chapter reveals, is maintained by 
assuming the impossibility of a modern non-west. When CPT upholds a fusion of the 
categories of modernity and western, it basically perpetuates the above assumption, even 
if implicitly, in the works produced by comparative theorists. Second, when the west and 
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modernity are separated, CPT is able to make sense of the political in a rigorous manner 
by considering a multiplicity of historical and geographical contexts, as originally 
suggested by Euben. This rigor is evident in the inevitable challenge that CPT poses, in 
this new construction, for traditional political theory, i.e., either to convincingly refute 
CPT’s claim of a constitutive external or to complicate its own understanding of western 
universality. Third, this approach relieves CPT of its excessive reliance on one kind of 
dialogical model, i.e., of philosophical hermeneutics. To be sure, dialogue, in this 
suggested construction, remains the dominant mode of studying inter-civilizational 
interaction. However, in this instance, it not only results in multiple understandings of 
the political, but does so in a truly open ended manner. In fact, in a manner so open 
ended, that modernity itself could be the outcome of inter-cultural and inter-
civilizational contact. Yet this open endedness is not achieved arbitrarily and is based on 
verifiable criteria. Finally, by dropping modernity from the picture, CPT’s subject matter 
remains no longer restricted by the late modern period. This not only allows 
comparativists to show that the political is possible in non-western contexts, but also 
forces traditional theorists to reexamine their modern self-understanding in the light of 
ideas from their own forgotten non-modern past, which is equally marginalized but is as 
important as the non-west.   
 In the chapters that follow, as mentioned earlier, I examine four cases of actual 
inter-civilizational contacts between the west and its others in the pre-Enlightenment 
period. Each of the cases represents a crucial point in human history where opportunities 
for broadening civilizational horizons were perceived and capitalized upon by a west 
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which did not have the definite superiority that has until now been responsible for 
shaping CPT as a field. As the discussion in this chapter shows, most comparativists 
have focused on understanding the nature and purpose of the political in non-western 
contexts and have measured it against a western standard, i.e., achievements of the non-
west have been shown as comparable to those of the west. Such an approach towards 
CPT is valuable in that it identifies and justifies the usefulness of doing theory 
comparatively. However, when viewed as a group from a distance, these studies 
represent a hotchpotch of interesting works which lack rigor of the kind one sees in the 
works of traditional political theory. Furthermore, as I have argued above, the tendency 
to treat non-western ideas as singularly important episodes in the development of non-
western systems of thought and a lack of attention to the broader movements, of which 
these ideas are often a part, restricts a fuller understanding of the linkages that define 
these non-western works in the first place. In this context, the cases chosen for this 
dissertation are not only important because in each case an early representative of the 
west experiences and records what he has witnessed in previously difficult-to-access 
foreign lands; but also, when looked at as a group, these cases enable us to develop a 
narrative of western perceptions regarding the Other in multiple contexts. I have argued, 
that the narrative which emerges out of these western accounts of the Other also reveals 
an implicit counter-narrative about changing perceptions of the western Self. As Mary 
Campbell reminds us, up until the early modern period, east, or more specifically, Asia 
and the Orient, were not just geographical references. Instead, these were as much places 
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in medieval western imagination as they were upon the face of the earth. 96  In fact, for 
medieval Europeans, according to Seymour Phillips, “The East probably began almost as 
soon as they left familiar ground, after which any strange experience might be expected 
to befall them.”97 The discussion of cases in later chapters of this dissertation attempts to 
throw light on how this familiarity with the west’s own position and values was 
challenged and affected by contacts with the Other. 
 At the same time, one must remember that there are always a minimum of two 
sides to the contact equation. In the first three cases, westerners approach others who are 
politically, economically and also in terms of civilizational achievements and history, 
superior to themselves. In these circumstances the only comfort that these 
representatives felt came from their conviction regarding the truth of their religious 
beliefs. Yet this comfort could only be exposed cautiously, or not at all, if the 
corresponding Other was not in a tolerant frame of mind. Dangers and discomforts also 
came from putting oneself up for scrutiny by strangers who did not appreciate the piety 
of their beliefs or the value of the way the visitors thought or behaved. Inevitable 
compromises were also made by western representatives because of unfamiliarity with 
language and customs. Also noteworthy is the fact that the Europeans are on the losing 
end of the compromise here, since they are visitors on an unfamiliar terrain. What they 
observed needed to be reconciled with what they knew, or thought that they knew, about 
the east already. Theorizing in these circumstances took place often, if not continuously, 
as prior ideas in the minds of westerners frequently necessitated verification and new 
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ideas were formed. Yet in many instances, observable facts failed to persuade them to 
drop those ideas which conflicted with reality. To deny what one sees needs theorizing 
as does that which has never been imagined.  
 In context of CPT, specifically, I hope to highlight in later chapters the manner in 
which a western identity is upheld in the face of the unexpected. The cases here, 
therefore, open a window on how identities such as East, West, Self and the Other come 
into being.98 Especially the last case, which I discuss in the concluding chapter, i.e., the 
arguments of Las Casas in defense of the Indians, provides for an interesting contrast to 
the first three cases. As Mary Campbell reminds us about the significance of the New 
World, “When Europe found the Other World for which it had sought throughout the 
East, that ‘earthly Paradise’ became the scene of the hugest genocide the world has ever 
known.”99 Las Casas’s account of the destruction of the Indies and his identification and 
defense of indigenous rights guarantees him the position of an originator of descriptive 
accounts of the New World.100 In his arguments, we get a unique opportunity to see once 
again the process whereby the notions of Self and Other are created and enforced on the 
mind of a people. However, as I argue, the case of the New World is different from all 
other cases discussed in this dissertation, because the power balance is heavily in favor 
of the Europeans and the conditions of the contact are diametrically apart from the cases 
discussed earlier. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
“NO PEOPLE AND A FOOLISH NATION”101: THE THIRTEENTH CENTURY 
MONGOL EMPIRE THROUGH WESTERN EYES 
 
 This chapter focus’s on William of Rubruck’s account of his journey to the 
Mongols in the mid-thirteenth century (A.D. 1253-1255). William’s is one of the earliest 
eye witness accounts of the Mongols to reach the west. Besides being one of the earliest, 
it is also unrivalled in reliability and detail among all other sources available on the 
Mongols of this period. Campbell terms William of Rubruck the “first fully present 
narrator”102 in addition to calling his narrative the beginning of the “responsible 
literature of travel.”103 Apart from these stylistic characteristics, his account also merit 
inclusion in this dissertation because of the timing of his journey and the fact that it 
greatly helps us in understanding the processes and considerations which went into the 
creation of the image of the Mongol Other in the western mind.  
 William’s account is also indispensable for this dissertation because of the 
purpose of his journey, i.e., to evangelize the Mongols. The details that we find in 
William’s account, therefore, arise out of the circumstances which he faced in winning, 
or failing to win, these strangers over to the Christian faith. Yet his personal experiences 
are recorded in the context of the demand made by his benefactor, Louis IX, to record 
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everything that he saw. As a result, William is forced to adopt a broader perspective on 
his personal experiences. Since he is a missionary, forced into a quasi-diplomatic 
position, the happenings as well as the feelings recorded by him can be termed as truly 
representative of the sentiments of any European of his time. This same quality also 
distinguishes William’s account from other extent descriptions of the Mongols of this 
period. More specifically, instead of giving details of the wonders of the east William 
seems more intent on dispelling them by taking special care to transmit only that which 
he had himself witnessed.104 In addition, the discomfort of travel which was enhanced by 
William’s personal beliefs and status of being a Franciscan missionary, the frustration of 
not knowing the language and being perpetually misrepresented by interpreters, the lack 
of resources, and the irrelevance of his message for the Mongols, all bring out the 
complexities involved in actual intercultural contact. As I explain later in this chapter, 
these complexities bring forth the unsettled nature of the Self and the Other, which is 
apparent in the manner in which Rubruck continuously tries to represent what he 
experiences in Mongol lands by attempting to place the strange and readjust the familiar 
in context of his existing knowledge. As Spurr argues, such representation is an 
inescapable feature of all travel writing because of the author’s need to constantly 
demarcate identity and difference for establishing her authority with the reader.105 Since 
a traveler is a stranger herself, therefore, Rubruck, who is in the Mongol lands with the 
specific purpose of evangelizing the local population, must make an effort to portray an 
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impressive image for the locals, about who he is and what he represents. As we shall see, 
in doing so, Rubruck invariably has to bring up, for scrutiny, those elements of his 
identity which in a western context he would rarely have the occasion to explain or 
question. The contact between William of Rubruck and the Mongols, therefore, is very 
significant for the conception of CPT that I have delineated in the previous chapter, as it 
brings forth the contribution of the Other in the creation or realization of Self.    
 Following from the above discussion and since, in context of this dissertation, 
my central focus is on William of Rubruck as a representative of the west, it seems to me 
that the true worth of his account can be understood if it is juxtaposed against other 
accounts of the Mongols from the same period. Therefore, wherever appropriate, I shall 
be referring to other well known European accounts of the Mongol people and lands, 
especially John of Plano Carpini’s Historia Mongolorum, which records a visit to the 
Mongols prior to William (A.D. 1245 & 1247).106 In addition, I shall also be punctuating 
my discussion of William’s text with details available in non-western primary sources of 
Mongol history, such as Juvaini’s thirteenth century biography of Chingiz Khan 
Ta’Rikh-i-Jahan Gusha (History of the World Conqueror) and famous Muslim 
chronicler Rashd Al-Dn’s account of the rule of Chingiz Khan’s successors in his Jami 
al-Tawarikh (Compendium of Histories).107 Here it also helps to remember that the 
desire to create linkages with the Mongols, on the part of the known civilizations of the 
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time, was not simply because of intellectual curiosity or religious zeal; instead, these 
endeavors were driven in large part by fear of the Mongols because of their ferocity and 
unprecedented success in conquering other people. In order to highlight this aspect of 
Mongol relations with other peoples, I will also discuss papal bulls sent by Pope 
Innocent IV to the Mongol rulers and Mongol response to the pope’s messages as given 
in the sources mentioned earlier. It was the Mongol modus operandi to invite a people to 
accept them as their masters and avoid their wrath, before they invaded them. Wherever 
available in translation, I will make use of these Mongol invitations and compare them to 
the responses sent specifically to the Europeans. A discussion of Mongol directives and 
responses to foreign communiqués is especially helpful in understanding the unique 
characteristics of Mongol political thought and attitudes towards their external world.  
 I have implied above, while highlighting the significance of Rubruck’s account, 
that the west had little, if any, comprehension of the way the Mongol mind worked. This 
claim is also confirmed by the initial western reactions to the Mongol appearance on the 
west’s geographical and imaginary horizons. As a result, many myths about Mongol 
origins had taken root in western thinking, some of which had carried on from earlier 
myths from the time of Alexander the Great.108 In fact, in the western mind, Asia had 
always been a land of wonder and mystery and the emergence of the Mongols was 
invariably treated as an extension of the mythical status of the continent from which they 
came.109 In the case of Muslims, however, Asia did not present as much of an enigma as 
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did the loss of power and empire at the hands of the infidels. Before they descended, 
from virtually nowhere, the Mongols were largely irrelevant to the survival and well 
being of any of the great empires of the time. The ferocity and speed of the Mongol 
invasions coupled with the absence of prior knowledge about these strangers compelled 
both Muslims and Christian writers of the time to think of Mongol invasions as a divine 
punishment for their sins.110 While such a characterization of the invaders is supported 
by the attitude and pronouncements of the Mongol rulers themselves, the same also 
reveals the mechanisms that the invaded employed to understand and make sense of 
what they had just experienced but which they obviously never could have imagined.111 
The unique significance of the Mongol episode in world history lies, therefore, in the 
fact that they possessed unbiased hostility towards all other empires of the time and 
forced each of them to redefine their self-understanding.  
 It is also noteworthy that the time at which the Mongols appeared on the Moslem 
and Christian horizons, neither had a clear advantage over the other.112 Hence, desire for 
an alliance with a third party to defeat the opponent was natural in both camps.113 
However, as I have stated above, the unbiased Mongol hostility towards Muslims, 
Christians and Chinese alike dampened all hopes of any Mongol-Other alliances. Still, 
because of the sudden and unexplained Mongol retreat after massive destruction of 
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Hungary in 1242 and reports of attacks on Islamic lands, Europeans retained some home 
of a possible alliance with the Mongols.114 This is also evident from the fact that both 
Carpini and William carried letters to this effect from the pope and Fredrick IX 
respectively. 
 Most historians argue that the Mongol task was facilitated by two major factors; 
first, deep divisions between different western nations; and second, a condition of 
stalemate between the west and the house of Islam.115 However, as I explain below, 
these historical circumstances could not have helped the Mongols much if they did not 
espouse a particular political outlook, employed sophisticated administrative techniques, 
and a practiced a strict code of military conduct.116 Details of these elements of Mongol 
political thought and practice are available in Muslim/Persian sources I have mentioned 
above. Using these non-western sources allows us to see the differences in western and 
non-western interpretations of the Mongol invaders. In addition, the strategy of using 
non-western sources to supplement assessments of a western source, in my opinion, is 
particularly useful from the CPT’s perspective.  And especially in the context of the 
discussion in the previous chapter, I feel that such an approach is absolutely unavoidable 
because of the degree to which the political and intellectual histories of the east and the 
west are intertwined. Historically, and since the rise of Islam, Christians and Muslims 
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considered each other the only true danger to the survival of their respective 
civilizations.117 In this rather neat division of the world, the appearance of the Mongol-
Other was an anomaly that needed immediate attention from those at the helm of affairs, 
political as well as intellectual, in Islamic and Christian lands.    
 In the case of Muslims, the unique dilemma presented by Mongol conquest of 
Islamic lands went directly to the heart of Muslim political thinking. In Islamic political 
theory, the Jews and Christians were tolerated on the grounds that they were people of 
the book; hence, their religions were considered true but incomplete and based on 
distorted divine revelation. The relationship between Islam and infidels on the other 
hand was defined as Dr al-Hrb (abode of war) where, other than necessary brief 
moments of truce, a general state of war prevailed. The theory provided that in due 
course all of Dr al-Hrb will come under Dr al-Islm (abode of Islam). The Mongol 
conquests presented a situation in which Dr al-Hrb expanded at the expense of Dr 
al-Islm and for which there was no conceptual provision in Islamic system of ideas.118 
This unprecedented situation, therefore, required the Muslims to redefine their 
fundamental beliefs and place the invading Mongols into the frame of reference that they 
employed to make sense of their outer world. A convenient, and perhaps sensible, 
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solution was to consider the Mongols a punishment from Allah for the sins commited by 
the faithful.119 
 Europe’s response to the Mongol menace was not very different either. The name 
“Tartar,” given to the new invaders attests to an approach very similar to the Muslims. 
According to Connell, the initial use of the term “Tartar” for Mongols is credited to King 
Louis IX of France who might have used it erroneously while referring to “Tatars.” 
However, the term was popularly adopted because of its mythical value.120 More 
specifically, 
A ‘Tartar’ was an agent sent from hell, a precursor of Antichrist, a nuncio 
of Satan, a son of Ishmael breaking forth from bounds in the mysterious 
East, the land of Gog and Magog, to unleash his fury upon the Christian 
world as punishment for its sins.121 
 
The above conceptions were also probably helped by Mongol attitudes as detailed in 
their alleged victory speeches in Muslim lands, which are authenticated in written replies 
to western monarchs and the Pope. For instance Juvaini allegedly reports that after the 
capture of Bokhara, Chingiz Khan mounted the pulpit and said, “O people…I am the 
punishment of God. If you had not committed great sins, God would not have sent a 
punishment like me upon you.”122 
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Similarly, in his reply sent to pope Innocent IV through Carpini, Mongol great 
khan Güyük wrote: 
…[Chingiz Khan and the Kaghan] both … have been sent to make known 
God’s command, nor to the command of god… How could anybody seize 
or kill by his own power contrary to the command of God?123 
 
 Considering the Mongols a punishment from God for one’s own sins reflects on 
the Muslim and Christian inability to envision a third worldview. This inability arose 
from creating and nurturing, over centuries, an image of the Other which, according to 
Blanks and Faressetto, was literally a photographic negative of the desired ideal image 
of the Self.124 Interestingly, Mongol political success did not really change this rather 
neat and naive view of the other; instead it dropped a kind of a self reflecting mirror 
between the east and the west. This characteristic of the Mongol episode makes studying 
this period in world history a unique and fantastic opportunity to understand how images 
of the Self and the Other are created and maintained. The Mongols, at least in the 
western imagination, remained barbarian and uncivilized even after they conquered 
western lands.125 However, as the Mongols did not build upon the success of their initial 
western campaigns, the threat they posed to the west reduced in intensity and rekindled 
hopes for a possible alliance. This fact coupled with eastward and internal movements of 
the Mongol stampede in post European conquest period, encouraged the west to seek 
alliances with them against their pre-Mongol traditional enemies.126 As this chapter 
unfolds, I will highlight salient features of Mongol political thought. However, for the 
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moment it is noteworthy that, despite all the innovations that the Mongols introduced in 
terms of administrative techniques, resource mobilization and the art of war, the only 
significance that they held for the west was as potential allies against Muslims.127 This 
rather dismissive attitude reveals that, to a great degree, the sources of construction of 
the Other’s image, even in the face of possible total self-destruction, remained 
unchanged. The picture on the Muslim side is very different, but a detailed discussion of 
that response is not within the scope of this dissertation. For the moment it is sufficient 
to note that considering the Mongols as a divine punishment was itself a mechanism to 
perpetuate western and Islamic ideal self image created in contradistinction to each 
other. I will, however, briefly come back to this point towards the end of this chapter. 
 Another important characteristic that makes the Mongol episode a particularly 
interesting one to focus on, in the context of CPT, is the impact that Mongols had on 
inter-civilizational contacts in general. In the last chapter, I argued that globalization 
levels the playing field between the haves and the have-nots. Before the Mongol 
invasions, eastern lands were almost completely inaccessible to the west, and all western 
knowledge about these lands, according to Campbell, was based on works such as 
Wonders of the East and Alexander’s Letter to Aristotle. The self-image of medieval 
Europeans, created by this knowledge depicted a world which was normal at its 
(European) center and monstrous at its (Asian and African) margins.128 To a great extent, 
the status of divine scoundrels, allocated to the Tatars by the Europeans, was helped and 
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even necessitated by this self-understanding. The profundity of the Mongol episode in 
the history of Europe, therefore, is also evident from the fact that it was only during this 
period that westerners were first physically able to visit these lands. William of Rubruck, 
during his journey in the Mongol lands, consistently came across people belonging to 
different religious, racial and national affiliations.129 This opening up of the east was a 
direct result of the Mongol cosmopolitan outlook which, unlike Christian and Islamic 
cosmopolitanisms, was centered on a  political rather than moral and spiritual notions of 
unity. The western inability to understand this novel way of looking at the world is 
perhaps best represented in the following character sketch of the Mongols in Carpini’s 
account: 
They break any promises they make as soon as they see that the tide is 
turned in their favour, and they are full of deceit in all their deeds and 
assurances; it is their object to wipe off the face of the earth all princes, 
nobles, knights and men of gentle birth… and they do this to those in 
their power in a sly and crafty manner: then because it is unfitting that 
Christians should be subject to them in view of the abominations they 
practice and seeing that the worship of God is brought to nought, souls 
are perishing and bodies are afflicted beyond belief in many ways; it is 
true at first they speak fair words, but afterwards they sting and hurt like a 
scorpion…130 
 
 The above passage distinguishes the highpoints of difference between a civilized 
Christian/ western self and a barbarous Mongol people who could not be trusted, 
because of their lack of civility, in matters of mutual accommodation. However, the 
reality of Mongol strategy and success, as I explain later, is very different from the 
above and based on concrete political measures adopted by Chingiz Khan and followed 
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vigorously by his successors. At the moment, the point I want to make is that these 
Mongol practices opened up the east in a sense similar to globalization today. Increased 
inter-civilizational activity during the Mongol period not only facilitated readjustments 
of the Other in the Christian and Muslim parts of the world, it also made such 
readjustments absolutely necessary. This leads me back to my point in the last chapter 
that CPT’s status as a separate subfield of political theory must be independent from the 
recent wave of globalization and accompanying technological innovations. To be sure, a 
certain increased degree of inter-civilizational contact is an important precursor for 
initiating comparative theorizing, as in the absence of such contacts any genuine 
knowledge of the Other is more or less irrelevant. It is only in circumstances such as 
those created by Mongol invasions and modern globalization that prevalent myths come 
into question and previous models of self-understanding are rendered deficient. This is 
further attested to by the fact that with the decline of Mongol power, western access to 
the east was once again blocked and the west’s knowledge of the east almost remained 
frozen in the two hundred years between William of Rubruck’s and Marco Polo’s 
journeys.131  
  What, then, were the principles of Mongol political thought, which gave free 
access to representatives from all other cultures and empires to Mongol seats of power, 
despite the fact that Mongols had hostile intentions towards them? I think a brief 
response to this question is important, as it provides us with the tools to understand 
several of the observations which William recorded in his account of the Mongols. The 
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rise of the Mongols began with the career of Chingiz Khan, who, after the turbulent early 
years of his life, was immensely successful in uniting and leading the people of his clan 
to lay the foundations of future Mongol Empire.132 Chingiz’s most distinguishing 
characteristic, according to his biographer and other historians, was his unparalleled 
military genius. Juvaini compares Chingiz to Chosroes of Persia, Pharaohs of Egypt and 
the Caesars of Rome, and states that: 
All that has been recorded touching the practice of the mighty [kings] was 
by Chingiz Khan invented from the page of his own mind without the toil 
of perusing records or trouble of conforming with tradition; … had he 
[Alexander] lived in the age of Chingiz-Khan, would have been his pupil 
in craft and cunning and … he would have found none better than blindly 
to follow in his footsteps.133  
 
While I find it totally legitimate to discount the exaggerated style of Juvaini’s prose, it is 
nevertheless a verifiable fact that Chingiz Khan’s success was indeed a function of the 
rules that he invented and enforced meticulously. This legislation, known as the Yasa, 
was deemed sacred by his successors and we find references to it in their letters which 
were written long after Chingiz’s death.134 According to Juvaini again, Chingiz ordered;  
…that Mongol children should learn writing from the Uighur; and that 
these yasas and ordinances should be written down on rolls. These rolls 
are called the Great book of Yasas and are kept in the treasury of the chief 
princes. Wherever a khan ascends the throne, or a great army mobilized, 
or the princes assemble and begin [to consult together] concerning affairs 
of the state and the administration thereof, they produce these rolls and 
model their actions thereon.135 
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The yasas therefore were also the beginning of the written mongol language in a script 
borrowed from the Uighur language. This highlights Chingiz’s status as the founder of 
not only the Mongol polity and empire but also, in a way, the Mongol faith. From the 
point of view of extending CPT to the pre-enlightenment period, it is noteworthy that 
Chingiz’s career also bears a remarkable similarity to the life and directives of 
Mohammad, the prophet of Islam. In addition to the fact that Mongols, like Arabs, were 
nomads, one cannot help but notice that Arabic, before the Qur’an was revealed and 
recorded, was an oral language. Chingiz’s yasas and the Qur’an formed the basis for the 
religious, societal and political practices of both their peoples. Similarly, the speed at 
which the Mongols and the Muslims conquered other known and well established 
civilizations of their time forms a virtual mirror image of each other. Finally, the practice 
of sending messages to a target population for submitting to their commands before an 
invasion took place is also common in the two traditions.136 Once again a detailed 
description of this characteristic of the Mongol empire is not within the scope of this 
dissertation. I mention this aspect of the Yasa only to highlight their fundamental value 
for the Mongol polity by comparing it to the place held by the Qur’an in the Islamic 
tradition.  
 It is also noteworthy that, for the value that it held for Mongol rulers, the Yasa is 
surprisingly vague on most aspects of social and political organization of the 
community.137 It stresses on the need to rely on divine support for their missions and 
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avoid bragging about the strength of their military when sending messages to foreign 
courts. The Yasa instructs the Mongol princes and Khans to hold the wise and skilled of 
any people in high regard and admonishes allocation of grandiose names and titles for 
Mongol rulers themselves. To inculcate bravery, strength and endurance in the youth, the 
Yasa requires arrangement of hunting campaigns in peacetime. It sets the minimum age 
of 20 years for all soldiers and organizes the army in units of ten, hundred, thousand and 
ten thousand. It gives guidelines to both the ruling khan and the populace about 
contributions for the upkeep of the Khan and the populace’s right to hold on to their 
possessions. The Khan was entitled only to the contributions made from surplus 
possessions and had no right over the belongings of an individual who died without 
heirs. Instructions are also recorded for the establishment of staging posts with horses for 
envoys in transit at every two miles. In addition to the above, Juvaini also notes that 
Chingiz was,  
“… adherent of no religion and the follower of no creed, he eschewed 
bigotry, and the preference of one faith to another, and the placing of 
some above the others; rather he honoured and respected the learned and 
pious of every sect, recognizing such conduct as the way to the Court of 
God.”138 
 
Thus lack of preference for a single faith also reflected in his yasas and he commanded 
to consider all sects as one and not to distinguish them from one another.139 
 Chingiz Khan’s descendents made efforts to follow diligently the directives 
recorded in his Yasas. This is also evident from the communiqués of Mongol Great 
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Khans to the European leaders long after Chingiz’s death. These communiqués have 
been examined in detail by Eric Voegelin with a focus on gleaning from them the basic 
framework of Mongol political theory.140 On their face value, these communiqués seem 
straightforward orders of submission to the European powers. However, Voegelin argues 
that these communiqués are essentially legal instruments written to fulfill the 
requirements of due process in Mongol public law, which was derived from constructing 
a parallel between the monarchical constitutions of Heaven and Earth.141 The Mongols, 
and more specifically Chingiz Khan and his successors, had a duty to rule the world. 
However, while God’s authority and domain was clear, the Khans’ rule was yet to be 
established. As Voegelin suggests, “The Mongol Empire is according to its self 
interpretation, not a state among states in this world, but an imperium mundi in statu 
nascendi, a World-Empire-in-the-Making.”142 
This conception of one’s destiny is bound to have profound impact on one’s self-
understanding. At the very least, it gives rise to a self-image which is bound to appear 
extremely arrogant to non-Mongols. This is also an aspect of Mongol life which is duly 
noted by all who visited these lands during the rule of the great Khans.143 However, to 
revert for the moment to the Mongol communiqués, it is important to note that these 
letters only follow the first command of the Yasa and only promise to reveal other 
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commands once the superiority of the Mongols has been accepted.144 Again, as Voegelin 
points out, such a scheme makes war a punitive expedition against those who refuse to 
accept the heavenly decree of Mongol world-rule rather than a preemptive attack against 
non aggressors.145 Once the submission was achieved, either voluntarily or through 
force, the remaining commands of the Yasa would come into play.  As is clear from 
above, these remaining commands pertain to the administrative and civil conduct of the 
Mongol empire. 
 Before I finally move on to William of Rubruck’s account, a brief note on the 
impact of the Mongols on the course of world history is in order. Chingiz Khan’s career 
and his Yasa both hint on a remarkably goal oriented and rational approach to politics. 
And because of such an approach, the Mongol episode in world history, according to 
Spuler, played a fundamental role in determining the later course of development in the 
Latin west and in Islamic lands. More specifically, in the post-Mongol period, Islam 
increasingly locked itself in its past by systematizing theology and discouraging any 
intellectual activity which did not directly contribute towards enhancing religious piety; 
and as a result, instruction in philosophy and non-theological arts was eliminated from 
the Madrasas. This shift in direction primarily took place because of the very orthodox 
religio-political stance of the Mamluks of Sultan Baybars, who were eventually 
successful in repulsing the Mongols and restoring the line of Abbasid Caliphs.146 The 
decline of progressive Islam resulted in a gradual shift of the Old World knowledge to 
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the Latin West, which had the good fortune to remain safe from Mongol, or any other so 
called barbarian invasions, since the Viking raids.147 I have mentioned above, that it was 
during the Mongol period that the Far East first opened up for the westerners to actively 
pursue their mixed motives of trade and religion. In the aftermath of the Mongol decline, 
when traveling to the east became dangerous once again, the Europeans were forced to 
consider alternate routes to these lands by sea.148 This European desire to reach these far 
away lands was fuelled by the intercultural contacts and the knowledge they generated. 
This increased intercultural activity, as I have suggested above, was a result of the 
administrative policies of the Mongol rulers which, as the Yasa reveals, were focused on 
revenue generation and smooth access to even the remotest parts of the empire. 
However, for the Europeans, the Mongol policies created the opportunity for the first 
time to gain precise knowledge of what existed only in legends and myths.149  
 One can easily glean from the above discussion many additional possible 
avenues of enquiry in context of the impact that the Mongols had on world history and 
the influence that Mongol political ideas might have had on the history, thought and 
attitudes of the Islamic, Chinese and Western civilizations. It is, however, neither 
possible (because of limited space) nor advisable (due to the limited scope of this 
dissertation) to venture into that discussion. My purpose in bringing out these historical 
details of the Mongols has precisely been, as I stated earlier, to frame William of 
Rubruck’s account for the specific conception of CPT discussed in the previous chapter. 
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 William of Rubruck’s account features prominently as the most authentic 
European source in almost all general histories of thirteenth century Mongols.150 I began 
this chapter with a mention of some unique stylistic characteristics of William’s account 
as pointed out by Campbell. She also believes that William’s account marks a new era in 
the history of travel writing.151 This distinction becomes all the more important when we 
take seriously Campbell’s claim that “the history of travel writing in the pre-
enlightenment period is the history of Europe’s relations with the Orient.”152 William’s 
account is, therefore, not only important as a source on the Mongols, but also holds 
serious merit on its own terms in providing a model for the role of the witness in 
observing alien phenomena. This is to say, the method that William adopted in writing 
his travelogue was up to him and the commendable manner in which he accomplished 
this task is independent of the uniqueness of the circumstances he encountered in the 
Mongol lands. Part of this merit also comes from the fact that William accurately records 
not only what he saw, but also what he felt when he saw it.153 As Campbell illustrates, 
by juxtaposing William’s narrative against Marco Polo’s account, the former has no 
points to prove and the generalizations that William draws are based on verifiable 
experience rather than conjecture.154 Of course, Campbell’s discussion and treatment of 
William’s account is within the thematic boundaries of her broader work on the history 
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and development of the genre of travel narratives. Yet she makes the significant 
observation that it was 
only with the thirteenth century’s penetration into the secular East … 
[that] the literary struggle toward the establishment of the modern genre 
of travel writing  finally, formally begin… an experience that calls for 
new conventions and challenges the powers of language with an 
unprecedented object – the secular journey through the real world. … in 
Marco Polo’s and Friar William’s accounts we find … structures that 
follow space through time – emphatically the traveler’s time, not the time 
of the scriptural past or the unnarratable, unvisitable present of 
Wonders.155  
 
Campbell’s forceful endorsement of the significance of William’s work also implicitly 
recognizes many novel opportunities made available to Europeans, for the first time, 
during the Mongol era. If the history of travel is the history of Europe’s relations with 
the Orient, then the Mongol episode and William’s narrative are the two most significant 
sources to understand the development of relations between the West and its Oriental 
other in their embryonic stage. 
 The significance of William’s account in the context of the unique circumstances 
of the Mongol era and its implications for the inter-religious/ inter-civilizational dialogue 
during the high Middle Ages, has also been discussed by Nederman.156 In fact, 
Nederman’s work, in this context, is more appropriate for the purposes of this 
dissertation. Where Campbell identifies William’s place in the overall history of travel 
narratives, Nederman’s treatment of his account is focused on bringing forth the novelty 
of William’s experience within a thematic analysis of European discourses of toleration 
up to the early modern period. He not only strongly argues against the common 
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misconception that thinkers in the Latin Middle Ages were restricted by the unitary 
nature of Latin Christianity to have any worthwhile views on tolerance as a worthy 
principle or practice but also convincingly illustrates that reasoned defense of the virtues 
of religious toleration can be found in the works of thinkers as early as about 1100 
A.D.157 Once again William’s account, as Nederman argues, holds a special place in this 
pre-Enlightenment debate on toleration. More specifically, the contact between William 
and the Mongols provides us with the rare opportunity to see the actual act of navigating 
a religiously and culturally diverse and tolerant society by a Latin Christian missionary. 
This contact brings forth all the problems of inter-civilizational and inter-religious 
dialogue while highlighting the possibilities and practicability of peaceful coexistence.158 
In his later work, Nederman and his coauthors use William’s example specifically in 
context of CPT’s preference for the dialogical model of philosophical hermeneutics as 
the best way forward for comparative theorizing. Here again, Nederman’s approach is 
instructive for CPT, as it clearly demonstrates that the Gadamerian fusion of horizons is 
not always a given outcome of an inter-civilizational dialogue.159 But from the 
perspective of this dissertation and the conception of CPT elaborated upon in the 
previous chapter, the most significant aspect of Nederman’s work on toleration is his 
conviction that 
One may enlarge the horizons of current toleration theorists by means of 
a careful examination and appreciation of how early thinkers dealt with 
similar issues about diversity of human conviction and action. In turning 
our gaze towards the Middle Ages, we encounter a rich and complex 
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reality, in which thinkers as early as the twelfth century challenged the 
validity of repressive practices, proposed remarkably tolerant doctrines, 
and were sometimes prepared to respect deep differences among personal 
and group beliefs and actions, especially in religious matters.160  
 
 The spirit in which CPT scholarship started and has grown is verbatim the conviction 
expressed above. Nederman, in my opinion, provides substantial incentive to 
comparative theorists for expanding their horizons beyond the late modern period and 
seeking redress of the monopolistic tendencies which have taken root in western political 
theory. It was precisely the dissatisfaction with this aspect of traditional political theory 
that formed the very basis for investing in CPT as a new subfield; and the bias 
introduced by the monopolistic tendencies, as I discussed in the previous chapter, is not 
just restricted to the west but to a modern west. Furthermore, the notion that it is only in 
context of the recent wave of globalization and technological advancement necessitates a 
better understanding of the Other is once again rendered deficient when we consider 
examples from the pre-Enlightenment period such as William’s and others discussed in 
later chapters of this dissertation.  
 I have, until now, mentioned the unique stylistic characteristics and historical 
importance of William’s account as discussed by other scholars. But as I stated earlier, 
my motive in choosing William’s account for this dissertation is quite specific, i.e., to 
see what his encounter with the Mongols reveals about the contribution of the Other in 
the making of the Self. The first eight chapters of William’s report to Louis IX give a 
general description of the Mongols, focusing mainly on regional geography and history, 
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Mongol dietary habits, domicile and norms of societal conduct.161 The strangeness of 
what William encounters, even during this early part of his journey, is evident from his 
comment that the Mongols and their land was like a different world to him. However, 
the impression that one gets from this portion of his report is that of a detached observer 
who has no stake in what goes on in the Mongol society.162 Form the ninth chapter 
onwards, the tone of William’s report changes from that of an observer to that of a 
participant. Interestingly, it is also here that he first refers to the Mongols as Barbarians 
and reaffirms his analogy of a different world.163 After initial attempts to be polite, 
William concludes that the Mongols are a thankless and an extremely arrogant people 
and believe that nobody should deny them anything.164 Upon taking leave from the 
Mongols, in this initial encounter, William once again compares the experience of 
getting away from the natives as an equivalent of escaping from “the clutches of 
demons.”165 Mongol impudence and thanklessness, as we shall see, would be the least of 
William’s worries during his long journey in this strange land. Yet it is these basic 
attributes of a civilized people, in the western mind, that shape William’s impression of 
the Mongols.  
 Soon after this first encounter, William comes face to face the more concrete 
difficulties involved in accomplishing his mission. William’s mission, as he repeatedly 
claims, was a result of both his will to preach Christianity in Mongol lands and also to 
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fulfill the order of his superior, Louis IX, to deliver a letter to Sartach, a Mongol prince, 
who, according to a rumor in Europe, had converted to Christianity.166 It is, however, 
interesting that it was the possession of a letter by Louis IX, the emperor of the Franks, 
that resulted in William being pushed from one court to another to eventually reach the 
supreme ruler of the Mongols, the Great Khan Möngke.167 I shall return to this aspect of 
William’s journey later, but for the moment I want to go back to the more serious 
problems mentioned above. The most fundamental issue in having a successful or even a 
meaningful conversation with the Mongols was, of course, the language.168 Quite early 
on William describes his interpreter as “neither intelligent nor articulate.”169 But the 
problem, as becomes clear later and is acknowledged by William, too, was greater than 
mere lack of intelligence or eloquence of part of the interpreter; instead, it related to a 
total absence of a comparative vocabulary or expression in the Mongol language for the 
things that William wanted to say. This is especially frustrating for William, because 
whenever he saw the opportunity or had the inclination to preach Christianity, his 
interpreter openly admitted that he did not know how to express the things William was 
saying.170  
 If language was one barrier, the multi-ethnic, multi-racial and religiously 
pluralistic nature of the Mongol society was another. Initially, William tries to identify 
with the problems of the Christians. For example, when discussing the Russians, he 
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writes, “Because the Russians are Christians, they [Mongols] put Saracens in charge of 
them.”171 William’s observation here is contradictory and refutes several stories, given in 
the accounts of Rashd Al-Dn and Juvaini, about Mongol policy objectives.172 Indeed, 
the second part of William’s observation is more telling about the actual Mongol policy, 
i.e., “and when they can supply no more gold or silver, they and their little ones are 
herded out into the wilds to tend the Tartars’ livestock.”173 Mongol policy as given in 
Chingiz Khan’s Yasa was to be religion neutral as long as all religions served Mongol 
political purposes. Indeed, one finds several instances in the Mongol Empire where civil 
administrators were of a different religious affiliation than the populace under their 
control. However, the reasons for such appointments in fact prove that the Mongols did 
not prefer one religion over another. The criterion often used was the ability of the 
person appointed.174 Similarly, even though Chingiz’s Yasa instructed his successors to 
attribute all knowledge and power to the Mongol god (i.e., Tengri or eternal Heaven), 
when sending communiqués to other rulers, he made no requirement to enforce Mongol 
beliefs on conquered peoples.175  
 Following from above, it is also not unusual to find claims of Mongol preference 
to one religion over other by Muslim authors. For instance writing about Güyük Khan 
(second great Khan after Chingiz), Juvaini claims that he  
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… went to great lengths to honoring the Christians and their priests and 
when this was noised abroad, priests set their faces towards his court from 
Damascus and Rum and Baghdad and the As and the Rus; …. He 
naturally was prone to denounce the faith of Mohammad. Consequently 
the cause of the Christians flourished during his reign, and no Moslem 
dared to raise his voice…176 
 
 Of course, Juvaini blames Güyük’s Christian advisors for this injustice to the Muslims. 
But in an even more telling passage on Batu, he writes; 
He [Batu] was a king that inclined towards no faith or religion: he 
recognized only the belief in God and blindly attached to no sect or 
creed… The kings of every land and the monarchs of the horizons and 
everyone else came to visit him; and before their offerings … could be 
taken away to the treasury, he had bestowed them all upon Mongol and 
Moslem and all that were present.177 
 
Juvaini, who is Muslim, translates Batu’s lack of preference for any specific religion as 
an indication of his faith in one God, which, if we follow the Yasa, is most likely the 
Mongol sky-god Tengri. Still his audience, in comparison to Güyük’s, shifts 
dramatically from Christian priests to kings and monarchs of the world.  And even 
though Juvaini admits that Batu distributed offerings that he received to all who were 
present, he remembers specifically to mention Mongols and Moslems.  
 William’s observation about the Mongol practice to appoint Muslim 
administrators over a Christian populace and Juvaini’s understanding about Batu’s lack 
of special attention to the Christians, as against Güyük’s practice, reveals what I argued 
earlier, that despite the danger that the Mongols posed to both Christians and Muslims 
the primary concerns of representatives of both these civilizations remained focused on 
their age old rivalry with each other. What is more, it shows that favor for one’s own 
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civilization was gauged in terms of absence of the same for the opponent. William’s own 
encounter with Sartach (Batu’s son) and Batu, near the middle of his journey, is also 
noteworthy. In particular, he notes that when he was conveyed the order to visit Batu’s 
court by Sartach secretaries, they told him to refrain from saying that their master was 
Christian and cautioned him that he was a Mo’al.178 William perhaps correctly 
understands that Mongols believed that Christians were a people rather than a faith-
based affiliation. But interestingly he refuses to understand the Mongol limitation in 
grasping this concept and translates it as yet another example of their arrogance and their 
desire to promote their own name above all others.179 Even more important here is the 
fact that William is not totally insensitive to the Mongol concern for being known by 
their correct identity, as he clearly understands why they do not want to be called 
Tartars.180 For all we know, Sartach’s representatives could be cautioning William for 
his own good and to stay clear of any unintended trouble at Batu’s court, who, as we can 
ascertain from Juvaini’s observation, did not prefer any one religion over another in the 
true Mongol fashion. 
 William’s experience at Batu’s court once again confirmed his fears about 
Mongol indifference to his message and mission. When Batu asked him to speak, 
William went down on one knee, “as one does to a man,”181 but was admonished by his 
guide to kneel with both knees on the ground which, for William, was done only during 
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prayer. Given his posture at that particular moment, he therefore, decided to choose his 
words from a prayer stating that  
Be absolutely sure that you will not possess the things of Heaven without 
having become a Christian. For God says, “He that believeth and is 
baptized, shall be saved: but he that believeth not shall be condemned.182 
 
On hearing these words, Batu smiled and others present in his court ridiculed William, 
who bore this with patience and, through his interpreter, stated his actual reason for 
visiting Sartach. Batu did not take any offence at William’s words and instead gave him 
the honor to share a drink with him, which was regarded highly by the Mongols. This 
again affirms Juvaini’s claim that Batu was indifferent to Christianity.183  
 It is possible that the significance of William’s experience at Batu’s court may 
simply be a reconfirmation of his feelings that Mongols were arrogant and uncivilized. 
Still, at least one that William records is of great significance, i.e., the reason for Batu to 
ask William to go to Möngke’s court.184 The letter that William carried from Louis IX 
asked for permission to allow William to stay in the Mongol lands, which only Möngke 
could authorize. Batu played an important role in the election of Möngke as Great Chan. 
There are numerous references by Juvaini and Rashd Al-Dn attesting to his power 
within the Mongol ranks, yet his admission that he was not authorized to take the 
decision of allowing William to stay in Mongol lands is confirmation of the strict 
hierarchy maintained in the Mongol system based on Chingiz Khan’s commandments in 
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the Yasa.185 Second, Batu’s decision also casts a different light on William’s whole 
mission. Among the many scholars who have examined and analyzed William’s report, 
only Sinor claims that William undertook his journey because of his own religious zeal 
and not on the instructions of Louis IX.186 Batu’s reasoning, that Louis IX had asked for 
permission for William to stay, and William’s references in his report to Louis that at no 
point did he portray himself as Louis’s envoy, confirm Sinor’s reading. Sinor, however, 
does mention the reasons for Louis’s interest in renewing contacts with the Mongols 
after Pope Innocent IV had miserably failed in developing any workable relationship 
with them. More specifically, Louis’s efforts were based on a visit by two Mongol 
envoys in 1248 with a proposal for an alliance. These Mongol envoys who had Christian 
names reported that Great Khan Güyük and a number of other Mongol dignitaries had 
been baptized and now had the desire to help the crusaders to repossess the holy land.187 
While this confirms Juvaini’s claims of Güyük’s Christian leanings, it does not sit well 
with the letter that Güyük wrote to Pope Innocent IV (both of which are mentioned 
earlier in this chapter). Leaving aside the truth of the matter of Güyük’s religious 
inclinations, what I want to highlight here, by referring to Sinor’s argument, is William’s 
absolute disappointment upon eventual failure of his mission. However, before I discuss 
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this aspect, I want to mention one other extremely significant event that took place when 
William was at Möngke’s court in Karakorum.188  
 The journey to Möngke’s court and the time that William spent there is the most 
interesting, and also the most revealing, part of William’s journey. During these several 
months of travel, William first saw the real potential of actually converting the locals to 
Christianity. However, this only remained a potential, again because of his lack of a lack 
of a good interpreter.189 Upon reaching Karakorum, William’s first reaction was one of 
sheer amazement at the religious plurality that he witnessed in the Mongol capital.190 
Some of these religious practices, while detestable to William, are also a source of great 
inquisitiveness because of their novelty and an absolute lack of a parallel in the west 
such as Buddhism. In this regard, the following observations are extremely revealing, 
especially because here we find William in a similar fix as his interpreter, who could not 
find parallel vocabulary to express the tenets of the Roman Catholic faith in the Mongol 
language. He writes;  
Wherever they go, they also have constantly in their hands a string of a 
hundred or two hundred beads, like the rosaries we carry…191  
 
When I saw them I took them for Franks, being clean shaven, but the 
miters they were wearing on their heads were of paper192 
 
Wherever they go, they always wear saffron tunics, fairly tight and with a 
belt outside, exactly like Franks, and have a cloak hanging from the left 
shoulder and folded round the chest and back to their right side, the way a 
deacon wears a chasuble in Lent.193    
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The significant thing in these passages is the fact that William is able to describe alien 
Buddhist religious practices, which are unheard of in the west, by emphasizing their 
similarity to western religious rites.  This similarity, as William emphasizes, is such that 
it is hard to tell the difference between Buddhist monks and French priests. This is to 
suggest that the barbarian (or in this case the infidel) Other, when encountered, can only 
be described and understood in terms which are understandable to the Self. The 
strangeness of Buddhist practices and customs were after all not so strange when 
William reflected on them and was required to explain them to a potential audience. 
However, the realization that there are similarities is immediately obscured when 
William talks to the monks; the conversation about religious beliefs, which is cut short 
by the inability of the interpreter yet again, immediately creates the difference which 
distinguishes William form the infidels.194  
  The other and perhaps the most remarkable event in William’s whole journey 
was what Southern has called “the first world debate in modern history between 
representatives of East and West.”195 Scholars have analyzed this debate from multiple 
vantage points.196 However, one element of it that I find most interesting, and which is 
also mentioned by Samarrai, albeit from a totally different perspective and extremely 
briefly, is the fact that the alliance that formed before the debate began was between the 
Christians, the Muslims and the Nestorians against the Buddhists.197 Of the faiths 
represented in this debate, the three that had the most similarity combined against the 
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one which had little to share. What is more, William convinced the Nestorians to make 
an alliance with the Muslims against the Buddhists based on his understanding of 
similarities between Islam and Christianity.198 As Nederman points out, there is no 
indication in William’s text regarding who won the debate or even for that matter what 
could be termed as victory in such a debate.199  
From my perspective, the debate represents the type of discourse promoted and 
encouraged by CPT in its embryonic form. The circumstances in which William’s 
journey took place and its miserable outcome in terms of his ultimate objective of 
evangelizing the Mongols are instructive in understanding the complexities involved in 
an inter-cultural encounter. William’s account is perhaps the most suitable place to begin 
a discussion of CPT, primarily because it simply does not allow us the luxury to build 
neat imaginary dialogues between representatives of different civilizations. Moreover, if 
we accept Sinor’s claim that William’s journey was a result of his own religious zeal 
then maybe in his person we have found the first comparative theorist, i.e., especially if 
accept Euben’s definition of theory, as I explained in the previous chapter. Similarly 
when we shift our focus from William to the Mongol age we find globalization in its 
embryonic form. Again the central role ascribed to this phenomenon by comparativists 
seems to be overstated. As I argued in the last chapter, the Mongols were powerful, but 
their policies of religious toleration and facilitating international commerce allowed 
representatives of threatened, if not weaker, civilization to visit previously inaccessible 
regions of the world. The suddenness of the Mongol rise is yet another factor to keep in 
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mind, as in terms of non existence of precedence, the Mongol rise parallels CPT’s claims 
about the recent wave of globalization and technological advancement. The surprise with 
which the Mongols took the world forced members of established civilizations to reflect 
on how they understood themselves. In terms of methodological guidelines, encounters 
between the Mongols and William, as well as representatives of other civilizations, 
instruct us to entertain the notion that inter-civilizational contact almost invariably 
results in broadening of horizons. As Nederman and others have highlighted, this 
broadening of horizons does not always translate into a Gadamerian fusion of horizons. 
As we see from the analysis of William’s narrative above, the Mongols remained “no 
people and foolish nation” in western eyes. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
WISE MEN OF THE FRANKS200: JESUIT MISSIONARIES AT THE COURT 
OF EMPEROR AKBAR THE GREAT (A.D. 1580-1583) 
 
This chapter discusses the observations of the first delegation of Jesuit 
missionaries invited by the Mughal Emperor Akbar the Great to his court. The first 
Jesuit mission came to and stayed in India for approximately three years (A.D. 1580-
1583). In his invitation, addressed to the Chief Fathers of the order of St. Paul, Akbar 
had expressed the desire to know more about the Christian faith and asked requested the 
presence of, “learned priests, who should bring with them principle books of the Law 
and the Gospel, so that I [Akbar] may learn the law and what is most perfect in it.201 This 
was indeed a most fortunate development for the Society of Jesus, which had 
piggybacked on Portuguese success and established itself firmly in India at the time of 
this invitation.202 Furthermore, the prospect of converting the Mughal emperor to 
Christianity was directly in line with the general missionary practice of the Society, 
which preferred to achieve mass conversions by employing a top-down approach.203  
There is ample evidence that the Jesuits were wishfully optimistic in their assessment of 
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the Indian emperor’s readiness to adopt their faith. But the record of their observations 
also reveals that in their zeal to Christianize the whole of India through its Emperor, the 
Jesuits failed miserably to understand Akbar’s politics or personality. His interest in 
Christianity, though genuine, was nothing more than his general desire or curiosity to 
know about the essence of diverse religious traditions. This desire, and the politics which 
took shape because of it, are perhaps the outcome of the problems and challenges he 
confronted in consolidating his empire the most distinguishing characteristic of which 
was religious diversity. As a consequence of this situation, Akbar invited and 
encouraged discussions on doctrinal issues among delegates from various religious 
traditions at his court.204 There is no single consolidated record of these debates, but this 
problem is somewhat compensated for by the fact that participants and contemporary 
historians on opposing sides of the debates have recorded their perspectives in accounts 
of Akbar’s reign, in particular, and Indian history, in general. 
 The primary source that I have chosen for analyzing this encounter between early 
modern India and Europe is the commentary of Father Antonio Monserrate, a member of 
the first Jesuit delegation.205 Monserrate accompanied Akbar on his military campaign to 
Afghanistan and was aware of the plot which prompted that invasion. His observations 
on India generally, and more specifically on Akbar’s interest in art and literature, his 
religious leanings, style of government and warfare, and his political ideas, are a treasure 
trove of valuable insights into the European interpretation of early modern Indian 
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society, culture and religions. In addition to Monserrate’s commentary, I will also look 
at the letters that Monserrate and his colleagues sent to the Society superiors during their 
stay at the court.206  Second, I will rely on the Ain-i-Akbari, written by Akbar’s partisan 
and minister (vizier) Abul Fazl.207 Ain-i-Akbari is the third volume of Akbar’s court 
history, the Akbar Nama, and is a detailed gazetteer of Akbar’s reign. The Ain will help 
us in contextualizing the observations made by Monserrate in his commentary, on the 
one hand, and informing us about Akbar’s political thought, on the other. As with the 
Jesuit missionaries, I will also be using letters sent from Akbar’s court to foreign rulers, 
governors and local leaders within his Empire and his allies. Third, I will consider 
Muntakhabu-t-Tawarikh (Selections from Histories) of Al Badaoni.208 Al Badaoni was 
Akbar’s courtier, too, but wrote a dissident account of his reign. His history sheds 
important light on the intellectual tensions which were the hallmark of Akbar’s India. 
The Ain and the Tawarikh are massive works, the completion of which took decades, 
and they cover much more than what is of immediate concern in this chapter; it is 
significant, therefore, to mention that the focus here is intentionally limited to the 
sections of these works that deal with explaining Akbar’s political thought and practice 
and are also relevant in context of inter-civilizational contacts.  
These sources show that Akbar’s invitation to the Jesuits was initiated in the 
context of the ongoing arguments at his court about the nature and purpose of the 
sovereign’s role and in terms of the relationship between religion and politics. By virtue 
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of their training and missionary methodological practices, the Jesuits were well equipped 
to engage in these debates and hold their ground against rival religious traditions. 
However, historical records left by the Jesuits suggest that they read more into the 
imperial invitation than was merited. The Jesuits in fact treated these religious debates 
almost as an irritant in effectively pursuing their ultimate goal to convert the emperor. 
Their inability to comprehend with the broader context in which they received the 
imperial invitation reveals the significance of the mindset with which one approaches the 
Other for an inter-civilizational dialogue.  
The choice of Akbar’s India as a case to be included in this dissertation is also 
significant from the perspective that the Mughals were descendants of the Mongols. 
Akbar’s political thought exhibited visible signs of influence from key features of 
Mongol political ideas, in particular, the continuing impact of the code of laws allegedly 
developed by Chingiz Khan.209 This aspect of Akbar’s lineage, both personal and 
political, represents a certain degree of continuity with the case discussed in the previous 
chapter. On the other hand, and from a European perspective, India played the role of a 
launching-pad for Jesuit missionary work in the east. For instance, Matteo Ricci, whose 
life and work in China are the subject of the next chapter, began his missionary career in 
the  east from India. The same holds for Francis Xavier, the first Jesuit missionary of 
note to work in the east, who used India as a base for approaching Japan and China. 
These two features provide a broader civilizational context for analyzing this encounter 
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between the western civilization and Mughal India. Another significant element that 
needs to be at the back of any analyst’s mind when discussing Mughal India is the fact 
that the Mughals themselves were foreigners in India. Akbar’s reign is interesting 
specifically because, even though he was the third in succession among the Mughal 
rulers, he was the first who actively worked towards consolidating his empire and 
forging a nation from the religiously and culturally diverse Indian population around the 
figure of the emperor.210 In crafting his political plan, Akbar and his vizier Abul Fazl 
borrowed ideas from the Central Perso-Islamic, Turko-Islamic and Greek traditions. 211 
As I have stated earlier, the Jesuits failed to read Akbar’s secular intentions and 
interpreted his politics, which surely was unconventional for a Muslim monarch, as 
being directed against Islam and therefore in favor of Christianity. The Jesuit 
misinterpretation was due to western civilization’s past experience with Islam.  
Akbar was the third Mughal ruler of India but the first two, Babur and Humayun, 
were merely conquerors.212 Babur remained busy in acquiring more of India’s territory 
and his son Humayun in re-acquiring what he inherited from his father but had lost 
because of lack of interest and political acumen to deal with matters of the state.213 
Akbar, who was Humayun’s son, was the first among Mughal rulers who consistently 
enlarged the territorially meager empire inherited from his father and also invested great 
effort in consolidating his conquests. Akbar achieved this consolidation simultaneously 
on two fronts. First, the measures were taken to build an infrastructure for the efficient 
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administration of the empire through the creation of a composite ruling class.214 Second, 
the imperial patronage was directed to the arts, i.e., translations of religious and secular 
literature from ancient and regional languages into Persian, painting, architecture, 
religious and secular debates at the court and historiography.215 As a result of these 
measures, Akbar was successful in establishing himself as the first “national king of 
India,” meaning that his status as the ruler was accepted by all in his empire regardless 
of their ethnic, religious or cultural affiliation.216 A crucial connotation that this term 
suggests is that Akbar was successful in molding an Indian nation founded on ideals 
independent of the religious affiliations of the populace in his empire. While this was no 
small feat given the times during which Akbar accomplished this task, it also raises some 
interesting questions regarding the popular notion that India was ruled by a Muslim 
minority for over 700 years till the advent of the Europeans. As the discussion of 
Akbar’s political thought below suggests, he was able to achieve such a status primarily 
through the consistent rejection of the inherited obligations and influences of his Muslim 
birth. 
The key features of Akbar’s political thought as mentioned by Abul Fazl in the 
Ain, and summarized here at the cost of oversimplification, seem to be extracted from 
his tendency to reject an ideologically bound traditional basis of identity. In the context 
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of India, he opted for the state to reject both the dominant religious ideologies, i.e., 
Hinduism as well as Islam, and proposed instead a synthesis anchored on the notion of 
sulh-i-kul or universal peace. By doing so he attempted to divest the Muslim and Hindu 
officials of the state, of the tendency on part of each, to view the Other from their 
respective religious frameworks of thinking. This was no doubt a truly ingenuous 
approach to solving the problems of a multi-confessional polity. However, what is even 
more remarkable is the manner in which Abul Fazl lays  the theoretical foundation for 
sulh-i-kul. He writes 
God, the Giver of intellect and the Creator of matter, forms mankind as 
He pleases, and gives to some comprehensiveness, and to others 
narrowness of disposition. Hence the origin of two opposite tendencies 
among men, one class of whom turn to religious (dn) and the other class 
to worldly thoughts (duny). Each of these two divisions selects different 
leaders,217 and mutual repulsiveness grows to open rupture.218 
 
In the above quote it is noteworthy that the nature of the temporal world or the 
human condition is defined in terms of the creation of intellect in man instead of the act 
of creation of the first man. It is the intellect which equips human beings with reason, 
whether limited or comprehensive, and makes them realize their self-interest. Based on 
this self-interest, human beings then choose their leaders in distinct religious or worldly 
arenas. It is noteworthy that Abul Fazl emphasizes the inherently conflicting nature of 
religious and worldly reasoning. This could lead one to assume that in Abul Fazl’s 
scheme conflict is not only an unavoidable, but also an irresolvable feature of human 
existence. He therefore clarifies in a later passage by exploring the question whether 
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there is any possibility of achieving common ground between the conflicting religious 
and worldly tendencies of men and answers in a matter of fact manner that, 
When the time of reflection comes, and men shake off the prejudices of 
their education, the threads of the web of religious blindness break, and 
the eye sees the glory of harmoniousness.219   
 
One can detect a clear predilection for reason over revelation in Akbar’s thought 
via Abul Fazl’s reasoning.220 However, before one goes further, another important point 
to note here is the presence of a glorious harmony in God’s world which the humans can 
only recognize after they have shed the fallacious images conjured because of the 
presence of varying degrees of intellect. If God’s world is harmonious, as Abul Fazl 
repeatedly asserts in elegant Persian prose and verse throughout this chapter in the Ain, 
then the blame for strife in human society lies squarely with human intellect, which 
ascribes false significance to religious or temporal matters.221 Divisions between 
religious and temporal worlds thus are creations of the human intellect and not of God 
and therefore untrue. Furthermore, since God is one and he created man and his intellect 
along with everything else in the world, humans, when they are able to see beyond their 
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self created images, find that everything in the world is in perfect harmony and universal 
peace reigns simply because the cause of conflict has been overcome.222  
Yet, the ability to see beyond this deception is not everyone’s forte, primarily 
because of the factors mentioned earlier, but also because even if some people possessed 
such wisdom, the majority’s inability to see beyond the deception would cause its 
members to be cautious in the interest of self-preservation.223 Abul Fazl states that if a 
time comes when a people or a nation as a whole learn to worship truth, they invariably 
look towards their king because of his exalted status. These people then also expect their 
king to be their spiritual guide, because he alone is ordained with the “ray of Divine 
wisdom.”224 He claims that Akbar is such a king, indifferent to the usual joys and 
sorrows of the temporal world, and “is the spiritual guide of the nation, and sees in the 
performance of his duties a means of pleasing God.”225 As the bearer of divine authority 
and a representative of the divine will, it thus becomes Akbar’s responsibility to avert  
conflict of any sort between the people under his rule and inform them of the true nature 
of things beyond the veil cast by imperfect human intellect over human understanding.  
Abul Fazl also distinguishes between a true king and a selfish ruler. He states that 
in the case of the former, the many advantages that a mighty king has are longer lasting 
whereas in the case of a selfish ruler these are short lived.226 This is so because a true 
king does not attach himself to the outward grandeur of the empire and dedicates himself 
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to removing oppression and provide for everything which is good. These include, among 
other things, security, health, justice, faithfulness, and truth.227 In further elaborating on 
the nature and conduct of a true king, Abul Fazl establishes a direct link between God 
and king without any intermediaries.228 The true king, because of his divine nature, also 
possesses god-like abilities which restrict him from reacting in a typically human fashion 
to worldly stimuli.229  
The theory of sovereignty or that of the ideal monarch which takes shape from 
the precepts discussed above is surprisingly modern in its outlook. As Akbar puts it 
repeatedly in the letters written to other monarchs and the administrators of his empire, 
and Abul Fazl says in the Ain, the true king must “put the reigns of desire into the hands 
of reason.”230  Once the king accepts reason as his guide it obligates him to ensure and 
provide swift justice without regard to the class and status of the petitioner, protect the 
life and liberty of the populace, save the populace from potential tyrants, and promote 
happiness in his realm by achieving harmony and peace by ridding the polity from 
several potential and existing diseases introduced because of the presence of varying 
degrees of intellect in ordinary humans.  
Abul Fazl, however, once again underscores the fact that it is only the true king 
who can achieve these goals in their true spirit as he never tries to defy the dictates of 
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reason.231 In other words, reason is prior to the set of public goods mentioned above 
because they can only be truly achieved with recourse to reason. The other 
accompanying set of obligations for the ideal ruler which this rather circular theory of 
sovereignty demands from the true king is that, since he represents divinity, i.e., the 
factor which distinguishes him from ordinary humans and selfish rulers, he does not 
withhold his blessings from those who do not follow the path of reason and are driven by 
their defective or incomplete intellect. In other words, entitlement of the populace to the 
set of obligations mentioned above, i.e., justice, security, right to happiness, guidance to 
embark on the path of truth and reason, etc., are the universal rights of the populace 
regardless of their religious orientation.232 In the ultimate analysis the true king is divine, 
tolerant and magnanimous towards his subjects. As might be expected, Abul Fazl in the 
Ain clearly endows Akbar with the qualities of a true king and posits him as the perfect 
man. He also gives several examples of the Emperor’s deeds and acts in support of his 
claim in the Ain.233  
One could think of Abul Fazl’s theory of sovereignty as flattery from a trusted 
and be loved aide of the emperor. However, when one looks at Akbar’s correspondence 
with other rulers, members of his family, and his administrators, it appears that he 
believed in his own divine nature and regularly practiced and propagated the policy of 
sulh-i-kul to others.234 For example, in his letter to the European king mentioned in the 
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title of this chapter, Akbar accepts the divine status of his counterpart and therefore 
highlights their common quest to rule in accordance with the dictates of reason, making 
it the basis for extending a hand of friendship.235 Furthermore, he addressed the 
European king as “Wise Men of the Franks.” This manner of addressing a monarch only 
begins to make sense after the brief discussion of Akbar’s notion of the fallibility of 
human intellect and his theory of sovereignty, i.e., Akbar allowed the same status to his 
European counterpart that he had assumed for himself.  It is also noteworthy that 
towards the end of this letter, Akbar categorically stated his belief that 
Most people were prisoners of the shackles of uncritical acceptance 
 (taqld) without any real piety, they adopt the customs of their 
 predecessors, relatives and associates that too blindly without any 
 reflection, careful consideration and arguments. They accept the same 
 faith among those whose followers they were brought up, and they 
 remain without virtue of verification  (tahqq) – a prerequisite of 
 wisdom and truth – the finding of which is the proper goal of 
 reason.236 
 
 Similarly in one of his farmans (ordinances) to the current and future 
administrators of the empire, Akbar cancels the tax on all items that constitute means of 
necessary livelihood for the populace.237 Moreover, he requires from his officials to 
ensure that 
  Weak people were not oppressed by the strong and the tyrants do not 
  stretch the hand of cruelty and oppression over the downtrodden and 
  crush them ruthlessly.238 
 
                                                 
235
 Haider (1998) p.8 
236
 Ibid., pp.9-10 
237
 These included food items, medicine, oil, perfumes, garments and cloth, household articles made of 
metal, leather, grass etc. See ibid. p. 14 
238
 Ibid. 
 101 
In another circular, which enumerates the duties of the imperial officers, Akbar clearly 
instructs them to 
Study books on ethics and good morals … so that they may be acquainted 
with the various extreme stages and requirements of faith and piety and 
may not be diverted from the right path by mischief-mongers.239  
 
The circular further states that 
The best service to God in this world is the growth of relations and the 
accomplishment of works of people’s welfare which they should perform 
without regard to (personal) friendship, enmity or relationship.240 
 
Officers  
Should patronize the people whom God had blessed with the courage to 
speak truly for such men are rare. While mean and wicked people have no 
inclination towards truth and desire their ruler to be involved in trouble, 
the good and righteous fear to speak the truth apprehending some trouble 
for themselves and being cautious that the addressee may not feel hurt.241 
 
Finally they 
Should not interfere with religious matters, customs or beliefs of people, 
for a wise person would not intentionally choose his own loss in transient 
worldly affairs, how could he then deliberately select a wrong path in 
eternal matters? If the men are right, they (the officers) should not oppose 
them unnecessarily. If they are not on the right path, even then they (the 
officers) should not interfere or oppose them, for they (men) are the 
victims of ignorance and as such deserve sympathy rather than opposition 
and oppression.242 
 
A brief look at the instructions to the officers in imperial ordinances and the letters to 
other rulers supports the notion that Abul Fazl’s political ideas, as expounded in the Ain, 
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were at the core of Akbar’s imperial policy. It is useful here to remember that Akbar 
ruled India for almost half a century and one could divide this period into various 
phases. In the first phase, he concentrated on reacquiring and expanding the territorial 
limits of his realm, as the kingdom that he had inherited from Humayun, his father, was 
not substantial.243 During the second phase of his rule, i.e., by the mid-1560’s, Akbar 
had acquired substantial territory and he began to concentrate on developing a solid 
bureaucratic administration and imperial service to manage the expanding empire.244 In 
the development of this administrative infrastructure, he appointed Hindus and Muslims 
alike to key governmental posts. This proved to be a highly effective move, as it raised 
Akbar’s status from that of a conqueror of India, belonging to a foreign minority, to the 
accepted leader of all Indians.245 During this phase, he also forged alliances with Hindu 
Rajputs, rulers of independent smaller states, and married Hindu princesses to cement 
those alliances.246 According to Spear, Akbar’s imperial service opened the previously 
non-existent opportunity to be part of the highly prestigious imperial service to those 
who previously sought fame and glory through recourse to obscure local independence, 
via insurrection, or through committing gang robberies.247 The dates of the letters and 
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the Ain and Twarikh suggest that the ideas delineated above derive from third phase of 
Akbar’s rule, which begins in early 1570s.248  
During this third phase, Akbar actively pursued a policy of religious toleration 
and invited members of different religious traditions to visit his court and argue about 
doctrinal matters pertaining to their respective faiths. According to Badaoni, this act was 
based on lack of formal educational in Akbar’s life, which made him believe that 
The Truth is an inhabitant of every place: and that consequently 
how could it be right to consider it as confined to one religion or 
creed, and that, one [Islam] which had only recently made its 
appearance and had not yet endured a thousand years! And why 
assert one thing and deny another, and claim pre-eminence, for 
that which is not pre-eminent?249 
 
As has been mentioned earlier, Badaoni offers a dissident account of Akbar’s 
reign. His history is replete with similar comments about and details of events, but, from 
the perspective of an orthodox believer in Islam.250 Badaoni also illustrates the 
ideological tensions, as regards the correct relationship between religion and politics and 
the role and status of the sovereign in early modern India. Badaoni’s primary concern is 
Akbar’s willingness to open up Islamic beliefs to debate by followers of other faiths. He 
also perturbed by the skill of non-Muslims in articulating the logic of their respective 
faiths through recourse to reason, writing that “within a short period of time no trace of 
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traditional Islam was left in the Emperor.”251 Badaoni dedicates several pages in the 
second volume to demonstrating the  specific influence of different religious traditions 
on Akbar’s policy  and thought.252  
While the tone of Badaoni’s narrative seems to ridicule the Emperor for his 
follies, he also seems perplexed by the fact that Akbar did not find any problem in 
believing in all the religions simultaneously and in adopting whatever suited him the 
most from each tradition. For instance, due to the influence of a Brahman, he appeared 
in public with his forehead marked like a Hindu253 and strongly agreed with the notion 
that the transmigration of souls was an indisputable common element in every religious 
tradition.254 He also prohibited the slaughter of cows and used to chant spells taught by 
Hindus to subdue the sun.255 Similarly, Badaoni states that Akbar firmly believed in the 
truth of the Christian faith because of the influence of Christian monks from Europe.256 
At another place, he expatiates on the   influence of Zoroastrians on the emperor who 
persuaded the latter to start the practice of keeping a perpetual sacred fire like the kings 
of Persia.257  
Badaoni also underlines the fact that part of the reason for Akbar to move away 
from Islam was frequent disagreements among Muslim scholars present at his court. 
These scholars represented different sects and seemed to hold diametrically opposed 
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views on most doctrinal issues.258 This obviously militated directly against Akbar’s 
agenda, since he was keenly interested in developing a strong basis for the peaceful 
coexistence of all religions within his empire. One must remember here the earlier 
discussion about the fallibility of human intellect. If we take Akbar’s and Abul Fazl’s 
argument at face value, then by not adhering strictly to the dictates and doctrines of a 
single religion, Akbar was probably seeking to demonstrate his superior or even divine 
ability to see beyond the supposed restrictions imposed by intellect on the reasoning 
ability of ordinary human beings. Support for this claim can be found in Akbar’s attempt 
to form a new religious or ethical creed popularly known as Din-i-Ilahi or the Divine 
Faith.259  
A detailed discussion of the true nature of Din-i-Ilahi is not within the scope of 
this dissertation. However, it is pertinent to briefly discuss some of the key features of 
Din-i-Ilahi and also the circumstances which propelled Akbar to think seriously in terms 
of instituting a new religion. These circumstances relate to Akbar’s growing discontent 
with Islam in particular and organized religion in general during the last phase of his 
rule. Badaoni, after deliberating at length on various un-Islamic practices that the 
emperor had fallen into or was flirting with, reproduces verbatim the text of a document 
presented to Akbar in A.D. 1579 by Muslim scholars and jurists holding positions of 
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prominence in various parts of the empire.260 This most extraordinary document 
proclaimed that, according to Islamic sources, the rank of Sultn-i-dil (just ruler) is 
higher in the eyes of God than the rank of the Mujtahid (an authority on points of 
religious law). Therefore, in the interest of the nation and political expediency, Akbar’s 
decrees regarding religious questions on which the Mujtahids cannot agree will be final 
and binding on the entire  nation.261 Furthermore, according to the document, the 
emperor was entitled to issue new orders as long as these were in conformity  with some 
verse of the Quran and held real benefit for the nation.262 Though Badaoni does not give 
a specific date, he states that soon after receiving this document Akbar abolished use of 
the Islamic Hijri calendar and inaugurated a new era which began with the first year of 
his accession to throne; this era was termed Trkh-i-Ilh.263 In addition, he notes that 
anti-Islamic activity at the court gained greater momentum and that subjects like 
astronomy, mathematics, medicine, poetry, history and novels were cultivated and 
thought more significant than study of the Quran or Islamic law.264  
Abul Fazl and Badaoni present two extremes of the overall spectrum of ideas 
regarding religion and politics which had currency in Akbar’s India. It was in this very 
context that Akbar sent the invitation for Jesuit missionaries to come to his court. The 
Jesuits, as mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, were ecstatic about Akbar’s 
interest in the Christian faith and sensed that he was possibly on the verge of conversion 
                                                 
260
 For the details of the signatories see ibid. p. 278 and for the copy of the actual text see pp. 279-280  
261
 See ibid. p.279  
262
 Badaoni claims that the document was written and signed first of all by Abul Fazl’s father, Sheikh 
Mubarak, who was the Mufti of the empire (chief jurist). Ibid.p.280 
263
 Ibid. p. 316 Akbar also commissioned the writing of a new history of the thousand years starting from 
his own ancestors. See Moin (2005) pp.1-2 
264
 Ibid. 
 107 
to Christianity. 265 Soon after their arrival at the court, the Jesuits inquired from a 
Christian priest, who was acting as their host on the emperor’s request, into Akbar’s 
views on religion in general and the status of his knowledge about the Gospel in 
particular.266 The fundamental bias of the European missionaries becomes evident even 
during this early phase of their stay at the court. Based on his interaction with Akbar, the 
host informs the missionaries that in his opinion the emperor revered Christ and the 
Virgin and was not far from acknowledging and embracing Christianity as the true faith. 
Immediately after this sentence, and quite ironically, the host identifies the doctrinal 
issues, which according to the king, prevented him from converting to Christianity. He 
says,  
But as the king himself said, his judgment is clouded, as it were, when he 
heard that there are three persons in one God, that God had begotten a son 
from a virgin, had suffered on the cross, and had been killed by the 
Jews.267  
 
The host further suggests that if somehow Akbar could be made to believe that the 
Gospel had in fact come from God, the inconsistency between these doctrinal matters 
and human reason could easily be resolved.268 This solution could only be suggested by 
somebody who was ignorant of Akbar’s political and religious ideas discussed earlier in 
the chapter. First of all, the doctrinal matters mentioned by the host all defy human 
reason. Second, the proposed solution indicates an incorrect understanding of the 
problem that needed to be resolved in order to convert the emperor. Akbar claimed to be 
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the representative of God. One must also remember that this conversation between the 
newly arrived missionaries and their host took place after Akbar had received the 
authority from Muslim scholar to be the supreme authority on earth even in religious 
matters. As the conversation further reveals, the Jesuits seem to have interpreted Akbar’s 
lack of devotion to Islam as their good fortune.269 This is also evident from the fact that 
in their meeting with the King, after this conversation, the Jesuits were invited to 
participate in the religious debates at the court. Monserrate notes that the Jesuits took 
this as “an opportunity to debate the accuracy and authority of the Holy Scriptures on 
which the Christian religion is founded and that of the vanity and lies of the book in 
which the Musalmans [Muslims] put their faith.”270 Monserrate relates that the King was 
impressed by the arguments made by the missionaries, and in private asked them for an 
explanation of the doctrinal issues mentioned by their host earlier.271 Interestingly, the 
Jesuit response to the king’s request was to pray and seek enlightenment from God on 
these issues and humbly wait for His response.272  
Monserrate records several similar debates after this one and notes that the king 
was happy that all the missionaries were united in their opinions, whereas the Muslims 
could never seem to agree on anything.273 Akbar himself also encouraged the 
missionaries in believing that he was on the verge of conversion. According to 
Monserrate, he suggested to the missionaries that if he felt his conversion to Christianity 
                                                 
269
 According to the host Akbar believed that “Muhammad was a rascally imposter, who had deluded and 
infatuated men by his lies” See ibid.  
270
 Ibid. p.37 
271
 Ibid. p.38 
272
 Ibid. 
273
 Ibid., p. 39 for debates see pp. 39-42, 50-51, 57-8, 100-101, 118-121, 136-9,  
 109 
would cause an upheaval in his empire, he would pretend to his people that he is going 
for pilgrimage to Mecca but would instead go to Goa and get baptized.274 In addition, 
Monserrate claims that Akbar always sided with the missionaries during religious 
debates and praised them extravagantly.275 However, despite this optimism, the 
missionaries also realized the problems involved in converting the emperor, partly 
because of possible political repercussions, but also because of their assessment of 
Akbar’s nature and approach. Some of these are spelled out in a letter written by father 
Acquaviva, a member of the delegation, to Everard Mercurian, Superior General of the 
Society of Jesus.276 The primary problems that Acquaviva mentions are that Akbar 
“wanted to understand the scriptures through recourse to reason, and that he is very 
curious and wants actual miracles to be convinced.”277 Acquaviva further suggests that 
Akbar is familiar with the authority of the Pope and the power of the King of Portugal 
and would be positively influenced towards Christianity if he received some gifts from 
these two.278  
Other than these insights into Akbar’s approach towards Christianity and religion 
in general, Jesuit letters generally highlight two other tendencies which are of 
significance for CPT. First, they repeatedly point to the problems linked to 
communicating their point of view to the King because of their limited language ability 
in Persian or Arabic and the resulting necessity to communicate through an 
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interpreter.279 Second, even though they realize the difficulties involved in the 
conversion of the emperor and gradually even came to the point of accepting the futility 
of their enterprise, they did not give up hope because of Akbar’s lack of interest in 
Islam. Acquaviva, for instance, categorically states that,  
we have not lost hope, for it is no mean achievement to have reached half 
the way, that is, his [Akbar’s] having lost faith in his religion.280 
 
Similarly, in terms of missionary zeal, the Jesuits fare great pride and joy in the fact that 
they could be very close to martyrdom. They had publicly announced that Mohammad 
was an Antichrist and for such an act the punishment was the death penalty.281 This point 
is important for CPT, as the Jesuits failed to comprehend  the complexity of Akbar’s 
approach to religion and politics because of their own bias against Islam. What 
Acquaviva claims as half the achievement, i.e., Akbar’s loss of faith in Islam, could 
actually be the most serious problem of his having lost faith in religion in general, 
including Christianity.  
Comparative theorists who favor construction of imaginary dialogues by 
comparing philosophical treatises from non-western traditions with their western 
counterparts risk the same error committed by the Jesuits. Such an approach can leed to 
construction of faulty hypotheses because of incorrect problem identification at the 
planning stage of a comparative study. As the discussion of Akbar’s and Abul Fazl’s 
theory of sovereignty clearly suggests, Akbar’s chief concern as a ruler was to achieve 
cohesion in a religiously diverse populace. He overcame this problem first by 
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theoretically constructing for his subjects a Rawls-like veil of ignorance through a 
description of the centrality as well as fallibility of human intellect in understanding 
religious or temporal matters. Second, he acquired authority from Muslim scholars for 
his superior status vis-à-vis Muslim jurists in deciding matters of faith. A truly aware 
Jesuit mission would not have misinterpreted Akbar’s willingness to hear criticism of 
Islam as a hopeful sign for their own purpose. In fact, Akbar’s perplexity on the select 
doctrinal issues related to Christianity, as noted before, could be interpreted as his 
mockery of the intellect of those who believed in Christianity, since all these questions 
were about phenoma that defy human reason.  
A related possibility for Akbar’s tolerance of a critique of Islam, which cannot be 
ignored, is the timing of the Jesuit mission’s presence in India. One must remember that 
this was the completion of the millennium since the migration of the prophet from 
Mecca to Medina. Several measures that Akbar enforced during this period are 
suggestive as regards his intentions. One such measure, discussed earlier, was his 
replacement of the use of Islamic calendar with a new era which began with the first 
year of his accession to throne. Another measure was to stop the minting of coins of all 
denominations from A.D. 1581-2 till 1590-1. Minting of coins resumed in A.D. 1591-2 
(Islamic Hijri 1000) with the date alf or 1000 inscribed on them.282 These measures must 
also be looked at in the context of Akbar’s Divine Faith and Badaoni’s statement that 
“on copper coins and gold muhurs the era of the Millennium was used, as indicating that 
the end of the religion of Muhammad, which was to last one thousand years, was 
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drawing near.”283 All these measures suggest that Jesuit criticism of Islam and 
Muhammad in fact favored Akbar’s intentions regarding the creation of a religious creed 
which would incorporate elements from diverse religious traditions. This point is further 
supported by Akbar’s brief speech, reported by Monserrate, in which he makes reference 
to the incompatibility between and hostility among different religions and commands 
representatives of each to explain their faith to the emperor and to each other so that it 
could be decided which religion is best.284 Akbar’s solution, as we know, was sulh-i-kul 
or universal peace, but to the Jesuits this presented an opportunity to establish the 
superiority of Christianity despite the fact that they had not given any satisfactory 
replies, based on reason, to the questions asked by Akbar regarding Christianity. 
The above discussion also foregrounds the ever present possibility and 
significance of unintended outcomes during an inter-civilizational encounter. The Jesuits 
had a specific mission in mind which blinded them from interpreting the broader context 
in which Akbar was operating. Neither could they understand that they were in a sense 
acting as Akbar’s foreign and impartial advocates against orthodox religious forces in 
India. One must also remember here the Society of Jesus’ unique position in the 
ecclesiastical politics of the west, which will be described in detail in the next chapter of 
this dissertation. As members of a counter-reformation movement in the early modern 
period with a twin focus on mission and education, the Jesuits were singularly well 
prepared to counter arguments pertaining to the separation of the Church and State and 
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in countering heresy. Furthermore, they were present in India for quite some time and 
had launched foreign missions to China and Japan from their base in Goa. If they had 
engaged Akbar and Abul Fazl, with whom they had extensive contact, from a 
philosophical rather than a religious standpoint, they probably would have been more 
successful in achieving their ultimate objectives. This is indeed speculation but it is 
probably not totally without merit, as we find several statements in both Tawarikh and 
the Ain that Akbar was profoundly interested in privileging philosophy, sciences, and the 
arts over religious reasoning.285  In fact, Akbar’s interest in painting was legendary and 
is frequently attested to by Abul Fazl in the Ain.286 The change that occurred in Mughal 
painting because of the impact of European art that came to Akbar’s court via the 
Jesuits, and later by way of other European travelers and visitors to India, had a crucial 
and lasting effect on Indian art and architecture as well as on  the manner in which 
Mughal emperors liked to be depicted in their portraits.287 Wellesz, for instance, states 
that Christian images, brought by missionaries, were copied by Akbar’s artists and 
 adaptations of such images to very different subjects appear in the 
illustrations of manuscripts…. One of the figures seems to have been 
inspired by ‘Christ in the Garden of Gethsemane’. ‘Sita purging herself 
by fire’ might almost be mistaken for a Christian martyr. The various 
birth scenes in manuscripts of the Akbarnama are reminiscent of 
presentations of the Birth of the Virgin…. Even the pictures of Hindu 
ascetics, on which the nudes are often rendered with great cleverness, 
give sometimes the impression of being distant reflections of Christian 
hermits.288 
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Europeans visitors to Akbar’s court had brought works of art to India as gifts or 
souvenirs from their homelands with hope to gain favor from him, or to convert them to 
Christianity, as in the case of Jesuits. But, because of Akbar’s inability to read himself 
and the resultant unusually high interest in artistic renditions of history, these souvenirs 
ended up having a much stronger and long lasting influence on Mughal India than the 
actual message that the Europeans wanted him to accept. European art therefore played a 
significant role in the self-imaging of Mughal India in general and of Mughal Emperors 
in particular. In this context, then, argument favoring a methodology for CPT that insists 
on the fusion of horizons is accomplished through constructing imaginary dialogues and 
is pre-occupied with controlling the power disparity between parties on both sides of the 
equation is inherently suspect because of its intrinsic tendency to overlook the 
unintended outcomes of an inter-civilizational encounter. As the cases of Jesuits in India 
and China (to be addressed in the next chapter) show, honest but unintentional cultural, 
linguistic and religious mistranslations are almost unavoidable and may in fact result in 
the most profound identity-transforming outcomes for all parties involved in the 
dialogue.  
 A striking  example of mistranslations mentioned above can be seen in the way 
Monserrate describes the Hindu religion. The manner in which he describes the origin of 
the Hindu faith is, curiously, in terms of the dawn of Abrahamic faith that emerges from 
a single source by a founder.289 In addition, he also makes sense of idol worshipping 
practices and the structure of relationships between Hindu deities in light of his own 
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knowledge of similar practices in the west in the pre-Christian era, comments are replete 
with references to Athenians, ancient European poets, names of and relationships 
between Roman Gods such as Jupiter, Neptune, Orcus, Minerva, etc.290 In visualizing 
the Hindu religion in this manner, Monserrate almost totally equates ancient India with 
ancient Rome.291 Monserrate’s description of the Hindu system of beliefs provides us a 
glimpse into the embryonic stages of the manner in which later Europeans and colonial 
powers interpreted it.292 This European interpretation of the Hindu faith as “Hinduism” 
had profound implications for Colonial British policy towards Indians, on the one hand, 
and on the natives of the sub-continent, on the other. In fact, the claim made by Muslims 
of India in support of division of the subcontinent, on the basis that Hindus and Muslims 
were two distinct nations and could not live together, was a result of this nationalist 
identity. From the point of view of CPT, then, Monserrate’s unintended cultural 
mistranslation had a crucial bearing on how Europeans understood Hindus and Muslims 
of South Asia and also how they distinguished themselves from their colonial subjects.  
To conclude this chapter it is pertinent to refer once again to comparative 
theorists’ predilection for the late modern period and their tendency to equate the notion 
of “west” with “modern” as discussed in the first chapter of this dissertation. The 
discussion in this chapter reveals the primacy of reason and rationality (tahqiq) over 
blind acceptance of a religion (taqlid) as the key motivating factors in Akbar’s and Abul 
Fazl’s political practice and thought. Furthermore, we find the notion of a social contract 
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between the true ruler and his subjects and also advocacy for the role of the state in 
terms of guarantor of the free practice of religion. These ideas and state practices, which 
bear a distinctly modern mark, are seen in action in early modern India before they are 
developed in Europe by some of the most well known proponents of the social contract 
tradition.293 Given this fact, CPT’s tendency to identify the west with modernity, as 
discussed in the theory chapter of this dissertation, poses serious problems to the extent 
that it forms the sole basis for establishing a new subfield of political theory. The 
discussion of Akbar’s India provokes us to question the notion that modernity is a point 
in human history which the west reached before the rest of the world.294 The first Jesuit 
mission at Akbar’s court is only one instance of the early contacts between India and its 
western other. As we saw in the example of the development of west European 
understanding of Hinduism as an eastern faith, the records and correspondence 
maintained by these and subsequent western visitors gave rise to a more nuanced self-
understanding in the west, which was developed in contradistinction to the defining 
characteristics of their counterparts in other civilizations. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
“DELUSIONS OF CELESTIAL PERFECTION”295: THE ENCOUNTER 
BETWEEN JESUIT MISSIONARIES AND CHINESE LITERATI IN EARLY 
MODERN CHINA 
  
This chapter’s focus is on the encounter between Jesuit missionaries and the 
Chinese Literati in the late sixteenth century. Of particular concern within this broad 
focus is the life and work of Matteo Ricci, who was co-founder of Jesuit’s China mission 
and the main representative of the Society of Jesus and, by implication, the Catholic 
Church in the region.296 My main sources for analyzing this encounter between the west 
and its Chinese other are Ricci’s journals, which were translated from original Italian 
into Latin by his colleague and contemporary Nicola Trigault.297 The journals, which 
cover a period of more than thirty years, present a vivid picture of late Ming China and 
are a particularly well suited source to gain meaningful insight into the complexities of 
the east-west encounter in particular and inter-civilizational contact in general. In 
addition to Ricci’s journals, I also look at writings and policy directives of some early 
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Jesuit missionaries and administrators and arguments of Chinese critics of Christianity 
and western civilization available in English translation. All these primary sources are 
supplemented with several influential interpretations of the Jesuit experience and 
activities in the east. 
It helps to point out here that Ricci was neither the first European nor the first 
Jesuit to have come to China, but he may be characterized as the first European who felt 
the need to understand the Chinese on their own terms and devised an elaborate method 
of accommodation of Christianity to the Chinese culture.298 Because of his remarkable 
scholarly ability and his willingness to try innovative missionary methods, Ricci is often 
called the carrier of Euclid and Copernicus to China and an introducer of Confucian 
thought to Europe.299  This characterization is not incorrect, even though some recent 
studies have raised questions about the usefulness and success of Ricci’s efforts in the 
context of the actual Jesuit mission of Christianizing China.300 From the point of view of 
this dissertation, however, I am not so concerned with the success or failure of Ricci’s 
approach as I am with his conviction that Christianity should enter China implicitly by 
way of the Chinese Literati and his reasoning to adopt an ‘integrated, interwoven 
missionary method’ to realize that conviction.301 Such an approach required Ricci to 
invoke and amplify his training as a mathematician, logician, geographer and 
cartographer over his status of being a Jesuit missionary. It also demanded that Ricci and 
his colleagues learn Chinese and master the spirit as well as the content of Confucian 
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thought. This, as history tells us, was a monumental task which Ricci and his associates 
accomplished to near perfection. Given these facts it should be obvious that Ricci’s life, 
works and experiences deserve much more detailed treatment than can be accomplished 
in a single dissertation chapter. It is therefore worthwhile to acknowledge here that my 
focus remains intentionally limited to those elements of Ricci’s approach which, in his 
opinion, would have softened Chinese minds for the acceptance of western-Christian 
ideas, on the one hand, and prepared religious authorities in Europe to accept his version 
of the non-idolatrous nature of the Chinese, on the other.  
I begin with a broader discussion of the Jesuit missionary practice and experience 
in the east and the Society of Jesus’ position in the ecclesiastical politics in the west. I 
then move on to the significance attached to the Christianization of China by the Jesuits 
and early attempts made in this regard.302 Having thus set the stage I introduce Matteo 
Ricci into the picture. As stated above, the focus here will be on those aspects of Ricci’s 
experiences which have a direct relevance to CPT as described in the first chapter of this 
dissertation. Jesuit missionaries, during their initial decades in China, had retained an 
overtly religious and European appearance and equated themselves in dress and 
demeanor to the learned Buddhist monks who represented the most visible, if not 
dominant, religious group in China.303 Based on his experiences and observations during 
this early period, Ricci gradually came to the conclusion that the missionaries would be 
more successful in their endeavors if they abandoned this approach and shifted their 
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focus towards engaging with the Chinese Literati by cultivating their image as Christian-
western scholars and teachers of western science instead of missionaries from the 
west.304 In addition to highlighting the salient features of Ricci’s efforts in achieving this 
objective I shall also look at the western scientific achievements that he chose to present 
to the Chinese and the philosophical topics on which he published his views in Chinese 
language. Ricci’s choices in these regards reflect his attempts to represent the west and 
Christianity in a manner which, in his opinion, would have positively influenced the 
upper reaches of Chinese society and compelled them to accept the west as China’s 
civilizational equal.305  
As is well known, Jesuits’ accommodation methods later gave rise to the 
infamous rites controversy in the west. I will, therefore, also discuss features of the 
accommodation method which contributed to the rites controversy in order to illustrate 
the highly complex and multifaceted nature of inter-civilizational engagement in which 
transforming influence is active on both sides of the contact equation. Because of this 
simultaneous transformative process I will also touch upon Chinese accusations and 
criticism of the Christian faith in post-Ricci China. A comparison of the anti-other 
arguments in the east and the west, I hope, will highlight the ever-present potential of 
reversal of fortunes earned during a cross-cultural contact by either side. The chapter 
will conclude by juxtaposing the analysis of Ricci’s encounter with the Chinese Literati 
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in late Ming China with some of CPT’s dominant methodological preferences as 
mentioned earlier in this dissertation. These include the bias toward a Gadamarian 
hermeneutical approach to comparative theorizing in which a fusion of horizons is pre-
supposed and the limited nature of Anthony Parel’s suggestions that the ultimate 
objective of CPT should be to seek Voegelin-style equivalences between disparate 
civilizations and that the primary purpose of comparative theorizing should be to 
identify comparable non-western canons.306  
As stated above, it is important to refer briefly to the peculiar circumstances of 
the Society of Jesus in the west in mid- sixteenth century. The society, founded in 1540 
by Ignatius Loyola, was one of the several movements within the Catholic counter-
reformation for the rejuvenation of spiritual life and piety in early modern Europe.307 
However, according to Höpfl, it differed considerably from other European movements. 
These differences were mainly evident in the Society’s views on the need for 
engagement with and seeking patronage of secular institutions, influential individuals 
and rulers as well as an overriding concern with heretical ‘deformation’ and a 
simultaneous and equal focus on the twin vocations of mission and education.308 
Because of these factors, the founders of the Society were quickly able to influence and 
enlist brilliant young students into the Jesuit educational institutes and gain the 
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patronage of many influential individuals of the time throughout Catholic Europe.309 In 
its second phase of expansion, the Society, taking advantage of the Spanish and 
Portuguese expansion established residences in the new colonial cities of Africa, Asia 
and the Americas.310 These new residences served as launching pads for attempts to 
extend missionary work and to seek conversions in foreign lands such as India, China 
and Japan. According to Rubiés, it was the Jesuit stories carried back to Europe from 
these foreign lands which gave rise to the notion “that the souls lost by the Church in 
Europe due to the “heresies” of the Reformation were being made up in the missions of 
the New World and the East.”311 
One must bear in mind, however, that these phases of expansion were not really 
trouble free. For instance, during the first phase, the founders of the Society had to carve 
out a unique space for themselves in the middle of several influential and well 
established religious movements in Europe. As O’Malley rightly points out, one factor 
which defined the policy and practice of early Jesuits was the limitations they faced 
because of the absence of any official pastoral privileges enjoyed by members of the 
other orders.312 This jurisdictional limitation meant that the Jesuits did not have any 
ready made clientele from the “people in the pews.”313 Hence, in order to be competitive 
in the European religious scene of the time, the Jesuits needed to build a friendly image 
and also differentiate themselves in their teachings and approach from the existing and 
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more established religious movements. Understandably this condition created a bond of 
mutual dependence between the Jesuits and those pockets of society which were 
traditionally ignored by other orders. O’Malley cites early Jesuit writings that urge 
members of the society to focus on people who did not have ready access to ministers 
and pastors.314 The other important segments of society which the Jesuits targeted were 
the European secular elites.315 These early practices were instrumental in defining Jesuit 
activities outside Europe in the second phase of their expansion as well. Since they were 
used to dealing with previously ignored segments of society, it does not come as a 
surprise that the Jesuits were generally positive of their assessments of the indigenous 
peoples of India, Japan and Brazil.316 In addition, their focus on and success in enlisting 
members of the European aristocratic classes reflects on their techniques to attract 
similar segments of society to gain protection in colonial and foreign lands during their 
second and third phases of expansion. So, for example, when Francis Xavier (d. 1552) 
entered Japan, he won permission to proselytize the Japanese by impressing members of 
the Japanese elite by putting on an aristocratic appearance and through giving gifts of 
clocks, music boxes, wine and spectacles.317 The success of Xavier’s approach in India 
and Japan encouraged the Society’s superiors in Europe to consider a more relaxed 
approach towards matters of ritual purity for the missionaries working in non-Christian 
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lands. In terms of missionary methodology, this relaxed approach was a highly 
significant development as it marked a departure from the traditional practice of treating 
Christianity as a distinctly European enterprise.318 From the Jesuit perspective, the space 
for such a practice originated from the belief that all that was good belonged to 
Christianity and means justified ends in evangelical pursuits.319 This approach seems 
distinctively like arguments made in favor of CPT in terms of orientation and content, as 
it allowed the Jesuits to not only preach but also to learn from the natives of heathen 
lands. In other words, by attempting to understand others as they understood themselves, 
the Jesuits were able to develop a comparative perspective and identify those elements of 
heathen faith and philosophy that could be used as common ground to expound the 
superiority of the Christian point of view. Furthermore, the Jesuit approach also brings to 
the forefront the issue of intentionality implicit in claims of understanding the Other in 
such a manner. As the title of this chapter suggests, belief in an almost divinely 
sanctioned superiority and consequent glorification of one’s own tradition must be 
factored into any efforts aimed at a fusion of horizons between disparate civilizations. 
These beliefs, as I argue later, can result in quite unintended consequences, which can be 
detrimental to the primary objectives of comparative interlocutors, on the one hand, and 
can cause faulty theorization, on the other. 
The Jesuit understanding that the key to Christianizing the east lay in persuading 
the Chinese to adopt Christianity came as an unintended consequence of their 
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willingness to enter into a dialogue with the Japanese. The Japanese, who thought of 
themselves as knowledgeable and wise, accepted their inferiority to the Chinese in 
matters of wisdom, scholarship and other civilizational traits. This understanding 
emerged during Xavier’s dialogues with Buddhist monks in Japan. These monks 
repeatedly raised doubts about the viability of the Jesuit message because of the absence 
of any mention of the same in the works of the Chinese philosophers and scholars.320 
These dialogues were also significant as they impressed upon Xavier the need to become 
part of a particular civilization through learning native customs, languages and norms of 
behavior in order to be successful as a missionary.321 This understanding grew out of 
Xavier’s conviction that among all the lands he had visited the Japanese were “the only 
ones who could by themselves perpetuate Christianity,” partly because of the Chinese 
influence on them.322 This was also the beginning of Jesuit interest in establishing 
themselves in China. In a letter to Ignatius, wrote Xavier, 
These Chinese are very talented and dedicated to studies, especially with 
respect to the human laws pertaining to the governing of a state. They 
have a great desire of knowledge. They are a white race, without beards 
and with very small eyes. They are a generous people and, above all, very 
peaceful.323 
 
And in another, written immediately before he was to leave for China, Xavier stated; 
… three of us … are going to the court of the King of China, which is 
near Japan, a land that is extremely large and inhabited by a very gifted 
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race and by many scholars… they are greatly devoted to learning; and the 
more learned one is, the more noble and esteemed he is.324 
 
It is interesting to note that Xavier’s knowledge about China was solely based on 
his experiences with Buddhist monks in Japan, yet he was convinced that China held the 
key to converting the east. Xavier died before he could ever reach the Chinese mainland; 
however, his fascination with reaching China was shared by those who followed him as 
key office holders of the Society in Europe. Most prominent among these Jesuit officials 
was Alessandro Valignano (d. 1606), who was appointed Visitador (personal delegate) 
to all Jesuit missions in the Índias Orientais, by the General Superior of the Jesuit Order 
in A.D. 1573.325 As personal delegate of the General Superior, given the high degree of 
centralization characteristic of the Society of Jesus, Valignano had extraordinary power 
in overseeing and governing the regions under his jurisdiction. These powers included 
admission, dismissal, appointment, and transfer of members, and also determination of 
local Society superiors and implementation of new mission policies, based on native 
circumstances. In addition, Valignano was not under any obligation to seek approval or 
even counsel of political authorities in the regions in which he operated.326 This 
obviously created the potential for conflict between religious and political authorities, on 
the one hand, and within the Society, on the other, as it challenged the influence and 
authority of the Jesuits present at the Portuguese court.327 The same also further 
intensified hostility between Jesuits and their rival religious orders in the west.328 
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Valignano, however, remained unaffected by these tensions and successfully kept 
pushing the sphere of Jesuit activity further east.329  
In addition he also initiated what maybe called the first ever diplomatic mission 
from Japan to Europe by attempting to bring four Japanese youths to represent the 
Japanese Christian feudal lords at papal, Portuguese and Spanish courts.330 Valignano’s 
purpose in initiating this project was to impress Europe with the success of Jesuit 
missionaries in the east and to dazzle the Japanese youth with the achievements of 
European civilization.331 This act is also reflective of the Society’s image, which 
Valignano was interested in burnishing in western eyes, and of the means which he used 
to counter the accusations of rival religious orders against the Jesuit approach to 
missionary work. A discussion of the ultimate consequences of this episode, which were 
quite far reaching and unexpected, is not within the scope of this dissertation. The 
purpose here is to simply identify the general approach of Jesuit activity in the east under 
Valignano’s leadership. The hallmark of his approach was the willingness to learn from 
the circumstances in foreign lands and adapt the missionary policy accordingly and also 
back up the new policy with clear demonstration of the positive results being achieved. 
 Valignano’s primary region of interest was the Far East where, in the case of 
Japan, he virtually overturned the policies of his predecessor Francisco Cabral in favor 
of a policy of accommodation of Christianity to Japanese culture.332 He gave directions 
for a similar approach to be employed in China and appointed Ricci to that mission. Yet 
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another significant aspect of Valignano’s leadership in the region was his conviction, 
like Xavier, that Christianity and Europeanism should be separated if the former was to 
be successful in the Far East. Valignano’s belief is reminiscent of Fred Dallmayr’s 
notion of CPT, namely that the most suitable approach for comparative theorists and 
CPT is to locate a mid-point between the two extremes of Euro-centricism and Euro-
denial and engage with non-Europeans from that vantage point.333 The story of the 
Jesuits in China has several other important lessons for CPT as well, but it would be 
appropriate to briefly recount some of their more significant experiences before moving 
on to those insights. 
As it is clear from the discussion above, by the time Ricci moved to China, 
leaders of the Society of Jesus were convinced of two things. First, in order for 
Christianity to succeed in China, or the east generally, accommodation of Christianity to 
eastern cultures was necessary, which required a deeper understanding of these cultures 
through learning their languages and other significant cultural traits.334 Second, the Jesuit 
leaders believed that Christianity should be presented in a most palatable manner to the 
natives of the eastern lands. This forced the Jesuits to present only those aspects of 
Christianity to the natives which would be readily acceptable to them given their specific 
backgrounds. It was in context of these convictions that Ricci was ordered to China by 
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Valignano in AD 1583.335 Because of Valignano’s instructions, Ricci’s early career in 
China was dedicated to learning the Chinese language and reporting the circumstances 
of the Chinese kingdom to society superiors in Europe.336 These early years, and the 
responsibilities assigned to him by Valignano, coupled with his keen intellect, helped 
Ricci in appreciating the complexities involved in fulfilling the role of an interlocutor 
between east and west. Ricci’s journals, in his own words, are meant for a European 
audience and he consistently provides comparable examples from Europe to equip his 
audience with the tools to understand better the Chinese customs, laws and attitudes.337 
In doing so, Ricci and his translator Trigault also inevitably reveal the process through 
which they made sense of Chinese peculiarities. Early on, the journals claim the 
superiority of Ricci’s narrative over other sources of information on China, available to 
the Europeans, by pointing out that  
We [the Jesuits] have lived in friendly intercourse with the nobles... We 
speak the native language of the country, have set ourselves to the study 
of their customs and laws and finally, what is highest of importance, we 
have devoted ourselves day and night to the perusal of their literature.338 
 
The narrative that follows this claim is fairly elaborate and describes the geography, 
culture and government of the Chinese kingdom.339  
As stated above, more telling and interesting sections of this narrative are those 
which juxtapose China against Europe. Ricci frequently intersperses explanatory notes in 
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his description in order to contextualize Chinese peculiarities for his readers. For 
instance, he explains that the Chinese king is called the Lord of the Universe, because 
the Chinese believe that their vast dominion is to all intents and purposes coterminous 
with the borders of the universe. Furthermore, this understanding prevailed despite the 
knowledge of neighboring kingdoms which were deemed unworthy of any serious 
attention.340 In order to squelch any feelings of ridicule or surprise, which such an idea 
of self assigned jurisdiction might generate in the Europeans, Ricci immediately goes on 
to say that if the Chinese knew about similar titles assumed by European monarchs they 
would also be amazed at the absurdity of such notions, as no European ruler ever had 
any jurisdiction over China.341 But this conciliatory tone and strategy should not be 
mistaken as the overriding theme of the narrative, because Ricci frequently mentions 
European superiority in several areas. The most significant in this regard is his 
observation that the Chinese sense of superiority is a result of their ignorance and that 
they have the tendency to prefer that which comes from abroad over what they possess, 
once their deficiencies are made clear to them.342 This claim seems absurd when 
examined in the context of repeated assertions, by Jesuits in general and Ricci in 
particular, that the Chinese think of the non-Chinese as barbarians.343 In fact, according 
to Ricci,  
Even the written characters by which they [the Chinese] express the word 
foreigner are those that are applied to beasts, and scarcely ever do they 
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give them a title more honorable then they would assign to their 
demons.344 
 
This attitude towards the Other reminds one of the images that the Europeans had of the 
Tartars, as explained in the second chapter of this dissertation, and indeed Ricci also 
mentions that the last known raids on the Chinese mainland were made by the Tartars 
and since then the kingdom has been peaceful.345 One could, therefore, claim that 
hostility towards foreigners was partly because of memories and stories of past 
invasions. However, Ricci puts forward a totally different reason for this hostility. 
According to him, Chinese hostility to foreigners derived from their conviction that they 
could learn nothing of value from a source other than what was contained in their own 
books of wisdom.346  
Going through the journals, it appears that many of Ricci’s claims about the 
Chinese are self-contradictory. While it is not possible, or even required, to discuss all 
such claims individually, it is worthwhile to explore them in a little more detail from a 
methodological perspective. To reiterate, for purposes of clarity, Ricci’s journals are of 
great significance for CPT because they actually show attempts to achieve 
accommodation between two disparate cultures over a considerably long period of time. 
However, when these journals are read in the context of the brief discussion of the Jesuit 
place in European ecclesiastical politics of the time, it becomes clear that their 
publication, after Ricci’s death, was to serve the twin purposes of reporting on the 
Chinese to the Europeans and convincing the Europeans of the Jesuits’ achievements in 
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China. Partial proof of this claim is evident from the fact that Trigault heavily edited the 
actual journals to glorify the Jesuit mission in China and also to make them palatable to 
a European audience.347 This insight into the character of the Society of Jesus brings 
forth, once again, the significance of intentions for doing comparative work. Or more 
specifically, and as discussed later in this chapter, the Jesuit endeavors in the east 
highlight the unintended consequences of the intentions with which any comparative 
work is undertaken. But before one goes on to discuss these aspects of comparative 
theorizing, it would be useful to discuss a few specific episodes from the Jesuit 
experience in China. Based on these experiences the tenets of the accommodation 
method devised and adopted by Matteo Ricci.  
Perhaps the most significant occurrence that paved the way for Ricci to influence 
and impress the Chinese was the interest shown by Chinese Literati in the cosmological 
chart of the universe displayed in the Jesuit mission.348 Ricci was requested by the 
Governor of the province to make a similar description of the world in Chinese. The 
journals are also quick to reassert the point that the Chinese had never known such a 
description of the world and were intrigued by the depiction of their kingdom as only 
one part of the great east.349 Ricci welcomed the invitation and immediately began work 
on a bigger more detailed map of the world with Chinese illustrations.350 Ricci, however, 
made several amendments and added new annotations to the original map, “in keeping 
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with the Chinese genius.”351 In addition, the journals boast of Ricci’s ingenuity because 
he accommodated the Chinese misconception of being located in the center of the world 
by depicting the kingdom towards the center in the new map.352 This clever tactic paid 
off in two important ways in making headway with the Chinese; first, it developed a 
much higher general opinion of the European education system among the Chinese elite; 
and second, it helped to reduce the characteristic Chinese fear of foreigners by 
confirming that Europe and China were separated by great bodies of water and other 
natural barriers which dampened the overriding Chinese concern of a possible attack by 
foreign barbarians on their soil.353  
Ricci was greatly emboldened by the success of the map and concentrated on 
preparing and presenting other scientific objects which bore testimony to Europe’s 
superior status vis-à-vis China in the scientific realm. It is, however, interesting to note 
that the Jesuit effort in this regard was not focused on creating a general awareness about 
European scientific achievements. Instead, the Jesuits identified and chose to emphasize 
only those aspects which they thought were of direct relevance to the Chinese and would 
have emphasized European equality to China in the scientific field.354 It is also important 
to remember that at this stage the Jesuits were still in the process of creating a favorable 
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space for themselves in China. In other words, this was the pre-dialogue stage of the 
Jesuit-Chinese contact. The Jesuit approach, which worked quite nicely, at least until the 
time of Ricci’s death, suggests that in order to hold a meaningful dialogue between 
representatives of diverse traditions one must first clearly establish that a dialogue is 
worthwhile because of advances already made independently in areas of possible mutual 
interest. The journals repeatedly state it was Ricci’s success in establishing the Jesuits’ 
expertise in the scientific field which eventually led to a sustained dialogue on equal 
terms between Ricci and the Chinese Literati.355 Nicolas Standaert has described this 
pre-dialogue phase as the “first stage” of the “major principle” of cultural contact.356 
Once this mutual interest is established, the next stage involves acceptance of those 
characteristics of the other, both in thought and behavior, which are non-existent in one’s 
own culture. However, these alien elements are almost never accepted, as they exist in 
their indigenous cultural setting and are always subject to reinterpretation before their 
incorporation into one’s own system of ideas.357 It seems only logical to assume that 
events during both these stages of cultural contact are important since the approach 
adopted and the intentions at work during the first stage are intrinsically linked to the 
fate of the dialogue which takes place in the second stage of the overall process. In case 
of the Jesuits in China, I believe, it is the expectations developed by both sides during 
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the pre-dialogue stage determined the fate of the Jesuit mission in the post-Ricci period. 
In addition, in the pre-dialogue stage, Ricci realized that there were many similarities 
between the Chinese society and his own. Once these similarities were identified, it 
became inevitable for him to theorize and alter Jesuit preferences so that the ultimate 
objective of Christianizing China could be achieved. One must recall here the suggestion 
made by Parel that CPT’s purpose must be to seek similarities between disparate 
civilizations.358 As we can see, in case of Ricci, similarities merely necessitated a new 
approach towards the phenomenon or civilization with which one is trying to engage in a 
meaningful dialogue. Ricci had to make drastic changes to Jesuit approach in light of 
what he experienced. Ironically, the first of these changes was to give up the way of the 
Buddhist clergy, who were perhaps the closest parallel to European religious 
missionaries, in terms of vocation, in China and to adopt the dress and life style of the 
Chinese Literati. It was after a decade of living in China that Ricci asked for Valignano’s 
permission to allow him and his associates to change their identity.359  
Ricci’s request, granted by Valignano, also had other serious implications in late 
sixteenth-century China and Europe. In Europe, because of the Jesuits’ uneasy existence 
within the overall religio-political landscape of the west, it meant leaving the door open 
for fresh attacks on the integrity of Jesuit missionary strategy and ulterior motives 
because of issues related to ritual purity and also, in case of possible success, its 
potentially devastating impact on prevalent thinking, which supported the European 
monopoly over Christian faith. Ricci and Trigault were fully aware of this problem and 
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as a result they repeatedly assert, in the journals, that the Chinese assumed that 
intellectuals and literati had the unity of method and customs regardless of their locale 
because of their reliance on reason and logic to practice their craft. According to Ricci, 
this belief necessitated that the Jesuits follow “the customs and wear the clothes 
demanded by the customs of the country in which they reside” in order to be accepted by 
the locals as European scholars.360 This interesting argument reveals the importance of 
having an efficient strategy to keep the audience at home convinced that the Jesuit 
activities, in the zeal to achieve short term goals, did not in any way compromise their 
European identity. To a certain extent, the critique of CPT in the first chapter of this 
dissertation also highlights a similar tendency in a majority of attempts to conceptualize 
CPT. Most comparative theorists advocate inclusion of ideas of non-western thinkers 
into the mainstream study of political theory in the west. However, they at the same time 
also appear unwilling to discuss the impact of such an inclusion on the achievements of 
traditional political theory.361 To restate for purposes of clarity, the main justification for 
studying non-western systems of ideas regarding the political was dissatisfaction with 
traditional political theory’s western domicile and its patronizing attitude toward other 
traditions through a claim to universality. Consequently comparative theorists aim at 
juxtaposing ideas of prominent non-western thinkers against the arguments of their 
western counterparts to achieve a truly universal understanding of the political. In my 
opinion, and as the Jesuit case proves, the comparative endeavor in political theory, up 
until now, has ignored the potential transforming influence on the self-identity of parties 
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on both sides of the contact equation as an inevitable outcome of being exposed to new 
ideas. However this transforming influence may or may not push the encounter towards 
a fusion of horizons as the parties involved can also use the new information to develop 
more comprehensive and effective approaches to refute the other. To elaborate this 
further through recourse to the Jesuit experience in China, it is necessary to briefly 
describe Ricci’s missionary method and its outcomes. 
Ricci’s innovative missionary method in China was based on his observation, 
that China had a unique and very advanced literary culture and that almost all Chinese 
preferred to read books over oral forms of acquisition of knowledge. This culture in turn 
was made possible by the easy and efficient Chinese printing method.362 Ricci actually 
welcomed this Chinese trait as, according to him, written words, read at leisure and in 
one’s own language, could be much more persuasive than an oral sermon in a foreign 
language.363 Of course, this also suited Ricci, as he was an accomplished scholar 
himself. Writing books in the Chinese language also ensured that Jesuits could spread 
their ideas to lands which they could not easily visit themselves, including, all fifteen 
provinces of the Chinese kingdom, the Japanese, the Koreans, the inhabitants of Cochin 
China, and the Leuchians.364 However, making positive use of this Chinese trait required 
that the Jesuits adhered to the literary qualities and standards that the well respected 
Chinese scholars adhered to. To this effect, Ricci set out to revise the first Chinese 
Compendium of Christian Doctrines, which was written with the help of translators and 
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at a time when he was still a newcomer and did not fully understand the social and 
political realities of China.365 The guidelines adopted for the revision also explain the 
key features of Ricci’s approach. The revised compendium was, in Ricci’s view, “a more 
ample explanation of the Christian Doctrine” and was meant for the consumption of 
“pagans” and “neophytes” was based “entirely on arguments drawn from natural light of 
reason rather than such as are based upon the authority of the holy scripture.” 366 In 
addition, the new compendium also contained citations “which served its purpose” from 
the works of ancient Chinese writers and refuted all Chinese religious sects except the 
one that was adhered to by the Literati and was developed by Confucius “the prince of 
Philosophers.”367 Confucianism, suggested Ricci, contains but little that is reprehensible 
and besides it made excellent political sense since the Jesuits “were accustomed to use 
the authority of the Literati to their own advantage.”368 Politically, this was Ricci’s 
master stroke, because he not only openly endorsed the beliefs of the Literati, he also 
argued against the beliefs of the idol worshippers and hence established a doctrinal unity 
with the former and gained their support for Jesuit activities.369 By siding with the 
Literati and depicting Confucianism as a non-idolatrous ethical system based on natural 
reason, he created an image of the Literati as virtuous pagans who were worth saving.370 
Ricci’s overall approach reminds us of William of Rubruck’s move to convince the 
Nestorians and Muslims to forge an alliance again the Buddhists during the religious 
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debate at the Mongol court.371 In attempting implicitly to make an alliance with the 
Literati, Ricci, of course did not expose those elements of his own faith which could 
have alienated the Literati nor did he question those Literati practices and beliefs which 
later became the source of the rites controversy in Europe and China. Ricci’s approach, 
as the journals claim, was very successful in the short run.372 But he could not foresee 
the long term problems that it eventually caused. Apparently, Ricci’s success rested on 
extremely shaky foundations, since the manner, and possibly the only one, through 
which he could fuse horizons between the Jesuits and the Literati was by 
misrepresenting the self and misunderstanding the Other.373  
The above raises some interesting concerns about the dominant methodological 
preferences of comparative theorists. First and foremost, in the context of Dallmayr’s 
argument in favor of adopting the model supplied by Gadamarian philosophical 
hermeneutics for CPT, the Jesuit experience in China suggests that the desirable 
outcome for comparative theorizing should be the exact opposite of achieving a fusion of 
horizons because of the tendency of erroneously marginalizing those civilizational 
attributes that are fundamental to one’s self-understanding. Second, it exposes the 
inherent weakness of the practice of constructing imaginary dialogues between 
representatives of disparate civilization as the preferred style for doing CPT. An 
imaginary dialogue assumes that both parties have agreed to talk to each other. The case 
of Jesuits in China shows that reasons for scarcity of interaction during the pre-dialogue 
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stage are equally important for understanding a system of ideas. Hence, an imaginary 
dialogue, which juxtaposes ideas of the representatives of a non-western tradition against 
familiar western concepts, serves at best to achieve a temporary fusion of horizons 
which could easily fall apart when the genealogy and basis of non-western ideas is taken 
into account.374   
Ricci published numerous widely circulated works in Chinese, based on the 
criteria that he had determined for revision of the compendium, on topics related to 
philosophy, religion, ethics and mathematics.375 The fame gained through these works 
eventually won Ricci and the Jesuits a place at the Chinese imperial court. Hence, as 
Rubiés rightly asserts, it was  
… as members of a Renaissance civilization, and not as Christians, that 
sixteenth century missionaries could go further than their medieval 
predecessors. It was also largely in relation to the secular sciences that the 
Chinese intellectual elites welcomed, or rejected, the enormous effort of 
cultural transmission undertaken by the Jesuits.376  
 
Rubiés’ argument raises interesting concerns regarding the fundamental assumption on 
which the whole CPT enterprise is based, i.e., to understand the non-westerners as they 
understand themselves. The above quote highlights the fact that the Jesuits completely 
misunderstood the relationship between their increasing fame and success in China and 
the possibility of conversion of the Chinese people to the Christian faith. This 
misunderstanding seems to be based on two fundamental errors committed by the 
Jesuits. First, Jesuits’ works were focused on gaining friends in the scholarly class and 
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their success in achieving this objective could not be generalized to the broader Chinese 
population. Second, the compromises that the Jesuits had made in initiating a dialogue 
with the Literati were not of the kind that could later be reversed. They had projected 
their image as European scholars and were accepted only because they had the expertise 
to solve problems which were important to the Chinese but which they could not handle 
themselves, e.g., production of an accurate astronomical calendar.377 Furthermore, they 
presented European civilization to the Chinese as scientifically advanced but having a 
rather straightforward and uniform religious character. As stated earlier, the Jesuits 
achieved this by hiding from the Chinese the deep divisions in matters of faith that 
characterized the Europe of their time. This invited severe criticism of Jesuit methods 
and motives from rival Christian groups at home and also from the rival groups of the 
Literati factions with whom they had gained favor. These attacks became especially 
scathing after Ricci’s death which, in a sense, reflects his personal abilities. It is obvious 
that the purpose of these attacks was to discredit the Jesuit religious teachings by 
exposing logical inconsistencies in the Christian doctrine as explained by the Jesuits.378 
However, the manner in which the Jesuits’ scientific skills were denounced by these 
anti-Jesuit arguments is most revealing. Some of Ricci’s Chinese critics discredited his 
skills and knowledge by emphasizing classical Confucian teachings about the need for a 
positive relationship between skill and the nurture of body and mind. Maintaining the 
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notion that all foreigners are barbarians, they argued that, first of all, skills such as 
Ricci’s were already present in the writings of ancient Chinese scholars and, second, that 
even if these skills were new they had no impact on good government and good 
education which related to the mind of an individual and not in the skills that he could 
demonstrate. This superior ability of the mind remained the exclusive domain of the 
Chinese.379 Other critical comments highlighted the universal notion present in neo- 
Confucius teachings that man was superior as compared to the rest of creation and 
existed in continuum with the heaven. Since heaven was the ultimate standard for 
goodness, therefore human nature, because of this privileged connection, was essentially 
good. This notion clashed directly with the Christian emphasis on man’s essential 
sinfulness and the consequent need for a savior. These critics accepted the presence of 
evil in men but also argued that sinfulness or evil could be cured through recourse to a 
Confucian education, which, unlike Christianity, showed the path and the remedy to cure 
such moral weaknesses.380  
 The above criticisms, which are only a small sample of a whole industry of anti-
Christian and anti-western polemics, show the weakness of Ricci’s methods. While he 
was able to befriend and even convert some of the very influential members of the elite 
Scholar class, through displaying his scholarly abilities and by posing as a western 
scholar, he was not very successful in converting key players in the religious arena in 
China. In other words, by adopting the social customs and dress of the Literati, Ricci 
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was successful in becoming one of the Literati only and not as such a Chinese. His 
strategy of presenting a rather monolithic picture of the Christian faith backfired because 
most of the accusations leveled against his teachings were frequently the subject of 
religious and intellectual discussions in Europe. He mastered the Chinese classics and in 
his Chinese works responded to those through recourse to reasoning methods learned 
during his own humanist training at Jesuit institutions in Europe. However, in his zeal to 
fit in with the upper reaches of Chinese society, he ignored the complexities of Christian 
doctrine and the western scientific milieu.  
The problem on the scientific front is evident from the fact that at the very time 
at which the Jesuits were introducing, using and promoting Copernican theories and 
ideas in the East to gain imperial favor, they were recognized as the leading opponents 
of Copernican scientists and of skeptical and post skeptical philosophies in Europe.381 
The selective approach on the religious front, on the other hand, was apparent from the 
choice of the single most influential segment of Chinese society to gain access to the 
larger population and also by choosing to hide key elements of the Christian doctrine on 
the pretext that the uninitiated Chinese would not be able to grasp the complexities 
involved in understanding the superior Christian message. This selective approach 
placed the Jesuits in a precarious position in the middle of two great world civilizations 
which had developed almost completely independent of each other with different but 
very dynamic and rich scholarly traditions. Both these civilizations believed in notions 
of heavenly perfection and, in the end neither was willing to give up their superior self-
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image. As a result, the Jesuits were discredited in both the civilizations China as well as 
Europe.  
It was the Rites controversy which eventually caused the downfall of the Jesuit 
China mission. As we have seen, Ricci’s strategy was to befriend the Literati by arguing 
that in its pure form Confucianism was based on natural reason and principles fully 
acceptable to Christianity. Based on this argument, he identified with the Chinese 
society those whose customs and life styles should be acceptable to the Christians and 
hence perfectly all right for the Jesuits to adopt for achieving future mass conversions. 
The remaining Chinese population was depicted as consisting of those who engaged in 
idolatry and indulged in customs totally unacceptable to Christianity. This theoretical 
division, made in the last decade of the sixteenth century, was accompanied by the 
beginning of sustained efforts by Ricci to establish himself as a scholar completely on 
par with and acceptable to the best in the Chinese scholarly elite. By the beginning of the 
seventeenth century, Ricci had reached the Chinese capital and felt reasonably 
comfortable about the foundations of the church in China. It was at this point that he 
began to put into action the final stage of his plan for the Literati, which was to convince 
them that Christianity was not in conflict with the ideals of Confucian teaching and that 
it was possible for a high official of the Chinese empire to be Christian and a follower of 
Confucian teachings at the same time.382 Ricci set about doing this by publishing 
comparative works on Confucianism and Christianity which were sure to be widely 
circulated because of his own reputation and because the Chinese, as stated earlier, had a 
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rich literary culture and preferred to read books over oral forms of acquiring knowledge. 
Most of Ricci’s famous works, including the revised compendium and translations of 
other European texts, were produced during this stage of his career in China. 
Consequently, it was also during this period that the most scathing critiques of Ricci’s 
work surfaced from his opponents.383 It is indeed interesting to note that Ricci was 
especially diligent in stressing to his Chinese audience that his new writings did not in 
any way suggest disrespect for Confucianism. Instead, he took the stance that the more 
he immersed himself into the realm of Confucian teachings, the more it became clear to 
him that the Chinese culture in its original form proclaimed a unique form of 
monotheism.384 To this end, as Dunn argues in his seminal study, Ricci developed a 
Chinese philosophical vocabulary for Christian terms.385 Many of these terms came 
under rigorous scrutiny by the Chinese and the Europeans and were adjudicated as being 
based on an inaccurate understanding of Confucianism by the Chinese, on the one hand, 
and as misrepresentation of Christianity by the European critics of the Society of Jesus, 
on the other.386  
It is noteworthy, from the point of view of this dissertation, that critics on both 
sides were not merely interested in achieving a more accurate vocabulary by providing 
more nuanced understanding of both philosophies, i.e., Confucianism and Christianity. 
Instead, the tone and content of these critiques emphasized the superiority and ultimate 
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truthfulness of each system of ideas. Based on his understanding, Ricci had insisted that 
many of the ancestral rites practiced by the general public, and special Confucian rites 
followed by the sect of the Literati, were mere social practices and had no religious 
connotations. These rites reinforced notions of filial piety and formed the basis of the 
very fabric of Chinese society. Based on his argument for the secular nature of these 
ancestral rites, Ricci sought and was granted approval for continued practice of such 
rituals by Chinese Christians from his European superiors and the Vatican. As Ross 
points out, if Ricci had not painted these rites as secular, there simply would not have 
been any Chinese Christianity.387 In support of his arguments Ricci interviewed many of 
the members of the Literati regarding the true nature of these rites and reported in the 
journals that the Literati claimed that, instead of being a religious sect, their association 
could be best understood as “an academy instituted for the proper government and 
general good of the kingdom.”388 Based on this claim and his admiration for the Chinese 
scholarly tradition, he argued that in truth, “the teachings of this academy were far from 
being contrary to Christian principles which provided the basis to believe that such an 
institution could derive great benefit from Christianity and might be developed and 
perfected by it.”389 One could accuse Ricci of being too desperate to achieve a 
compromise between Confucianism and Christianity, but this should be a question for 
the historians to decide. However, from a theoretical perspective and especially the one 
developed in this dissertation, it is interesting to note that Ricci believed that Confucius 
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philosophy was deficient and could only be perfected once it was brought in line with 
Christian teachings. Interestingly Ricci was acceptable to the Chinese only because of 
their misunderstanding that he appreciated and believed in the superiority of the Chinese 
tradition. This faith in the superiority of one’s tradition resulted in the persecution and 
eventual expulsion of Christian missionaries from China, as well as, a prohibition 
against allowing Chinese Christians to practice ancestral rites through a papal bull by 
Pope Clement XI in A.D. 1715, hence bringing the Jesuit enterprise in China to an 
end.390  
If one hypothetically replaces the Jesuits with comparative theorists and their 
policy of accommodation with the question of appropriate methodology for doing CPT, 
the Chinese rites controversy provides at least two interesting macro level insights for 
CPT. First, the Jesuit case cautions us that an endeavor to compare and understand ideas 
of a non-western civilization must not be an attempt to equate eventually and merge 
them with those of western civilization. It also reminds us of the significance of taking 
into account the cultural baggage that interlocutors carry with them when initiating an 
inter-cultural dialogue. Moreover, as the Jesuit and other cases of inter cultural contacts 
discussed in this dissertation show, while one’s own cultural disposition is instrumental 
in making sense of the Other, it also has the tendency to exaggerate the differences and 
similarities that are encountered in a foreign setting. This tendency can cause the desired 
inter cultural dialogue to be based on flawed assumptions that can cause it to unravel on 
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closer scrutiny and become counterproductive vis-à-vis the original intention of the 
interlocutors.  
Second, the encounter between China and the west reminds western theorists 
with a comparative bent that excursions into foreign lands, or foreign ideas, with the 
intention of achieving a degree of accommodation between disparate systems are 
fundamentally transformative and leave a permanent mark on parties on both sides of the 
contact equation even in instances where achievements of these theorists are reversed. 
For example, even though the advances made by the Jesuits in terms of their 
accommodation policy were eventually reversed because of the rites controversy, they 
nevertheless contributed heavily to the religious debates raging inside the Europe of their 
time. As Rubiés convincingly argues, because of their peculiar missionary spirituality, 
quite paradoxically, the Jesuits may actually have ended up playing the role of a catalyst 
in bringing about the eventual secularization of Europe.391 The gist of Rubiés’s argument 
is that the religio-cultural and educational background of Jesuit missionaries working in 
China compelled them to identify and emphasize the distinction between the original 
intention of Confucian philosophy and the secularity of those Chinese civil customs that 
did not contradict the “natural light of reason.” The sophistication with which the Jesuits 
elaborated on and responded to their critics (i.e., rival religious orders as well as 
philosophers) on this point brought the foundations of the Christian-European identity of 
the time under intense scrutiny and eventually contributed to the emergence of the 
concept of a rational civilization that could exist independently of theological 
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definitions.392 Rubiés’s account of the unintended consequences of Jesuit strategy in 
China, and the discussion in the first chapter of this dissertation, remind us of the 
possibility that in the zeal to promote a geographically neutral and truly universal 
understanding of the political, comparative theorists in actuality may be promoting an 
even more intensely Eurocentric account of the same. Furthermore, given comparative 
theorists’ assumption that CPT with a geographically neutral orientation can peacefully 
co-exist with traditional western political theory, one could argue that a fate similar to 
the one suffered by the common objective of all religious orders within Counter 
Reformation Catholicism could also befall the overall practice of political theory in the 
west. To be sure, according to the notion of CPT developed in this dissertation, such an 
outcome would be a welcome one; the argument here is against the problematic nature 
of the manner in which the role of CPT has been conceptualized until now by prominent 
comparative theorists within the broader practice of political theory in the western 
academia. 
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CHAPTER VI 
 
CONCLUSIONS: OTHERNESS, CANONICITY AND COMPARATIVE 
POLITICAL THEORY 
 
The main objective of this dissertation was to enumerate and analyze the reasons 
given by some of the leading political theorists in North America to start a new subfield 
of political theory in the form of CPT. The key arguments by these political theorists or 
comparativists, as I have referred to them throughout this dissertation, suggest that 
analyses of systems of ideas developed in the non-west reveal that there is “humanly 
significant knowledge outside the western canon.”393 CPT, in this context, is the 
proposed new subfield based on the notion that “political theory may have started in 
western civilization but is not coterminous with it.”394 The fact that it supports both these 
notions clearly makes this dissertation a work of CPT. However, as discussions in the 
previous chapters show, there are also significant differences between this dissertation 
and previous works of CPT. The most fundamental of these differences concerns the 
usefulness and necessity of CPT. More specifically, where almost all comparativists 
seem to agree that CPT is useful in the context of the current wave of globalization, this 
dissertation has attempted to demonstrate that comparative theorizing must be adopted 
because ideas about the Self are often shaped as a result of the encounters with the 
Other. This different approach to CPT creates the possibility to move the comparative 
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endeavor from a peripheral existence to the center of the vocational landscape of 
traditional political theory in western universities.  
Following from these observations, then, this dissertation also supports different 
methodological preferences for CPT. Most previous works of CPT assume that the west 
has a decided advantage over its others in a globalized world and suggest that one must 
first effectively control the civilizational power disparity and then attempt comparative 
theorizing. This dissertation refutes the validity of such a methodological claim by 
looking at records of actual encounters between east and west which took place in the 
pre-enlightenment period when the west was not the most dominating civilization in the 
world. These records confirm the significant influence of ideas espoused by the Other in 
the shaping of the Self, but do not provide evidence for a major role played by power 
inequalities between participants in inter-civilizational dialogues. The stories of these 
encounters suggest that notions of western self-superiority and self-righteousness not 
only persevered but perhaps grew even stronger in the face of powerful opponents. In 
fact, in instances in which Europeans made accommodations to a foreign culture, these 
were based on their faith in the superiority of Christian doctrine and were allowed only 
with a clear understanding that an accommodative approach will eventually help 
Europeans in evangelizing their hosts.395  
It is important to mention here that one must, without a doubt, include the impact 
of forces of globalization as a key factor in any description of the world and the human 
condition in the late modern period. But to interpret globalization in terms of facilitating 
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the west in maintaining its political or ideological influence over the rest of the world is 
probably an overstatement. After all, it is in the age of globalization that events such as 
the terrorist attacks by radical religious fundamentalists on the US mainland and in 
Europe equally became a possibility. Without advanced networks of travel and 
communication such attacks could neither be planned nor executed. In a recent article, 
which discusses implications of globalization for the United States and the west, Fareed 
Zakria writes that 
in 2006-2007, 124 countries grew their economies at over 4 percent a 
year…. Over the last two decades, lands outside the industrialized West 
have been growing at rates that were once unthinkable… the overall trend 
has been unambiguously upward. … A list of 25 companies most likely to 
be the world’s next great multinationals … [includes] four companies 
each from Brazil, Mexico, South Korea and Taiwan; three from India, 
two from China, and one each from Argentina, Chile, Malaysia, and 
South Africa. This is much broader than the much-ballyhooed rise of 
China or even Asia. It is the rise of the rest – the rest of the world.396 
 
These facts show that forces of globalization have provided CPT’s supposedly 
disadvantaged non-west with the tools to equal the west in economic terms at least. 
Hence an argument for CPT that is based on the centrality of globalization is clearly 
overstated. Furthermore, this approach also limits the content of this new subfield of 
political theory to a period where the existence of a state of globalization becomes a 
prior condition for political theorizing itself. Globalization, in my opinion, is significant 
in the late modern period only because of its role as a catalyst and as an agent for 
broadening the theoretical horizons of the west and convincing traditional political 
theorists to recognize the inevitability of including non-western systems of ideas into 
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any discourse which claims to find universally applicable/ acceptable solutions 
pertaining to the dilemmas faced by human beings in general. It is important to 
remember here that catalysts only speed up ongoing processes and, as such, lack the 
ability to generate independent reactions of their own. As the cases discussed in this 
dissertation highlight, contacts with the east provided new data to the west about the 
world and its inhabitants and forced western observers to reassess and adjust their self-
understanding accordingly in the light of this new information. Furthermore, because of 
the technologically advanced nature of the globalized world, we now have greater means 
and stronger reasons to test existing theories and come up with new ones, as our 
medieval and early modern predecessors did in the cases discussed in this dissertation.  
Even if we choose to ignore the doubts raised by the above stated facts regarding 
globalization, the popular methodological and theoretical approaches to CPT do not fully 
satisfy the objection that traditional political theory creates a western monopoly over the 
political because of its sole reliance on western canonical texts. As this dissertation has 
argued, an attempt to counter this situation via an argument based on the unprecedented 
nature and impact of processes of globalization in the late modern period eventually 
results in strengthening this notion of a western monopoly. This is to say that the non-
west becomes relevant only as a result of a process, i.e., globalization, which is initiated 
by the west. The west’s interest in its Other in the late modern period, in this context, is 
because of certain unexpected outcomes of the process which was meant to perpetuate 
western monopoly over the rest of the world. Hence, it is the above stated facts about 
globalization that now require that the west must understand the source and logic of the 
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ideas originating in the non-west in order to maintain its supremacy. This logic is 
confirmed by Fred Dallmayr, arguably the most ardent advocate of CPT in the west. In 
one of his recent pieces, he writes, 
It is surely advantageous for ourselves, for the pursuit of our concrete 
self-interest, if we know more about the world and the people we are 
dealing or have to contend with.  This is particularly true in our shrinking 
or globalizing world today—a world exhibiting a great diversity of 
cultural, philosophical, and religious traditions.  As long as we are mired 
in ignorance or blinded by coarse prejudices, we are likely to go astray or 
to encounter roadblocks which can frustrate or obstruct the unhampered 
pursuit of our interests and preferences.397 
 
To be fair to Dallmayr, he issues the above statement with an eye on avoiding 
conflicts in a world where inter-civilizational contact is absolutely unavoidable.398 The 
question that he ignores, and one which should intrigue political theorists in the west, 
however, is: why would inter-civilizational conflict necessarily be the outcome of an 
increased frequency of contact? Dallmayr frames his response to this question in terms 
of western rationalism and the notion that human beings only act because of selfish 
motives. Therefore, he makes the plea to western political theorists to gain a better 
understanding of non-western systems of ideas because it is in their own self interest. 
Dallmayr’s argument raises two problems: first, how is his approach different from 
Huntington’s approach, which predicts a clash of civilizations as an inevitable outcome 
of the increased interplay between forces of globalization?399 The second problem is that 
Dallmayr, perhaps unwittingly, relegates non-western ideas to a position where their 
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usefulness is assessed only in context of their utility for the west. The fact, as 
demonstrated through the analyses of east-west encounters discussed in this dissertation, 
is that non-western systems of ideas have intrinsic value of their own and are based on 
foundations similar to those found in the experience of the west. Furthermore, it is ideas 
from a foreign civilization which are often responsible for honing, if not formulating, the 
self-understanding of civilizations. This dissertation suggests that this influence is almost 
unavoidable and does not carry any requirement for an ultimate “fusion of horizons.” 
Inter-civilizational encounters, as Erich Leed correctly states, belong to the category of 
cross-cultural contacts “which generate a new kind of self consciousness, a species of 
collective self-awareness.”400 In this context and writing about European travel writing, 
Leed argues that 
from the sixteenth century on, Europeans encountered with increasing 
frequency a world of contrastive ethnicities, which allowed them to make 
comparisons between themselves and others. Out of these comparisons 
arose a self image of a culture no longer merely the heir of ancient 
traditions, a periphery of ancient centers, but a center in its own right and 
a culmination of history on the cutting edge of the “modern.” 401  
 
Even though Leed is only interested in writing a history of travel, a phenomenon 
which he thinks is a central force in causing historical transformations, he, nevertheless, 
ends up supporting the notion of CPT presented in this dissertation by making the claim 
for the centrality of comparison in understanding the nature of the Self. 402 Similar 
arguments regarding creation of the Self in contradistinction to knowledge about the 
Other have been made by other notable scholars also. For instance, Todorov, in his 
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classic study of the European encounter with the New World, describes the significance 
of his work by stating,  
It [his work] permits us to reflect upon ourselves, to discover 
resemblances as well as differences: once again self-knowledge develops 
through knowledge of the Other.403  
 
 In fact, and as I discuss later in this chapter, Todorov’s study of the discovery of 
the New World by Europeans is of unique significance for the argument presented in this 
dissertation. This is because all the cases discussed in this dissertation relate to places 
and peoples about whom the Europeans had some degree of prior information. Even in 
case of China, which was closed to foreigners, Jesuits had received considerable 
information from the Japanese. Detailed descriptions of the Chinese can be found in the 
letters sent by early Jesuits back to Europe.404 Similarly awareness and the urge to gain 
better understanding about the Mongols was a result of their successful military 
campaigns against Muslims and against the west itself. Contacts in this context most 
probably, as Dallmayr suggests, were initiated from a utilitarian perspective and in pure 
European self interest. In addition, given that European representatives in all these cases 
were missionaries who had come to the east with the primary objective of 
evangelization, it is logical to suggest that the main frame of reference for the Europeans 
was religion. As we have seen, European religious motivations, on the one hand 
developed certain expectations about the east and its inhabitants, while, on the other 
hand, these guided the interpretation of the unfamiliar customs encountered in foreign 
lands. For example, regardless of the differences in time and locale, we find that 
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European Christian missionaries automatically chose Muslims in eastern lands as their 
prime opponents.  
 The rivalry between Islam and Christendom could be of prime importance in a 
milieu where the encounter was between Muslims and Christians only. In the encounters 
discussed here, the missionaries, by making Muslim-Christian rivalry the issue of prime 
importance, totally missed the socio-political or even religious context of the eastern 
lands which they were visiting. Akbar, for instance, couldn’t care less about the 
supremacy of Islam over other faiths, as confirmed even by the Jesuits.405 Similarly, the 
Mongols also did not care about this issue at all as long as the adherents of all religions 
did not bear ill will toward their Mongol masters.406 However, as we notice, Akbar’s 
contempt for Islam and Mongol indifference to religion were interpreted as a hopeful 
sign for spreading Christianity in India in case of the former and as an absolutely 
hopeless pursuit by Rubruck in the later instance. This assessment of the east reflects on 
how these European visitors understood themselves, i.e., they measured the goodness or 
the badness of the Other in terms of their distance from successful future conversion to 
the Christian faith, which was the primary component of their own self identity and from 
which they could not disassociate themselves in order to make any realistic assessment 
of what they experienced in the east. In cases like Jesuits in China, where Muslims were 
absent from the scene, the missionaries had to invoke their secular learning as the 
defining element of the European civilization in order to engage in a dialogue with 
Chinese scholars. But even in this case the focus on secular rather than the religious 
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elements in the dialogue was justified to the Society superiors in Europe as necessary for 
successful future conversion of the Chinese people to Christianity. 
Contacts with the east were also instrumental in enhancing European 
geographical horizons. As R. W. Southern argues, it was contacts with the Mongols that 
enlightened the Europeans about the enormity of size of the non-Christian world. He 
writes, 
By the middle of the thirteenth century …it was seen that this picture 
[European estimate of population ratio of non-Christians to Christians] 
was far too optimistic. There were ten, or possibly a hundred, unbelievers 
for every Christian. Nobody knew: and the estimate grew with access of 
knowledge.407  
 
According to Southern, an immediate impact of this new information on European self-
understanding was a change in attitude toward the Crusades, which either seemed almost 
impossible or at least in need of serious reassessment in terms of their aims as well as 
methods.408 This reemphasizes Leed’s and Todorov’s argument that it is contacts with 
the Other which are responsible for shaping our collective self-awareness. 
 In light of the above, then, traditional political theory which does not pay heed to 
the notions of the political envisaged outside the boundaries of the west is by definition a 
limited enterprise. This is to say that traditional political theorists’ exclusive reliance on 
the western canon enables them only to understand and analyze the internal dynamics of 
their own civilization. If it is true, as Leed and Todorov argue and as this dissertation 
supports, that the content of the western canon may itself have been profoundly shaped 
by west’s contact with its others, then to talk of a western civilization or a western 
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identity in such circumstances automatically requires the understanding of that which 
westerners have excluded from any description of the self and termed “non-western.” A 
comparative perspective, therefore, helps us in understanding the nature and basis of a 
built-in civilizational criterion against which the degree of civility and humanness of the 
Other is measured by different civilizations. For example, as the discussion of the 
civilizational traits of the Chinese revealed, all foreigners were barbarians as far as the 
Chinese were concerned. Similarly, all foreigners were acceptable to the Mongols as 
long as they were willing to submit to the supremacy of their Mongol masters. But 
perhaps the most telling of the cases, in this regard, is that of Mughal India where Abul 
Fazl and Akbar forged the concept of an Indian civilization whose most outstanding 
characteristic was diversity in terms of its people, terrain, languages, and customs. In 
other words, Abul Fazl used the very existence of diversity as the unique distinguishing, 
and hence unifying, characteristic of India.409 The ideology that he devised to legitimize 
this diverse entity was the notion of perpetual peace or sulh-i-kul. This ideology, to use 
Todorov’s term, demanded a distributive rather than an assimilationist approach because 
of its cross-religious or cross-cultural outlook.410 In terms of the built-in scale for 
valuing civilizations, then, Indian civilization’s greatness lay in its ability to absorb 
diversity and make it its own. As a consequence of this approach the greatness of 
civilizations which boasted of their unity of faith was automatically suspect form an 
Indian point of view.  
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   The Mongols, the Chinese, the Jesuits, the Europeans, and the Mughals were all 
aware of their Others to some degree. And as the frequency of European contact with the 
east increased, it forced representatives of the encountering civilizations to make 
presentations of what their respective civilizations stood for. Admittedly, it was mostly 
the visitors who had to make this presentation in order to acquire acceptance and space 
in the foreign lands. But, as the cases discussed in this dissertation suggest, both, the 
foreigners in order to make these presentations, and the hosts, in making a favorable or 
otherwise decision about the ideas presented, were required to achieve a certain degree 
of Alterity in order to communicate with each other. In my opinion, therefore, it is the 
formulation and presentation of arguments by members of different civilizations in this 
state of Alterity which should be central to the CPT enterprise, because prior to this 
stage the Other is theoretically irrelevant. It is also only in a state of Alterity that a 
simultaneous need arises to gain insight into foreign ideas, on the one hand, and to 
formulate and present those which define the Self, on the other. In this process, the 
peculiarities which a culture or civilization has internalized, and which do not seem 
questionable to its members anymore, come up for questioning by those who neither 
know nor care about their logic and significance. Many of these internalized concepts 
can be the basis of a civilization’s confidence in its own superiority over its others. So, 
in a manner of speaking, then, it is only in a state of Alterity that “leaps of faith” are 
exposed to questioning by both the self and the Other.  
A classic example of the above can be seen in Matteo Ricci’s decision to hide the 
significance of Christ’s crucifixion and passion for Christian faith from his hosts and to 
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present instead the picture of baby Christ and Madonna to his hosts which, resulted in 
the Chinese misunderstanding that the Christians believed in a female God. Ricci was 
accurate in his assessment of the Chinese mind, which is also confirmed by the incident 
when a eunuch from the royal palace discovered the figure of Christ on the Cross in 
Ricci’s belongings and interpreted it as evidence that the Jesuits were involved in dark 
magic.411 Ricci’s decision to hide the crucifixion could only have been made in a state of 
Alterity which enabled him to understand how the Chinese would respond to doctrines 
of Christian faith. But even more important is the fact that Ricci, a Jesuit missionary 
aiming to Christianize China, chose to compromise on one of the fundamental tenets of 
his faith in order to start a dialogue with the Chinese. Ricci’s life in China is filled with 
similar examples, some of which have been discussed in the fifth chapter of this 
dissertation.  
In addition to the above examples, and as I stated earlier in this chapter, it is also 
useful to consider briefly here some aspects of the impact of the discovery of the New 
World on European self-understanding. As mentioned in the introductory chapter of this 
dissertation, I have pulled this case out of the chronological sequence of other cases 
because of its unique circumstances. These unique circumstances provide interesting 
points of comparison with previously discussed cases in understanding the impact of the 
Other on one’s self-understanding.  
The most striking characteristic of the encounter between Europe and the New 
World, in context of this dissertation at least, is the impact that the absence of a Europe-
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like system of ideas among Amerindians had on European understanding of the Other in 
general and on their own civilization’s role in a global context in particular. For 
example, on the first day making landfall in the New World Columbus noted in his diary 
that 
the [Indians] should be good and intelligent servants, for I see that they 
say very quickly everything that is said to them; and I believe that they 
would become Christians very easily, for it seemed to me that they had no 
religion. Our Lord pleasing, at the time of my departure I will take six of 
them from here to Your Highnesses in order that they may learn to speak. 
No animal of any kind did I see on this island except parrots.412  
 
It is noteworthy, according to Columbus, that the Indians have no religion and that they 
cannot speak. Furthermore, Columbus states that he wants to take the Indians to Europe 
in order to teach them how to speak rather than teaching them European language/s. The 
act of speaking refers to a unique human characteristic and Columbus’s choice of words 
suggests that he considered these naked natives of the New World as something less than 
human.413 As to the notion that Indians did not have any religion, Columbus notes at 
several places that when the natives saw the Europeans they repeatedly raised their 
hands towards the sky, thanked god, and believed that the visitors had come from the 
heavens.414 The fact that the Indians believed that Europeans were visitors from heaven, 
as Columbus himself states, shows that they had some sort of a system of religious 
beliefs. Similarly, the fact that the Indians were able to answer Columbus’s questions, 
with signs and actions, suggests that they could communicate like humans and did not 
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know the language of the visitors.415 Columbus’s reading of the Amerindians, however, 
suggests that their nakedness and lack of civilizational elements, comparable to Europe’s 
traditional others, made them an “Entirely Other” for early Europeans visitors.416 This 
category of the Other is described by Haidu in following terms 
In context of Occidental philosophy the “Entirely Other” designates a 
substance (in the Aristotelian sense) simultaneously irreducible to the 
substance of the enunciator and unknowable precisely because of the 
radical difference between the two substances. God and man are so 
different that man cannot formulate a positive discourse regarding the 
other substance.417 
 
 This unique nature of contact with the New World, in the context of the cases 
discussed earlier in this dissertation, can also be affirmed via comparison with William 
of Rubruck’s experience in Mongol lands. As discussed in the second chapter, William 
noted that when he went among the Mongols, he felt as if had entered a new world. 
However, the presence of Nestorian Christians and Muslims at the Mongol Khan’s court 
allowed him to place these Others into an intelligible frame of reference and on a sort of 
a civilizational scale that allowed him to communicate his observations in 
understandable terms to his intended audience in Europe. The facts that Rubruck actually 
had the opportunity to prove in a debate that Christianity was the only true faith, that he 
failed to convince the Mongols to allow him to stay in their lands and preach his faith, 
and his eventual desire that if it was in his power he would constantly preach war against 
the Mongols, present a picture where the attempts to engage with and convert the Other 
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have failed and resulted in absolute disillusionment. In the case of Columbus, on the 
other hand, the inhabitants of the New World are actually no more significant than his 
interest in the flora and fauna and natural resources such as gold. For example, in the 
passage quoted earlier, the characteristics of the inhabitants of the New World seem to 
be only as important as informing the Europeans about the kind of animals that are found 
there. Furthermore, the observation that Indians quickly learn to repeat things in a 
European language was interpreted as a sign that they would make good servants and 
also quickly accept Christianity. In other words, without explicitly saying so, Columbus 
relegated the Indians to a sub-human status because of his inability to converse with 
them or to relate to their condition.  
In addition to this, scholars seem to be in agreement that the discovery of the 
New World encouraged Columbus to view himself as playing an important role in the 
unfolding and fulfilling of Christian prophecies and resulted in consequent depictions of 
the New World as the Garden of Eden or the fabled east.  This again proves that the 
status of an “Entirely Other” was assigned to the inhabitants of the New World by early 
Europeans visitors.418 But the noteworthy point here is that while radical differences 
between the Amerindians and the Europeans placed these people uniquely beyond the 
grasp of Columbus’s intelligence, they nevertheless caused the Europeans to reflect on 
their own role in context of this newly discovered reality. This highlights the centrality 
of Self-Other encounters in the broadening of one’s knowledge about one’s larger 
environment, on the one hand, and reasserts the notion, on the other hand, that the Other 
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has a formative influence in determining how we understand ourselves. Even though a 
detailed discussion of European attitude and policies towards the inhabitants of the New 
World is not exactly within the scope of this dissertation it maybe useful to go in a little 
more detail about the manner in which the discovery of the New World eventually 
forced the Europeans to reflect on their self-understanding and on the canonical texts 
which formed the basis of their identity.  
Robert Paine argues that the European dilemma in the context of the discovery of 
the New World was twofold. First, “a new continent had to be added to the Orbis 
Terrarum,” however, because of “first principles of the sacred cosmography it had to be 
ontologically ‘the same’ as the other continents.”419 And second the Amerindians had to 
be placed within the existing framework of European knowledge. These aspects  pushed 
the Europeans towards “fighting on two fronts – of living by the canon and of breaking 
loose from it.”420 Paine’s description of a canon, in this context, and its alternate could 
also be very enlightening for CPT. Building on Baehr and O’Brien notion that “ a canon 
exists as a totality – exclusive, unalterable, and impregnable to the possibility of 
critique,’421 he argues that  
As the Truth, a canon must not be tempered with; but how is the Truth to 
be understood, even as the world around it changes? So there will be 
commentaries, but always in accord with the founding precepts of the 
canon – beyond them lies the abyss of heresy.422  
 
In the above context, then, CPT’s endeavor to include non-western texts into the 
theoretical discourse of the west and the suggestion of some comparativists to develop a 
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non-western canon seems problematic right from the beginning. This is to say that only 
those non-western texts could be acceptable to western political theorists that are either 
already in agreement with or in contradistinction to the founding precepts of the western 
civilization and the rest should be rejected as irrelevant. The development of a non-
western canon under such conditions will automatically be governed by the rules that 
shape the western canon, so the original dissatisfaction voiced by comparative theorists, 
that the west seems to have a monopoly over the political, will remain intact. 
Furthermore, the task of CPT in this context is limited, by definition, to finding 
similarities between disparate civilizations, again because radically different non-
western texts must be rejected as irrelevant if the sanctity of canons is insisted upon. As 
a result, and as the analyses in this dissertation suggest, even if CPT is successful in 
developing a non-western canon, it could only be an image of its western counterpart 
and may not reflect fully the complexity of non-western systems of ideas.  
Furthermore, the very emphasis on keeping the western canon intact and creating 
a counter non-western canon in order to do comparative theorizing reveals the distinct 
and limiting characteristic of political theory as a western vocation, especially in the face 
of globalization which is characterized by comparativists as an unprecedented condition. 
Gellner, for example, suggests that during transportation from theology to cultural 
studies the need for canonicity is the dominant characteristic of societies which lack “a 
sense-of-theoretical-alternative.”423 CPT in such a characterization of civilizational 
attitudes can either be the provider of a theoretical alternative to traditional political 
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theory or it can perpetuate the primacy of canons for political theorizing and hence 
produce understandings that are essentially western in orientation and are already being 
produced by traditional political theory.  
This dissertation has suggested that the task for CPT should be to explore the 
possibility of non-western influences on the development of the western canon, hence 
challenging the truth claims embedded in the very notion of canonicity itself. The 
dissertation also suggests that CPT’s focus on identifying non-western texts for the sole 
purpose of comparison via recourse to imaginary dialogues is problematic precisely 
because such an approach fails to resolve effectively the dilemmas on account of which 
the call for a new subfield was issued in the first place by Fred Dallmayr. A detailed 
discussion of these criteria has already been presented in the first chapter of this 
dissertation. However, it is worthwhile to reconsider one major claim, or more 
specifically a methodological guideline, suggested for CPT by its founders, i.e., the quest 
to understand non-western ideas as they are understood by non-westerners themselves.  
Here once again the European experience in the New World comes in handy, 
especially in Las Casas’s writings, which provide an interesting source to comprehend 
some key issues related to understanding the Other in terms of its self-understanding 
while staying rooted in the canonical teachings of one’s own civilization. As stated 
above, discovery of the New World, as a case to discuss methodological aspects of CPT, 
is particularly useful because of the “Entirely Other” nature of the Amerindians accorded 
to them by the Europeans. In this regard, Pagden points out that Las Casas’s ideas 
regarding the rights of the Indians and the Indians’ unassailably human status were based 
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in the language of neo-Thomism.424 And Las Casas’s main task, in pleading the case of 
the Indians, was to demonstrate that it was his reading of the canon that was “the only 
true one” because he had “been there.”425 If Pagden’s analysis of Las Casas’s writings is 
true, then in context of CPT the noteworthy point here is that the western canon needed 
to be reinterpreted if the Amerindians were to have a place in the experience and history 
of the west. As Pagden states, 
Only an interpretation of the canonical texts, that the “cruel and 
implacable enemies of the Indians” had used against them, could secure 
the human status of the Indians before a community for whom exegesis 
was the only access to knowledge.426   
 
Las Casas’s defense of the Indians, then, had a twofold significance in terms of 
European self-understanding. On the one hand, it introduced the notion that Europeans 
in the New World were perhaps behaving in a so called non-western or a non-Christian 
manner towards the Indians.427 On the other hand, Las Casas’s arguments expanded the 
western canon in terms of its interpretive capability.428 In the context of the overall 
argument made in this dissertation, the noteworthy point, highlighted by these 
implications of Las Casas’s work, is that even when the Europeans did not find any 
obvious similarities between themselves and their Others it caused self-reflection and 
redefinition of how the Europeans understood themselves. The European experience in 
the New World, therefore, suggests that CPT’s task cannot be limited to seeking 
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Voegelin-style equivalences between disparate civilizations as suggested by Anthony 
Parel. The Europeans in this instance had to reflect seriously upon and theoretically 
justify their treatment of and stance towards the New World and its inhabitants. The self- 
reflection, or even self-correction, in the light of new evidence, which was embedded in 
these theoretical positions towards the Amerindians, has been elaborated by several 
prominent political theorists in the west. For example, according to Pagden, it was the 
failure of Aristotle’s theory of natural slavery to reconcile with the known facts about 
the social life of the Amerindians that led theologians like Francisco de Vitoria to 
recognize that there were inherent contradictions in the theory itself.429 In the same vein, 
Todorov highlights the epistemological significance of the discovery of the New World 
and argues that this discovery was the cause whose effect was the beginning of the 
modern era, which rendered previous modes of making sense of reality essentially 
redundant.430 Pagden affirms Todorov’s position and highlights Las Casas’s argument 
regarding “being there” as an essential condition for acquiring the ability to interpret 
reality.431 Without the encounter between the “Entirely Other” Amerindians and 
representatives of the European civilization, such radical readjustments in European self-
understanding as reflected in the European approach towards acquisition of knowledge 
would probably not have been possible.  
 The discovery of the New World, in comparison with other encounters discussed 
in this dissertation, also raises the possibility that maybe the degree of strangeness of the 
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Other is directly proportional to the intensity of the potential challenges to the manner in 
which one understands the Self. To be clear, and to reiterate a point made earlier in this 
dissertation, as long as the Self has no knowledge of the Other, or the Other exists in a 
far removed state, there is no theoretical cost for the existing civilizational understanding 
of the Self and thereby the world. However, as the knowledge about the Other increases, 
primarily because of increased direct contact, theories of self-understanding 
automatically come under scrutiny. In this situation even if we choose to ignore the 
Other, we need to have a theoretical foundation for doing so. Again as Pagden argues,  
Observers in America, like observers of anything culturally unfamiliar for 
which there exist few identifiable antecedents, had to classify before they 
could properly see; and in order to do that they had no alternative but to 
appeal to a system which was already in use.432 
 
Hence, as the frequency of European contact with the New World increased and each 
became a permanent fixture in the life-world of the Other, the weakness or the 
inadequacy of the existing system of ideas also became more visible and eventually 
required modification in the light of new facts.  
 Yet another significant episode for CPT in the story of early European 
experiences in the New World is the debate regarding the intellectual and religious 
capacity of the Amerindians between Las Casas and Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda.433 Las 
Casas and Sepúlveda held diametrically opposed views on the Amerindians; however, as 
Lewis Hanke argues, the significance of this debate lies in the fact that it was the first 
time that a colonizing nation organized a formal inquiry into the justice of the methods 
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used to extend its empire.434 In addition, it was also the first time that an attempt was 
made to stigmatize an entire race as inferior and as born slaves.435 Part of the argument 
on both sides of the debate was based on Aristotle’s theory regarding the condition of 
natural slavery in some human groups. Aristotle framed his theory in the context of the 
relationship between passion and reason and its impact on human behavior, arguing that 
groups in which passion ruled supreme were inferior by nature.436 Consequently, 
Sepúlveda argued that the Amerindians were barbarians, who were governed by passion 
rather than reason, and therefore they were slaves by nature and the Spanish war against 
these people was justified.437 Las Casas responded to Sepulveda’s argument by 
reassessing Aristotle’s statements on barbarism, as a phenomenon, and showed that there 
were several kinds of barbarians and that the Indians did not fall into the category which 
Aristotle called natural slaves. 438 Building further on this claim, he also challenged 
Sepulveda’s argument regarding the legality of Spanish war against the Indians.439   
 In defending the Indians, Las Casas also indirectly forced his audience to rethink 
several firmly established aspects of Christian identity. For instance, he brought up the 
issue of Church’s jurisdiction over infidels and non believers in the context of the natural 
law tradition and linked his arguments about treatment of the Amerindians to Christian 
relations with the traditional Others. He argued that “Jews, Moslems and idolaters who 
do not live in Christian kingdom are not under the jurisdiction of the Church, nor any 
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Christian prince, no matter how their crimes may violate natural law.”440 Once again, 
Las Casas’s experience in the New World brought forward new data to challenge 
existing theories and approaches towards the Other, not just in the context of the New 
World, but also in terms of Christian understanding vis-à-vis the Other in a more general 
manner. It is noteworthy that Las Casas’s key strategy in formulating all his arguments 
in defense of the Indians was to mix the American reality with familiar European 
theories. As mentioned earlier, this was the “being there” aspect of his reasoning, which 
Las Casas claimed was a necessary condition to gain any real understanding of the New 
World and its inhabitants.441  
The episode of the discovery of the New World and the subsequent European 
attitude towards its inhabitants has serious implications for the CPT endeavor. As 
mentioned already, this east-west encounter demonstrates that even a contact with an 
“Entirely Other,” especially if it is on a continued basis, can disturb existing 
understanding of the Self. Hence a methodological approach which insists on the 
continuation of a tradition, while acknowledging increased frequency of contacts with 
the Other, is unlikely to achieve a neutral dialogue between the east and the west. In 
context of CPT, this is most evident because of its heavy reliance on the model of 
Gadamarian philosophical hermeneutics. To quote Haidu once again,  
In hermeneutics, subject and object are related by a key term: 
“tradition.”…[which] takes the shape of an uninterrupted dialogue… 
continuous from one text to another in the form of question and answer, 
each text producing an answer to the question asked… by an earlier text. 
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The series of questions and answers constitutes the “tradition,” which 
becomes the condition of possibility of the cognitive relation between text 
and reader.442   
 
Building further on the above description, Haidu argues that reliance on 
hermeneutics, then, invariably implies a conversation in which all involved have already 
agreed on the foundational significance of certain common codes. In this context, CPT’s 
practice of constructing imaginary dialogues between western and non-western texts and 
its attempt to identify a non-western canon while relying on philosophical hermeneutics 
with an aim to achieve a fusion of horizons does not appear to be a good strategy at all. 
This is because philosophical hermeneutics pushes one to understand a single tradition in 
terms of a continuous dialogue. If one wishes to introduce a foreign text into such a 
dialogue, then the text in question must first fulfill the criteria of providing a useful 
answer to the questions which have been raised by some earlier texts in a foreign 
tradition. In terms of east-west dialogue, then, eastern texts selected in this manner for 
inclusion into the western discourse are unlikely to present a nuanced picture of their 
indigenous tradition to a western reader. As a consequence of this, CPT’s objective to 
understand the Others “as they understand themselves” is unlikely to be achieved if there 
is a heavy reliance on philosophical hermeneutics as the method of choice.  
Furthermore, in order to be fair to non-western civilizations, CPT’s quest to 
identify an alternate non-western canon must also be composed of texts that represent a 
continuous non-western tradition in shape of a dialogue consisting of important 
questions and answers which are significant in terms of the subject matter of political 
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theory. In this context, the concern of primary significance in my opinion is not whether 
such a construction is possible or not. Instead it is the very notion that a non-western 
tradition virtually needs to be constructed first. And that, too, mirrors our understanding 
of western civilization. This situation is further complicated when comparativists insist 
that the purpose of comparisons must be a “fusion of horizons” between east and west. 
The problematic part of the scheme here is that the choice of philosophical hermeneutics 
as a method has already pushed us in the direction of texts which are western-like in 
their orientation so that a fusion of horizons is in fact the predetermined outcome of the 
whole enterprise. And non-western texts in such a construction only serve the purpose of 
providing more data to support the answers already believed to be good in the west. As 
the cases discussed in this dissertation show, and as other critics of this approach in CPT 
have also argued, a fusion of horizons is not always the outcome of east-west 
encounters.443  
Yet another significant aspect that becomes evident from the examination of 
actual east-west encounters is that power disparity, while important, is not a major factor 
in determining how different civilizations understand themselves. In fact, as I stated 
earlier, notions of self superiority are maintained, if not strengthened, during a Self-
Other encounter, regardless of the power differential between the parties involved. 
Instead of power, the common factor in inter-civilizational encounters turns out to be the 
initiation of self-reflection. And this self reflection, as we have seen, is often focused on 
maintaining a superior image of the self, regardless of whether one’s own civilization is 
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at an advantage or a disadvantage in terms of power. CPT’s focus on neutralizing the 
west’s advantage in the era of globalization misses what should be the central point of 
theoretical focus during an east-west meeting. The proof of this claim, i.e., initiation of 
self reflection as a result of Self-Other encounters, can best be seen once again in the 
case of the discovery of the New World, where even an encounter with an “Entirely 
Other” raised challenges for European self-understanding.  
Using Haidu’s terminology, then, one could say that the discovery of the other, in 
the cases discussed in this dissertation, challenged not only the answers that the 
European civilization had provided itself, but also the questions which it thought were 
being raised by the very foundational texts themselves. Examples include reassessment 
of Aristotle’s theory of natural slavery by Las Casas and Sepúlveda in the context of the 
reality of the encounter with the Amerindians, Muslim and Christian understanding of 
the Mongols as a punishment from God, and Ricci’s reassessment of the Christian 
doctrine in his quest to find a place for Chinese practices related to Chinese ancestral 
rites by the literati in an attempt to create Chinese Christianity. The same is true of the 
Jesuit mission to Akbar’s court and Rubruck’s journey to the Mongol lands, which, on 
the one hand, informed the west about the nature of Hindu and Buddhist faiths and, on 
the other hand, increased their awareness about the characteristics and size of non-
Christian populations in the east, thus forcing the westerners to reassess their 
civilizational objectives and redefine the scope of their foundational texts. Furthermore, 
and at the very least, these examples force us to entertain the possibility of a strong role 
played by external elements in the development of European self-understanding. 
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The task of CPT, in light of the cases discussed in this dissertation, then, must be 
to identify and include the role played by elements external to a civilization in the 
development of the self-image of any given civilization. This approach also justifies the 
creation of a new subfield in the shape of CPT whose scope is defined by an exclusive 
focus on elements which are generally ignored by traditional political theorists. Focus on 
these ignored systems of ideas, without any bias for their geographical origins or 
historical position, promises to bring in new data for assessing self-images of various 
civilizations. These data would represent multiple civilizational standpoints on issues of 
common interest because of their origin in the instances of inter-civilizational 
interactions. Conceptualizing CPT from this vantage point will allow us to develop a 
more nuanced general understanding of the human condition in any given period and 
perhaps would permit us to propose more viable solutions to the dilemmas faced by us in 
a globalized world particularly.  
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